Knowledge that Transforms

We conduct a field survey to investigate whether current mid-level and future entry-level managers (collectively managers) subjectively value stock options and restricted stock consistent with economic theory. We find that managers, on average, subjectively value stock options at greater than their Black-Scholes value and greater than fair-value equivalent restricted stock. This result contrasts with conventional economic wisdom that risk-averse employees discount the Black-Scholes value of an option. With respect to stock options, our results also reveal that managers, on average, have a lottery ticket mentality when subjectively valuing options, they value shorter vesting periods, and they value longer terms to maturity. With respect to stock options and restricted stock, we find that managers tend to extrapolate recently rising stock price trends to arrive at their subjective values. Overall, our results suggest that in some cases standard economic theory does not accurately reflect how managers appear to subjectively value stock options and restricted stock.

Bayesian theory predicts an increase in market participants' reliance on reported current earnings to revise their expectations of future earnings when the uncertainty in future earnings is higher. Prior studies focus on price reactions and find negative associations between measures of earnings uncertainty and investors' reliance on reported current earnings. This study examines analysts' forecast revisions (of future earnings) around the announcements of current period earnings and finds positive associations between measures of earnings uncertainty and analysts' reliance on reported current earnings. The findings suggest that uncertainty measures and discount rates are correlated, and cross-sectional differences in the discount rate taint the interpretation of price reactions as evidence of expectation revisions under uncertainty. This study sheds additional light on the complex relationships among earnings uncertainty measures, price reactions to earnings surprise, and cost of capital.

We examine the relation between auditor tenure and a firm's ability to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts. We find evidence over the period 1988-2006 that firms with both short and long tenure are more likely to report levels of discretionary accruals that allow them to meet or beat earnings forecasts. These results suggest that while regulatory mandates for periodic auditor turnover have negative effects, sustained long-term auditor-client relationships may also be detrimental to audit quality. Further, although we observe a positive relation between tenure and the use of discretionary accruals to meet or beat earnings in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period, we do not observe such a relation in the post-SOX period. This latter finding is consistent with regulatory reforms and heightened scrutiny of financial reporting in the post-SOX period resulting in less aggressive efforts at managing earnings by client firms and/or increased diligence on the part of auditors. These findings may not generalize to firms that are not covered by analysts, because these firms do not face the same public pressure to manage earnings in order to meet or beat expectations. © CAAA.

This paper investigates whether client importance affects auditor independence within the local offices of audit firms. Client importance is measured as the proportion of audit fees, non-audit service fees, or total fees that a distressed, public client contributes to the total public-client revenue earned by the individual audit offices. Auditor independence is measured as the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern opinion. The paper focuses on changes in the relation between fee ratios and auditor reporting decisions from the pre-SOX (2001) to post-SOX (2003) period. In the pre-SOX period, I do not find statistically significant association between any of the fee ratios and the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern opinion. However, in the post-SOX period, I find evidence that higher audit fee and total fee ratios are positively associated with the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern opinion. That is, post-SOX, relatively more important clients are more likely to receive a going concern opinion. These results allay concerns that auditor independence is compromised for significant clients.

Prior research reports seemingly conflicting evidence and interpretations concerning the relation between dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts and stock returns. Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004) find a negative relation between levels of dispersion in analysts' forecasts and future stock returns. Yet, changes in forecast dispersion are negatively associated with contemporaneous stock returns (L'Her and Suret 1996). We demonstrate that levels and changes in dispersion reflect different theoretical constructs. Changes in dispersion primarily reflect changes in information asymmetry whereas levels of dispersion primarily reflect levels of uncertainty. Further, the uncertainty component of dispersion levels reflects idiosyncratic risk that is negatively associated with future stock returns. These findings provide support for Johnson's (2004) explanation that dispersion levels reflect idiosyncratic uncertainty that increases the option value of the firm and generally refute Diether et al.'s (2002) explanation that dispersion levels reflect information asymmetry. In addition, we reconcile L'Her and Suret's (1996) findings with the findings of Johnson (2004). We find that the negative association between changes in dispersion and contemporaneous stock returns is not due to increased uncertainty but rather increased information asymmetry.

Impact of the type of audit team discussions on auditors' generation of material frauds

This study examines discretionary accruals imbedded in quarterly earnings announcements that precede executive stock option grants. Prior research indicates that managers attempt to increase the value of their option pay (by depressing the option's exercise price) through a variety of strategies including timing voluntary disclosures, influencing option grant dates, or managing accruals. This study extends the research by jointly examining managerial incentives and opportunities to pursue an accruals-based strategy. We find evidence that discretionary accruals are lower when option pay is high and when concurrent firm performance is poor (incentive factors), but only when firms issue grants following earnings announcements relatively infrequently (opportunity factor). For firms that follow a predictable grant schedule, managers behave as if they believe that investors will discount earnings-based signals preceding the grant. Our results suggest that the decision to pursue an option-related strategy is influenced by economic tradeoffs. From a policy perspective, our results have relevance for the ongoing debate over option compensation practices, appropriate disclosure to investors, and the quality of corporate earnings.

This study examines whether the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board of directors is associated with firms' timeliness in the remediation of material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control. The sample comprises accelerated filers that disclosed at least one MW from July 2003 to December 2004 under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Using logistic regression analyses, I find that firms with larger audit committees, audit committees with greater nonaccounting financial expertise, and more independent boards are more likely to remediate MWs in a timely manner. These results suggest that the audit committee and the board play an important role in monitoring the remediation of MWs. Overall, the study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board under the SOX regime. The study also identifies important determinants of firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs, which is key to improving financial reporting quality and restoring investor confidence.