Knowledge that Transforms

This paper extends a familiar model of competition and disclosure to incorporate the practical feature that firms may not only hold private information about consumer demand, but they can also influence demand by the investments they make in improving product quality. Such investments can reflect installing new product features, improving durability, adding design enhancements, and the like. This paper demonstrates that investments stand to significantly influence the firm's preference for disclosures and, in fact, become a determining feature of disclosure choice. In particular, under Cournot competition, a firm prefers disclosure when the industry‐wide effects of information and investments are concordant. That is, if both product quality and demand information have large positive industry spillovers, disclosure is desirable because it promotes implicit cooperation in investments; if both have low spillover, disclosure permits a firm to convey strength to a rival and then use quantity and quality in concert to dominate the market precisely when the firm's demand is at its peak.

Academic research investigating the economic consequences of tax avoidance is almost always interested in the consequences of intentional, deliberate actions undertaken to reduce taxes relative to income. Therefore, it is crucial that such research distinguishes between intentional and incidental tax avoidance, since failure to do so can create endogeneity concerns and lead to incomplete and incorrect economic inferences. In this paper, we first develop a framework that conceptually defines and distinguishes between intentional and incidental tax avoidance. We highlight that the endogeneity problem arises because intentional tax avoidance is not directly observable. We consider two approaches to mitigating endogeneity concerns and apply these approaches by reexamining two influential studies that investigate the economic consequences of tax avoidance. We show how controlling for past accounting losses eliminates the effect of tax avoidance on credit spreads (Hasan et al. 2014, Journal of Financial Economics, 113 (1), 109–130) and how using an instrumental variables approach changes the sign of the relation between tax sheltering and stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2011, Journal of Financial Economics, 100 (3), 639–662). Overall, our paper punctuates the importance of both (1) conceptually distinguishing between incidental and intentional tax avoidance and (2) econometrically addressing the challenges that arise when empirical differentiation between incidental and intentional tax avoidance is important to the research question.

Recent research into the uses of accounting as a technology of government has used Foucault's notion of “counter‐conduct” to shed light on various ways in which the governed can seek to alter the regimes to which they are subjected. This paper unpacks the notion of counter‐conduct further in order to develop a clearer conceptualization of how regimes of government can change over time, with or without clearly identifiable attempts by the governed to influence such changes. We develop our argument based on a longitudinal field study of sustainable waste management practices in a municipality in the English East Midlands. We track the municipality's attempts to become more sustainable in the context of an evolving central government performance management regime that went through a series of legislative and administrative iterations—namely, Best Value, Comprehensive Performance Assessment, and Comprehensive Area Assessment. We conceptualize these iterations of central performance management and the related changes in local government practices and technologies of governing as a series of overlapping “modes of governing” (Bulkeley et al., 2007, Environment and Planning A , 39 (11), 2733–2753). We suggest that accounting research can benefit from the notion of modes of governing because it sheds light on the theoretically expected, but empirically underresearched, copresence of multiple rationales, programs, and technologies of governing, all operating at the same time.

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.

We document strikingly opposite time‐series patterns of analyst forecast errors (FEs) and associated market reactions, illustrating that analyst forecasts have become a less useful benchmark of the market's earnings expectations in recent years. The mean FE has increased from negative one to two cents in the 1990s to positive one to two cents in the 2010s, whereas average earnings announcement returns have declined from 0.30% in the 1990s to −0.30% in the 2010s, turning negative in the past 17 years. Underlying the time‐series pattern of increasing FEs is a secular trend where firms move away from just meeting or beating, to which the market reaction has become increasingly negative, toward a large beat, while the frequency of meeting or beating the consensus analyst forecast remains stable during the same period. We develop a parsimonious predictive model of earnings surprises based on peer and past analysts' FEs and find that our predicted FE closely mirrors reported FE, with the average value hovering around one to two cents in most years of the past two decades. The market reaction to “around zero” unexpected FE (FE minus predicted FE) is indistinguishable from zero over time, suggesting that our model serves as a good benchmark of the market's expectation. Our evidence has broad implications for appropriate earnings benchmarking, for the disappearing discontinuity of the earnings surprise distribution around zero, for earnings management to beat analysts' forecasts, for empirical designs when examining the earnings‐return relation, and for the disappearing earnings announcement premium.

