Knowledge that Transforms

Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2016‐01 requires that unrealized gains and losses on equity investments (equity‐URGL) previously recognized in other comprehensive income now be included in net income. Using a sample of public insurers, we examine how this accounting standard change influences managerial investment decisions, with a particular focus on the moderating effects of compensation contracting and financial reporting practices. We find that prior to ASU 2016‐01, equity‐URGL was positively associated with CEO compensation, but this association dissipates in the post‐adoption period, when equity‐URGL is more frequently excluded from CEO performance metrics. Despite purported concerns about increased earnings volatility due to the new reporting requirements, highly affected insurers do not significantly reduce the size or risk of their equity investment portfolios following ASU 2016‐01, particularly when compensation metrics exclude equity‐URGL. We also find that equity‐URGL is more frequently excluded from non‐GAAP earnings post‐adoption, suggesting that managers adjust financial reporting practices as a response to the change. Moreover, highly affected insurers maintain the size and risk of their equity portfolios when equity‐URGL is excluded from non‐GAAP earnings. These findings suggest that managerial responses to ASU 2016‐01 are influenced by a balance between incentive structures and the costs associated with adjusting investment strategies.

Security prices are affected by information strategically disclosed by managers as well as by informed trading of outsiders and vice versa. However, market frictions, such as short‐selling costs and constraints, significantly affect trading in financial markets. In this article, we examine the joint determination of voluntary disclosure, security prices, and short‐selling, and address the following issues: How do major market frictions affect managerial disclosures? How do disclosures influence strategic informed trading in the presence of frictions? What does the interaction of strategic disclosure and informed trading imply for price efficiency? We find that short‐selling (trading) costs have a substantial impact on the equilibrium disclosure policy and its interaction with informed trading and price efficiency. Because of endogenously binding short‐sale constraints, better‐informed traders can either deter or encourage disclosure, thus reconciling mixed available evidence on the relation between short‐sale constraints and managerial disclosure. Furthermore, price efficiency need not improve with managers' information endowment because greater disclosure can endogenously inhibit informed short‐selling in equilibrium. Our analysis also generates novel empirical predictions relevant to the literature on managerial disclosure, shorting, and price efficiency.

In this paper, I conduct three experiments to investigate whether and how relative performance information (RPI) influences employee advice‐seeking and how advice‐seeking, in turn, affects employees' trust in their manager. The first experiment shows that, in a setting where the manager can provide useful advice, RPI increases advice‐seeking frequency, which is marginally positively associated with trust in the manager. The second experiment indicates that RPI increases advice‐seeking frequency when the manager's advice is highly useful, with a marginally significant effect when the advice is of low usefulness. Mediation analyses reveal that RPI alleviates employees' concerns about self‐presentation toward their manager, thereby increasing advice‐seeking frequency, but only when the manager's advice is of high usefulness. The third experiment shows that advice usefulness impacts employees' trust in their manager by influencing their perceptions of managerial competence and benevolence. This paper discusses theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

Professional skepticism is an essential element of a healthy audit. In this study, we present a framework in which the two elements of professional skepticism—skeptical judgment and skeptical action—differ in that skeptical judgment involves paying attention to audit risks, whereas skeptical action often involves overcoming personal risks. This distinction suggests that the optimal conditions for skeptical judgment may differ from the optimal conditions for converting that judgment to skeptical action. Specifically, interventions that promote vigilance will facilitate judgment because they make potential accounting issues salient, but such a focus will also draw attention to potential adverse consequences of taking action. To test this proposition, we conduct two studies in which we align skeptical judgment and skeptical action with two pairs of distinct and contrasting mindsets to operationalize differential vigilance. Our results suggest a duality in skepticism which has important implications for researchers and practitioners designing interventions to improve audit quality.

In contrast to prior research that typically focuses on the characteristics of the audit committee (AC), we investigate how intergroup differences between the AC and the rest of the board (ROB) affect monitoring effectiveness. Drawing on group literature and the similarity attraction paradigm, we hypothesize that high intergroup differences between the AC and the ROB impede communication and information sharing. Poor “fit” between the AC and the ROB can lead to an “us versus them” mentality that reduces trust and hinders knowledge exchange, diminishing monitoring effectiveness. Using a sample of listed US firms, we find that intergroup differences between the AC and the ROB in terms of their respective characteristics are linked to a lower likelihood of reporting an existing or likely material weakness, higher discretionary accruals, and a lower likelihood of a going‐concern opinion among financially distressed firms. These negative effects are most pronounced when the AC and the ROB are very different (i.e., in the upper quartile and decile of the AC‐ROB distance distribution). Additional analyses show a higher probability of a Big R restatement, a lower likelihood of a Big R restatement when a material misstatement likely exists, and a lower likelihood of goodwill impairment when one is expected. Notably, the adverse impact of AC‐ROB dissimilarity is more prominent when the AC is less powerful or lacks group stability. Regulators and companies should be aware that AC composition decisions cannot be made in isolation because large intergroup differences in director profiles between the AC and the ROB reduce monitoring effectiveness.

