The study examines how the risk of exhausting corporate tax liabilities before deducting interest expense affects corporate leverage. It differs from prior studies in three ways: (1) it uses data compiled by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from corporate tax returns rather than accounting data; (2) it measures risk of tax exhaustion more accurately; and (3) it adopts a first‐difference time‐series approach, so that firms act as their own control between adjacent years. These methodological innovations reduce biases caused by measurement error and omitted variables that were present in prior research. The results suggest that, all else being equal, high risk of tax exhaustion reduces firms' use of leverage. As well, the study provides the first evidence that personal taxes significantly affect corporate leverage. The effects on leverage decisions of other variables are also tested and the results are consistent with predictions from prior theoretical work.

We examine the impact of auditing on public school operations with two objectives: to investigate whether audits provide economic benefits to stakeholders, and how complex compliance rules impact auditing effectiveness. Utilizing auditing time data and a unique opportunity presented by the Quality Basic Education Act in Georgia, we estimate the relative performance of school district operations employing a stochastic frontier estimation technique. We find that auditing produces real economic benefits for stakeholders by mitigating inefficiency in the use of school resources. We also find that stringent compliance rules reduce an audit’s effectiveness but auditors’ experience can help to overcome the problems. The lack of disclosure of auditing costs hinders the ability to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of new requirements. Our analysis supports the notion that auditing is vital to establish governance mechanisms and disclosure of auditing costs is important to adequately evaluate a new policy.

Discretionary income smoothing has been argued to increase bank opacity and degrade financial system stability by making banks more difficult to monitor. However, no direct empirical association between discretionary smoothing and opacity has been established to date. We argue that smoothing could reflect either the opportunistic exercise of discretion that disconnects loan loss provisions (LLPs) from changes in underlying credit quality, consistent with smoothing increasing opacity, or an informative exercise of discretion to communicate forward‐looking information about loan losses. We examine the association between discretionary smoothing and the informativeness of LLPs for a sample of banks from 1994 to 2019 and find that discretionary smoothing is, on average, associated with more informative LLPs. However, this association is nuanced, with cross‐sectional differences and changes over time. We find evidence that an intervention by the SEC into bank LLP practices in the late 1990s curbed opportunistic smoothing via provisioning for homogeneous loans. Subsequently, smoothing is associated with more informative provisions, including for banks with both more homogeneous and more heterogeneous loan portfolios. Our findings are inconsistent with the notion that smoothing may be associated with greater opacity.

This is an accepted manuscript published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research.

This study uses an experiment to examine three alternative theoretical explanations for the unintended effects of preannouncements on investor reactions to earnings news. The theoretical explanations are cue consistency, recency effects, and diminishing marginal reactions. The experiment varies the amount of a management preannouncement at five different levels while holding constant consensus analyst expectations prior to the preannouncement and the subsequent earnings announcement. Participants provide preliminary forecasts of current‐ and next‐period earnings per share (EPS) prior to the preannouncement, after the preannouncement, and after the earnings announcement. The pattern of participants' final next‐year EPS forecasts and the results of follow‐up analyses appear most consistent with the predictions of diminishing marginal reactions and, to a somewhat lesser extent, cue consistency, suggesting that both mechanisms play a role in determining the effects of preannouncements. There is little evidence supporting recency effects. Finally, supplemental evidence indicates that participants are unaware that preannouncements influence their reactions to earnings news, suggesting that the effects are unintended. This study has implications for managers who make preannouncement disclosure decisions and for academics who wish to understand and interpret prior research on earnings preannouncements.

We examine the effect of litigation risk on managers' decision to issue earnings forecasts. We use a new ex ante measure of litigation risk, namely, the Directors and Officers liability insurance premium. This choice bypasses significant problems associated with the estimation of ex ante litigation risk in prior studies. By using this measure of litigation risk, our results are more intuitively appealing. We find that when faced with ex ante litigation risk, managers with bad news are more likely to issue an earnings warning. For good news firms, we do not see this effect. We also examine three forecast characteristics: forecast horizon, extent of news revealed and forecast precision. Firms with higher litigation risk tend to issue earnings forecasts earlier if they have bad news but not so when they have good news. They also reveal less news in the forecasts if they have good news. As litigation risk increases, bad news earnings forecasts become more precise. Good news earnings forecasts, however, tend to become less precise relative to bad news forecasts. This differential effect of litigation risk on management earnings forecasts, based on the direction of news, has not been documented by previous studies.

A company officer is an "alumnus" if he previously worked for an audit firm. Iyer, Bamber, and Barefield (1997) find that alumni have ties with their former audit firms and alumni are more inclined to provide economic benefits to former firms if they have stronger ties. If the alumnus is a senior corporate officer, the alumnus may benefit his former firm by recommending that the company appoint the firm as its auditor. However, the company's audit committee may be concerned that officer-auditor ties threaten audit quality. Therefore, an independent audit committee may not sanction the appointment of the officer's former firm. This study investigates (a) whether companies tend to appoint officers' former audit firms, and (b) whether independent audit committees mitigate this tendency. We document that companies appoint officers' former firms more often than they appoint alternative audit firms. However, companies are less likely to appoint officers' former firms if audit committees are more independent. This suggests that independent audit committees strengthen audit quality by deterring affiliations between audit firms and officers. © CAAA.

We examine the role of cash flow from operations (CFO) in chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation. We predict that CFO is contract‐relevant in the presence of earnings, and more so when (1) the quality of earnings relative to the quality of CFO as a measure of performance is low and (2) the need for CFO as a financing source is high. Our analysis is motivated principally by normative arguments and anecdotes from financial disclosures linking CFO to managerial effort and contracts, notwithstanding the traditional role of earnings in performance measurement. We find that the weight of CFO in the compensation model is positive and significant in the presence of earnings and stock returns. We also find that the relative quality of CFO compared with that of earnings has a positive (negative) impact on the weight of CFO (earnings). We further find that the relative weight of CFO is enhanced substantially when enterprise activities crucially depend on internally generated cash flow. These findings are unaltered when we include CEO age, firm size, and risk in the model and allow the coefficients to vary across industries.

Using data from Ontario hospitals, we investigate the conjecture that the stickiness of costs would be greater for functions that relate to an organization's core competency. We find operating costs for the hospital as a whole are sticky. Moreover, we find higher stickiness in costs pertaining to patient care relative to costs in other functions. Indeed, there is no evidence of stickiness in the operating costs of support departments that are peripherally related to the hospital's mission.

We examine the application of real options within two contexts of motion picture investment decisions by studio executives. The first is whether to continue marketing a film following its initial release in theaters (an abandonment option). The second centers on the decision to produce a sequel to an original film (a growth option). Few accounting studies have examined the use of real options but they are of considerable importance to companies managing risk through their cost structure and capital investment decisions. Specifically, a real option allows decision makers to postpone further expenditure commitment until a substantial portion of the uncertainty surrounding the investment has been resolved. Our evidence from the motion picture industry indicates that studios leave a portion of their marketing budget uncommitted until its spending is warranted. We also show that studios invest more in original films that they believe will lead to a sequel. Specifically, we find that studios spend higher production and marketing costs on films with sequels than those without, and that sequels generate higher returns on investment than non-sequels. Overall, our results suggest that the real options framework has applications for accounting research and practice by providing a basis for studying and understanding cost commitments in product or project-based settings.