Knowledge that Transforms

Les auteurs se demandent si le fait pour les directions d’entreprises de présenter des éléments exceptionnels dans les états financiers reflète la performance économique ou révèle l’opportunisme. Ils comparent plus précisément les éléments exceptionnels présentés sous la forme d’un poste distinct de l’état des résultats (présentation en résultats) à ceux qui sont intégrés à un autre poste et présentés uniquement dans les notes complémentaires (présentation par voie de notes). L’étude est motivée par l’intérêt des normalisateurs pour l’information relative à la performance et la présentation des états financiers, ainsi que par les études antérieures relatives aux choix du mode de présentation par les directions d’entreprises, dans d’autres contextes. Les résultats empiriques révèlent que les éléments exceptionnels qui sont présentés en résultats sont moins persistants que ceux qui sont présentés par voie de notes. Ces observations demeurent les mêmes, peu importe les différentes spécifications adoptées. Dans l’ensemble, les constatations des auteurs confirment que les directions d’entreprises qui préfèrent la présentation en résultats à la présentation par voie de notes ont pour but d’aider les utilisateurs à repérer les éléments exceptionnels les plus susceptibles d’être différents des autres éléments des résultats, c’est‐à‐dire que leurs motifs sont plus informationnels qu’opportunistes.

Many firms that use multiple lead measures in their performance measurement systems do not validate the causal model linking these measures to future financial outcomes, and the cause‐and‐effect relationships in the model are often left to subjective estimates that may be prone to errors. Using an experiment, this study examines how the accuracy of assumptions about the relative importance of lead measures in a causal model affects managerial performance and knowledge, when managers are given the opportunity to learn over multiple periods. The results show that having inaccurate relative weights on lead measures improves performance, reduces performance variability, and enhances knowledge, relative to not having any weights. Furthermore, performance is similar under accurate versus inaccurate relative weights, whereas knowledge is better under inaccurate than accurate relative weights, providing no support for the biasing effects of inaccurate relative weights. The findings suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, managers benefit even if they are given inaccurate relative weights on lead measures, and they are able to correct those inaccuracies to reach a comparable level of performance and knowledge as if they had been given accurate relative weights.

The purpose of this paper is to advance research in internal audit (IA) evaluation by developing an IA assessment model that considers interrelationships among specific factors used by external auditors to evaluate the strength of the IA function. The model is based on three factors identified by auditing standards and by prior academic research: Competence, Work Performance, and Objectivity. We develop an analytical expression of the model using the belief function framework in order to overcome limitations of prior research. Our results reveal that modeling the “And” relationship is essential for assessing the strength of the IA function. As far as interrelationships are concerned, the analysis shows that, when the three factors have a strong or a perfect relationship, the strength of the IA function remains high even if there is positive or negative evidence about one of the factors. This result holds as long as there are high levels of belief about the other two factors. Further, we demonstrate how the quality of corporate governance affects the evaluation of the IA function and how a cost–benefit analysis can be applied to this framework to help determine the amount of external audit work needed to comply with standards. Our analysis reveals that the extent of external audit work to be carried out by the external auditor depends on the strength of the IA function and the amount of litigation and regulatory costs likely to be faced by the external auditor.

This paper examines the effect of the inherent demand implied by short interest by studying how stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend on the level of short interest. We find that, for extreme good and bad news events, the inherent demand increases stock prices around the earnings announcement date, with the effect being stronger for good news relative to bad news. Specifically, the initial market reaction to an extreme positive earnings surprise is larger for firms with high levels of short interest. On the other hand, for an extreme negative earnings surprise event, the initial market reaction is less negative for heavily shorted firms. Furthermore, we find that the post‐earnings‐announcement drift is smaller (larger) in magnitude for extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises for the heavily shorted firms.

We investigate how private information and monitoring affect the role of accounting quality in reducing the investment-cash flow sensitivity. We argue that access to private information and direct restrictions on investments are likely to affect the extent to which accounting quality reduces financing constraints. Our results suggest that for financially constrained firms, banks' access to private information decreases the value of accounting quality. We further find that, for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, covenants directly restricting capital expenditures also mitigate the importance of accounting quality. Our results suggest that when information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest, accounting quality is most important. However, the importance of accounting quality is mitigated if outside capital suppliers have access to private information and is eliminated if they impose contractual restrictions on investment. We also provide evidence that banks' access to private information reduces the cash flow sensitivity of cash and mitigates the importance of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity. This additional evidence suggests that our investment-cash flow sensitivity results are not driven by measurement error of the investment opportunity set.

Analytical Procedures (APs) provide a means for auditors to evaluate the “reasonableness” of financial disclosures by comparing a client’s reported performance to expectations gained through knowledge of the client based on past experience and developments within the company and its industry. Thus, APs are fundamentally different than other audit tests in taking a broader perspective of an entity’s performance vis‐à‐vis its environment. As such, APs have been found to be a cost‐effective means to detect misstatements, and many have argued that a number of prior financial frauds would have been detected had auditors employed effective APs. With several dramatic and far‐reaching developments over the past decade, the current study examines whether and how APs have changed during this period. In particular, we focus on the impact of significant “enablers” and “drivers” of change such as technological advancements and the enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act. We also compare our findings to an influential study of the practices of APs by Hirst and Koonce (1996) that was conducted over 10 years ago. We interview 36 auditors (11 seniors, 13 managers, and 12 partners) from all of the Big 4 firms using a structured questionnaire. The data reveal some similarities in findings when compared to prior research (e.g., auditors continue to use fairly simple analytical procedures). However, there are a number of significant differences reflecting changes in AP practices. For instance, as a result of technology auditors now rely more extensively on industry and analyst data than previously. Further, auditors report that they develop more precise quantitative expectations and use more non‐financial information. They also appear to rely more on lower level audit staff to perform APs, conduct greater inquiry of non‐accounting personnel, and are willing to reduce substantive testing to a greater extent as a result of APs conducted in the planning phase. Finally, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act has had an impact in greater consideration and knowledge of internal controls, which is seen as the most important factor driving the use and reliance on APs.

In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing managerial short-termism and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance¿decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability¿is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long-term investment once managers free themselves from investors' myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward-looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.

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Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for managements track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.