Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines how the design of incentive contracts for tasks defined as workers' official responsibilities (i.e., standard tasks) influences workers' propensity to engage in employee‐initiated innovation (EII). EII corresponds to innovation activities that are not formally assigned to workers but are nonetheless encouraged and considered to be important for the company's success. Like other extra‐role behaviors, EII is difficult to incentivize directly. Therefore, it is important to understand whether and how explicit incentive contracts designed for the workers' standard tasks may indirectly influence their EII activity. We use field data from a manufacturing company that uses a dedicated information system to track workers' EII idea submissions. We find theory‐consistent evidence that, compared to workers receiving fixed pay, employees rewarded for their standard tasks with variable compensation contracts exhibit a lower propensity to engage in EII. This result is concentrated among ideas benefiting other constituents and activities beyond the proponents' standard task (i.e., broad‐scope ideas). In contrast, we find no difference attributable to standard task incentive design in the proposal of innovation ideas narrowly focused on the proponent's standard task (i.e., narrow‐scope ideas). Our findings suggest that variable pay narrows employees' conceptual focus around the standard task and hinders employee engagement in broad‐scope innovation activities compared to fixed compensation contracts. We contribute to the literature on incentives for innovation by showing that standard task compensation contracts have spillover effects on EII behavior. We also contribute to the nascent literature on EII by showing that innovation types , defined based on their relation with the proponent's standard task, matter. Our results are relevant for practitioners in that managers relying on variable pay contracts to incentivize standard task performance should expect lower employee engagement in broad‐scope EII.

Although information technology (IT) plays an essential role in financial reporting, many companies today lack sufficient human capabilities to utilize IT competently. We examine the association between a firm's access to IT‐capable labor and financial reporting quality (FRQ). We proxy for access to IT‐capable labor using workforce measures in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where the firm operates, including (1) the number of IT‐related college degrees relative to the total active workforce, (2) the level of education of IT graduates, (3) the income level of IT graduates, and (4) a composite measure. We find that firms in MSAs with a higher IT‐competent labor force are associated with fewer financial reporting misstatements and internal control issues. This study contributes to the emerging literature stream examining the influence of geographic labor characteristics on firm‐level outcomes and the research on the impact of IT capability on financial reporting processes. We also inform the current movement of integrating IT knowledge into the education curriculum.

We investigate labor market consequences for CFOs employed by fraud firms, focusing on reputational contagion for those who are not implicated. These individuals provide an opportunity to understand reputational contagion and the nuanced meaning of “guilt” because the labor market may suspect complicity or infer negligence regardless of whether that is truly the case. We compare these CFOs to a matched sample of non‐fraud CFOs and track both turnover and subsequent employment positions. Non‐implicated CFOs are more likely to experience turnover compared to non‐fraud CFOs, driven in particular by the public revelation of fraud to the labor market. We further find that non‐implicated CFOs are more likely to obtain comparable subsequent employment than non‐fraud CFOs before the fraud is publicly revealed, but not after. In supplementary analyses, we find that turnover rates are highest for non‐implicated CFOs who started their employment with the firm before the fraud began as compared to non‐implicated CFOs who started their employment after the fraud began. These results highlight the labor market significance of the public revelation of fraud and imply that the labor market does not fully distinguish between fraud firm association and general firm performance when making executive hiring decisions.

We examine the relation between voluntary disclosure and the value of analysts' research by studying the change in the informativeness of analysts' research after managers stop providing quarterly guidance to investors. We find that the market reaction to analysts' recommendation revisions increases significantly after guidance stoppage, controlling for confounding factors as well as for firm and time fixed effects. The increase in market reaction is greater for firms with more opaque information environments and for firms that previously provided disaggregated guidance. Further, the effect of guidance stoppage on the informativeness of analysts' research reverses after managers resume guidance. Finally, textual analyses of analysts' reports before and after guidance stoppage reveal that analysts issue longer, more frequent, and more detailed reports that convey more forward‐looking information after stoppages. These findings collectively shed light on the relation between the supply of voluntary disclosure and the value that sell‐side analysts add to price discovery in capital markets.

Recent management trends highlight two techniques firms use to motivate employee effort: (1) fostering employees' organizational identification (OI) and (2) offering employees tangible rewards such as gift cards instead of cash rewards. We use three studies to examine how OI affects employees' reward valuation and how such effects differ depending on the reward type. Study 1 is an experiment, demonstrating that increasing OI increases the emphasis participants place on a reward's symbolic value, which then increases the total value of the reward—to a larger extent when the reward is tangible than when it is cash. Study 2 is an experiment, providing evidence that Study 1 results are robust to using a tangible reward that is not socially consumed, that is selected either by the firm or by the employee, and that is either a good or poor fit with the employee's personal preference. Finally, Study 3 is a survey, asking respondents about actual rewards they received from their current employer and capturing their actual OI with their current employer. Results in Study 3 are inferentially similar to those in Study 1 and Study 2, albeit stronger for rewards of smaller monetary value. Collectively, these results highlight the particular benefit of strong OI on how employees value tangible rewards relative to cash rewards, which should be of interest to incentive system designers.

