Knowledge that Transforms

This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross‐sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political‐economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.

Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.

Foreign workers have been an important part of the labor force in public accounting firms over the past two decades. In this paper, we investigate whether and why foreign workers influence audit quality. We find that audit offices with more newly hired foreign labor have a lower mean absolute value of discretionary accruals and a smaller rate of restatements for their clients. The effect is more pronounced for audit offices that face more resource constraints or require greater foreign expertise. The results of improved audit quality are robust to alternative measures of immigrant intensity and audit quality, alternative samples, and using different ways to address endogeneity concerns. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by showing the impact of foreign labor in the auditing profession and provides public policy implications for the recent H‐1B visa debate.

Recent research on sell‐side analysts emphasizes the centrality of social ties and social interactions to what they do. However, we know little about how analysts create or maintain relationships over both the short and long terms. We remedy that in this qualitative study by illustrating the microlevel processes that analysts engage in as part of developing a network of relations around them. Starting from the premise that economic actions are embedded in social relations and drawing on interviews with analysts, fund managers, and investor relations officers in China, we show how analysts forge both weak and strong social ties to create an infrastructure of social networks that is foundational to information intermediation. This perspective broadens our understanding of sell‐side analysts as social, rather than solely information, intermediaries and highlights how information asymmetries often have a social basis.

We examine the costs associated with public disclosure, as opposed to confidential reporting, of tax country‐by‐country reporting (CbCR) information. Our study addresses a critical knowledge gap, considering the growing adoption of public tax transparency measures. We aim to illuminate this matter by examining the expected costs for firms of making previously confidential CbCR information publicly available. The fact that the information was previously confidentially reported to the tax authorities allows us to assess the cost of publication in isolation. Employing an event study methodology, we provide early evidence on the capital market reaction to this new requirement on a sample of European firms falling within its scope. We document a significantly negative cumulative average abnormal return of EUR 47 billion to 64 billion for up to 3 days following the announcement. Additional cross‐sectional results suggest that concerns about the reputational costs arising from public scrutiny and the proprietary costs from disclosing sensitive business information outweigh the potential benefits of an extended information environment from an investor perspective. Our findings highlight that the public disclosure of tax information imposes significant—and likely unintended—costs from a firm perspective. This aspect should be carefully considered when developing tax transparency measures.

This study examines the relationship between government subsidies and income smoothing using a sample of US‐listed firms. We find that subsidized firms smooth their earnings more aggressively than their unsubsidized peers. This finding is consistent with the reasoning that subsidized firms bear higher political costs and have more incentives to smooth earnings to avoid public attention. In addition, smoothing by subsidized firms is more pronounced when the subsidies are granted through non‐tax‐related channels than through tax‐based channels, and the positive association between government subsidies and income smoothing is stronger for firms under higher public scrutiny and with less transparent information environments. Further analysis shows that smoothing by subsidized firms serves mainly to obfuscate earnings and that subsidized firms that smooth earnings tend to continue receiving subsidies in the future. Overall, our results help explain the role of government subsidies in shaping firms' accounting and disclosure choices.

Recent literature finds that firms led by female CEOs are more likely to be targeted by activist shareholders and that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders' requests. Our study complements this literature by using two controlled experiments and a series of semi‐structured interviews with CEOs and CFOs to investigate how a CEO's response to shareholder activism influences investors' reactions and whether these reactions differ depending on the gender of the CEO or on how their response is explained. In the first experiment, we find that investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a female CEO uses an uncooperative response rather than a cooperative response to shareholder activism, absent any explanation for the CEO's response. Conversely, investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a male CEO uses a cooperative response rather than an uncooperative response. In the second experiment, where there is an added explanation for the CEO response, we find that investors react more positively to a female CEO's uncooperative response when the explanation is more communal (vs. agentic). Our interviews with CEOs and CFOs provide insights into how the gender of firms' leadership may play a role when activist shareholders target firms. Our results collectively suggest that investors rely on gender stereotypes when evaluating the responses of male and female executives to shareholder activism and that these evaluations affect their investment judgments. Our results also suggest a potential alternative explanation for the finding that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders than are male CEOs. Rather than inherent differences in the management styles of male and female CEOs, responses to activist shareholders may be driven, at least in part, by managers anticipating that they will be penalized by investors for deviating from gender‐stereotypical behavior.

Regulators and practitioners have concerns that the lack of standardization in non‐GAAP disclosure can make it challenging for users to process non‐GAAP earnings and use it in decision‐making. We examine whether auditor style extends beyond mandatory disclosures to induce similarity in non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Specifically, we find that clients audited by the same auditor are more likely to disclose non‐GAAP earnings in a similar manner. We assess disclosure similarity using (1) the decision to disclose non‐GAAP earnings, (2) the disclosure prominence of non‐GAAP earnings in the earnings press release, (3) the discussion of non‐GAAP earnings in the management discussion and analysis of the annual report, (4) the choice to exclude recurring items, and (5) the receipt of SEC comment letters related to non‐GAAP earnings. We find that the association between auditor style and non‐GAAP disclosure is determined by Big 4 accounting firms and clients audited by the same audit office. The results are stronger for larger audit offices and smaller clients. We provide evidence that auditors facilitate non‐GAAP disclosure, which can improve compliance with SEC requirements and increase the standardization of non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Our results are relevant to current policy discussions regarding auditor involvement in unaudited non‐GAAP earnings reporting.

This study examines the effect of shareholder scrutiny of corporate tax avoidance behavior and its related financial reporting. Specifically, we explore the factors associated with shareholder tax litigation and its effect on the future tax behavior of the sued firm and its peers. We find that sued firms have lower cash and GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) and engage in extreme tax avoidance before litigation. After litigation, they decrease tax avoidance activities, relative to matched control firms. Peer firms in the same industry as sued firms similarly reduce their level of tax avoidance and the likelihood of extreme tax avoidance after the litigation, relative to control firms. Additional analyses suggest that sued firms change their tax avoidance behavior, rather than merely their tax financial reporting. Finally, the spillover results are strongest for peer firms with the most tax avoidance (i.e., the lowest cash ETRs) when the sued firm's alleged misconduct is revealed.

This paper studies accounting and silence. Building on studies of accounting talk and introducing theories of “silencing,” we highlight the role of accounting silences in the production of engaging organizational conversations. Through a qualitative case study, we identify three forms of silence—the unspeakable, the unsaid, and the inaudible—and their links to accounting. Silences create motivations to engage in further accounting talk, but they also deny certain groups a voice in those conversations. An impression of participation, openness, and transparency emerges despite unequal access and the silencing of certain groups. Accounting itself can be silenced to avoid uncomfortable topics, potential problems, and anxiety‐inducing uncertainties. This silencing may serve to preserve a useful ignorance, avoid being in the know, and build alluring narratives and engaging conversations. Accounting silences sustain such conversations by protecting them from alternative voices, unsettling knowledge, and narratives that are incompatible with the organization's preferred story.