Corporate governance mechanisms designed to alleviate manager‐shareholder agency conflicts can worsen shareholder‐bondholder conflicts. This study examines how one such corporate governance mechanism, monitoring by large outside shareholders, influences the choice between public and private debt. I conjecture and find that firms with higher outside blockholdings are inclined to choose bank loans over public debt when they borrow, consistent with the notion that banks are better monitors than public debt markets. I also find that bank loans carry less price protection than corporate bonds against increased agency risk associated with outside blocks. Corroborating the monitoring story, I document that bank loans contain more accounting‐based covenants and dividend restriction provisions for firms with higher outside blockholdings than for those with lower blockholdings. I find no such relation for public debt covenants. This supports that banks' monitoring of their loans counters the agency risk caused by blockholders. This study extends prior research that associates governance mechanisms with agency costs of debt, by incorporating lenders' differential monitoring mechanisms in the overall corporate governance system.

We investigate how private information and monitoring affect the role of accounting quality in reducing the investment-cash flow sensitivity. We argue that access to private information and direct restrictions on investments are likely to affect the extent to which accounting quality reduces financing constraints. Our results suggest that for financially constrained firms, banks' access to private information decreases the value of accounting quality. We further find that, for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, covenants directly restricting capital expenditures also mitigate the importance of accounting quality. Our results suggest that when information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest, accounting quality is most important. However, the importance of accounting quality is mitigated if outside capital suppliers have access to private information and is eliminated if they impose contractual restrictions on investment. We also provide evidence that banks' access to private information reduces the cash flow sensitivity of cash and mitigates the importance of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity. This additional evidence suggests that our investment-cash flow sensitivity results are not driven by measurement error of the investment opportunity set.

We investigate how private information and monitoring affect the role of accounting quality in reducing the investment–cash flow sensitivity. We argue that access to private information and direct restrictions on investments are likely to affect the extent to which accounting quality reduces financing constraints. Our results suggest that, for financially constrained firms, banks’ access to private information decreases the value of accounting quality. We further find that, for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, covenants directly restricting capital expenditures also mitigate the importance of accounting quality. Our results suggest that, when information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest, accounting quality is most important. However, the importance of accounting quality is mitigated if outside capital suppliers have access to private information and is eliminated if they impose contractual restrictions on investment. We also provide evidence that banks’ access to private information reduces the cash flow sensitivity of cash and mitigates the importance of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity. This additional evidence suggests that our investment–cash flow sensitivity results are not driven by measurement error of the investment opportunity set.

We examine whether bank connections via common mutual fund ownership serve as a contagion channel affecting the systemic risk of the banking system. Examining this relation is important because common mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over the past 20 years, and a buildup of systemic risk was at the heart of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. We predict and document that the extent of a bank's connection with other banks via common ownership increases its contribution to systemic risk. We further predict and find that this association is primarily driven by passive mutual funds. We provide evidence that common passive ownership results in higher systemic risk through two mechanisms: nondiscretionary sell‐offs of bank stocks and a common pattern of voting. Our results are also robust to two alternate instrumental variable analyses. This study contributes to the literature by documenting an unintended, macro‐level consequence of common mutual fund ownership. Our findings broaden the understanding of common ownership as one mechanism through which systemic risk materializes and should be particularly relevant for regulators who seek to prevent future systemic failures.