The US Department of Justice's increasing use of deferred prosecution and non‐prosecution agreements (D/NPAs) over the past two decades has sparked debate about their merits compared with traditional plea deals, which often result in criminal convictions. This study examines the factors influencing prosecutors' decisions to use D/NPAs in disciplining firms for corporate misconduct. We analyze whether the likelihood of a firm's future misconduct varies by the type of discipline imposed, comparing the effectiveness of D/NPAs to traditional prosecution. Our findings reveal that prosecutors are more likely to employ D/NPAs with firms when a criminal conviction could cause significant economic harm to stakeholders. However, firms subject to D/NPAs are more likely to commit subsequent violations compared with those entering plea deals. As D/NPAs gain traction in the United States and internationally, our research highlights a trade‐off: while D/NPAs mitigate harm to innocent stakeholders, they are less effective at deterring future misconduct than traditional prosecutions.

This study examines whether better performance on the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) exam is associated with an auditor's career success and whether any relation differs based on gender. Our study adds to prior studies on the career development of auditors by showing that the auditor's performance on the exam predicts success during the auditor's career. Although there is little difference in the average CPA exam scores of male versus female auditors, we document gender differences in the relation between performance on the CPA exam and career success. Male auditors who pass the exam with superior results receive higher annual compensation than those with weaker results. They are also more likely to become partners in Big 4 accounting firms and have larger client portfolios. For female auditors, we find weaker or no association between CPA exam scores and compensation or other indicators of career success. Our path analysis shows that the mechanisms underlying career success work differently for men and women. CPA exam scores of male auditors have a direct effect on compensation and an indirect (mediating) effect through promotion to partner and client portfolio size. However, for female auditors, exam scores have no effect on promotion to partner or client portfolio size, and exam scores have a much smaller effect on compensation. Our findings suggest that CPA exam scores translate into career success for male auditors but not for female auditors.

Evaluating organizational effectiveness is a significant challenge for nonprofit donors making donation allocation decisions. Donations may be misallocated if organizational effectiveness is inadequately assessed, and donors, who are often organizational outsiders, rely on nonprofit disclosures on IRS Form 990 to make such assessments. We examine whether donors value volunteer commitment, as measured by the number of volunteers that nonprofits disclose on Form 990, alongside financial and governance disclosures in assessing organizational effectiveness. Donors and volunteers prefer to make respective gifts of money and time to nonprofits that are effective in furthering their missions. Based on the premise that volunteers, as organizational insiders, are better positioned than donors to judge the impact of their contributions, we hypothesize that volunteer commitment provides value‐relevant information to donors for use in assessing imprecise effectiveness signals—namely, the program ratio and corporate governance disclosures. Consistent with this, we find that the value relevance of the program ratio and corporate governance disclosures to donors is increasing with the level of volunteer commitment. These results suggest that donors view volunteer commitment as a signal of effectiveness, useful in interpreting other signals of effectiveness. The evidence is more pronounced among nonprofits that report more credible volunteer disclosures, have a larger proportion of sophisticated donors, and are more complex. These findings have implications for regulators considering nonprofit disclosure policies, as well as nonprofit managers and directors engaging volunteers.

The IASB asserts that global stakeholder participation in the standard‐setting process is critical for developing and maintaining high‐quality accounting standards. However, the myriad languages used in countries that apply IFRS may impede this participation. We find that the IASB is less likely to receive comment letters from stakeholders in countries with languages that are linguistically distant from English. We also find that comment letters from more linguistically distant stakeholders are less likely to be quoted in IASB staff‐prepared comment letter summaries, suggesting that they have less influence in the redeliberation process. Path analyses show that this result arises from language frictions being associated with reduced writing quality and originality. We also find that language frictions prevent participation in other standard‐setting communication channels. Collectively, language frictions appear to impede the IASB's efforts to equitably obtain and consider valuable global feedback.

This study examines whether PCAOB inspection reports are useful for signaling the risk of misstatements in future periods and the extent to which different types of audit deficiencies predict future misstatements. We find that, after the inspection report is issued, PCAOB‐identified audit deficiencies are positively associated with future misstatements for the audit firm's entire client portfolio. When we examine different types of deficiencies, we find that an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies is the most detrimental type of deficiency for future reporting quality. We also examine the deficiency types for Big 4 versus non–Big 4 firms separately. The results show that an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies is the only deficiency type that is positively associated with future misstatements for Big 4 firms. For non–Big 4 firms, however, future misstatements are predicted by an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies, inadequate substantive testing, and inadequate going‐concern assessments. Our study has important implications given the concerns raised by auditors regarding the usefulness of PCAOB inspections.