This paper examines how a low‐skilled, gendered occupational group collectively counters representations of its contribution to organizational performance. We situate this process within the literature on counter accounts—alternative representations designed to rectify perceived harms or injustices. Our study focuses on cashiers, referred to as “checkout hostesses” in their organization's gendered terminology, in the highly masculine building supplies sector. Drawing on a feminist theorization of counter accounts and a 1‐year ethnography at two levels (in a store and in a cashiers' working group), we show that cashiers produce three counter accounts: (1) a vocational qualification that highlights their accounting and selling skills, (2) a reframing of their customer credit activities as a contribution to sales, and (3) a quantification of their selling activity in a dashboard tracking sales at the checkout. These counter accounts challenge patriarchal social structures that frame their job as a low‐status “woman's job,” objectify them, and overshadow their contribution to organizational performance. We advance the concept of counter accounts from the inside, showing that they do not merely denounce oppression but also repurpose stereotypical gender and class norms as resources for collective empowerment. We also emphasize how internal organizational support fosters occupational groups' awareness of their agency. Finally, we argue that the potential and limitations of counter accounts must be assessed from the perspective of the vulnerable group itself, broadening their understanding as emancipatory tools produced for the “other” by the “other.”

The mandatory switch from the incurred loss model to the more forward‐looking current expected credit loss (CECL) model was originally scheduled to begin in 2020. However, when the COVID‐19 pandemic started in early 2020, US regulators made the switch voluntary. Our study investigates how banks' exposure to the pandemic affects their decision to adopt CECL as well as adopting banks' pandemic‐era pattern of loan loss provisions. First, consistent with pandemic‐driven economic uncertainty reducing banks' willingness to adopt the new model, we find a negative association between banks' pandemic exposure and their CECL adoption. This association is more pronounced for banks with more lending opportunities, more lending competition, and worse loan quality. Second, compared with non‐adopters, CECL adopters report more loan loss provisions during the pandemic's early period, and less or even negative loan loss provisions during the late period. The latter scenario reflects a reversal of earlier loan loss reserves and is more pronounced for banks with more exposure to states with a higher level of vaccination, consistent with banks having a more positive economic outlook because of improving pandemic conditions. Overall, our study offers useful insights into the adoption and implementation of accounting standards during periods of economic uncertainty.

This study investigates the association between managerial ability and cost rigidity. Cost rigidity refers to the relative proportion of fixed and variable costs. We expect that high‐ability managers will assess the potential upside congestion and downside default risks and choose an appropriate level of cost rigidity accordingly. Our results show that, on average, high‐ability managers tend to adopt a more rigid cost structure because they are more likely to realize favorable demand, and therefore, they retain higher capacity with more fixed inputs to alleviate potential congestion risk. We further document that firms with high‐ability managers will exhibit a higher (lower) level of cost rigidity when facing higher congestion risk (default risk). Our results are robust to using a propensity score matching method, a CEO turnover subsample, and alternative measures of cost rigidity and managerial ability. Taken together, this study suggests that firms' capacity management choices vary with the level of managerial ability.

Using two experiments, I examine the effects of relative performance information (RPI) on social bonding and subsequent cooperation. In Experiment 1, participants in groups of four first complete a more or less difficult individual math task and then participate in a public goods game. I find that RPI significantly increases contributions in the public goods game when group members exhibit similar performance levels in the individual task and when the task is more difficult. Conceptually, RPI in such a setting fosters social bonds by revealing a common challenge shared by group members. In scenario‐based Experiment 2, with performance level held constant, RPI strengthens social bonds when peers similarly miss a difficult target but not when they similarly surpass an easy target. Additionally, the inclusion of ranking information in RPI negatively impacts social bonding, regardless of target difficulty. While prior research predominantly examines RPI through the lens of social comparison, this study illustrates the conditions under which RPI can also foster social bonds and enhance subsequent cooperation.

Using terrorist attacks and mass shootings as an exogenous source driving psychological changes in managerial sentiment, we explore the causal effect of managerial sentiment on firms' short‐term operating decisions. Employing cost stickiness to measure short‐term operating decisions on resource allocation and cost control, we find that firms located in the attacked metropolitan areas experience a significant decline in the degree of cost stickiness. We further find that the effect is more pronounced for firms that have inexperienced and less confident CEOs, when attack events are more salient, and when managers have lower prior exposure to negative events in their personal experiences. We also explore inventory management as another form of short‐term operating decisions and find that firms exhibit reduced asymmetric inventory management and a lower level of abnormal inventory holdings in postattack periods. Overall, our study suggests that shocks caused by exogenous negative events affect managerial sentiment, which in turn shapes managers' short‐term operating decisions.