The provision of more frequent feedback to employees is increasing, although prior research has found mixed results as to the effect of increased feedback frequency on employee performance. Narcissism research identifies narcissistic oversensitivity as a key narcissistic subdimension that may result in particularly strong responses to performance feedback. We predict and find in an experiment that increased performance feedback frequency has a more negative impact on the performance accuracy of individuals with higher levels of narcissistic oversensitivity and that this negative interactive effect of feedback frequency and narcissistic oversensitivity is mitigated by the priming of a growth mindset. These results should be of practical interest to firms as they design their management control systems to improve employee performance, considering the variation in narcissistic oversensitivity among their employees. These results also contribute to recent accounting research on the effects of feedback frequency and employee mindsets.

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.