Using a mixed‐methods approach, I investigate how the terms that firms use to label non‐GAAP earnings interact with investors' scrutiny of non‐GAAP reporting to affect investors' information search behavior and investment decisions. This study informs regulators, who have expressed concern over the mislabeling of non‐GAAP measures, and managers, who are often criticized for their misuse of discretion in non‐GAAP reporting. I first provide descriptive evidence on the non‐GAAP labels used in practice, followed by a survey to understand what investors believe these labels convey about earnings quality. Finally, drawing on theory from psychology, I predict and then find in an experiment that investors who are more likely to scrutinize non‐GAAP reporting are not affected by non‐GAAP labels when deciding to seek out the non‐GAAP reconciliation, and react positively to appropriately used labels. However, investors who are less likely to scrutinize non‐GAAP reporting rely on the cue provided by the label when deciding whether to seek out the non‐GAAP reconciliation, and are more likely to be misled by inappropriately used labels. For regulators, these findings validate concerns related to the mislabeling of non‐GAAP measures and suggest increased non‐GAAP scrutiny helps counteract mislabeling. For managers, these findings suggest investors react favorably to the appropriate use of discretion in non‐GAAP reporting.

Enforcement of non‐compete agreements could affect executives' and directors' incentives to profit from their information advantage. This is because excessive trading profits could result in job termination, which would trigger the restrictions imposed by the non‐compete agreements. We find that executives' and directors' insider trading profits from sales are lower for companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements. The path analyses suggest that high enforcement of non‐compete agreements disincentivizes managers to profit from their information advantage to avoid the possibility of job termination and the cost of job terminations. We also find that insiders in companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements are less likely to exploit their information advantage by timing their sales before unfavorable corporate earnings announcements. The results suggest that enforcement of non‐compete agreements reduces executives' and directors' incentives by imposing costs on future outside employment opportunities.

There is concern that rather than critically deliberating specific circumstances, auditors focus on selecting and documenting defensible audit positions. Currently, subordinate auditors perform tasks mindful that they will be accountable for their work both inside (e.g., partners) and outside (e.g., PCAOB) the firm and adopt “implementation intentions” based on previous review experiences to guide their performance. In the context of fraud‐detection planning, we consider an alternative approach in which subordinate auditors work under contingent reward agreements under which they will be compensated for effective fraud‐detection plans. Lacking an anticipated course of action, they invoke a “deliberative mindset” in order to create a task strategy. In an experiment, auditors completed a fraud‐detection planning task under contingent rewards, accountability, or anonymity. We find that auditors operating under contingent rewards used deliberative mindsets. They were better able to identify potential fraud, select more effective procedures, and plan more hours for effective procedures. Auditors under accountability completed the planning task based on implementation intentions. They focused on broadly increasing audit hours across procedures, including allocating significantly more hours to less effective procedures. Mediation analysis shows that improved planning performance resulted from the use of deliberative mindsets and not implementation intentions.

This study examines boardroom connections that form when corporate executives sit on mutual fund boards. These connections have the potential to facilitate information flow that informs fund investment decisions. I find that fund trades in the executive's firm anticipate future earnings news and stock returns during the period that the fund and firm are connected. The evidence is consistent with a broad scope of information being transferred through the connections, implying the potential for these connections to have an economically significant impact. For example, trades in the executive's firm predict returns both inside and outside of the earnings announcement period, and trades in stocks in the same sector as the executive's firm also predict returns. This study highlights the potential for the role of fund directors to extend beyond their formal monitoring responsibilities and act as conduits of information.

I analyze US multinationals' (MNCs) use of foreign holding companies in their organizational structures and the impact of holding companies on internal capital markets. The look‐thru rule in the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (TIPRA) reduces the after‐tax cost of foreign intercompany financing transactions. I use TIPRA as a natural experimental setting to test whether a shift in US tax policy that reduces the cost of moving foreign capital increased firms' reliance on foreign holding company subsidiaries. I find that MNCs responded to TIPRA by creating more foreign holding companies. Furthermore, consistent with the policy objectives of TIPRA, I document that MNCs that rely on holding companies gained tax efficiencies in their post‐TIPRA foreign internal capital markets, reducing domestic taxation on foreign earnings and easing financial constraints. Overall, my results expand our understanding of foreign organizational structure decisions and their internal financing benefits. I contribute to the tax literature by documenting a response to TIPRA that sheds light on the growing complexity of foreign subsidiary ownership structures.