Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the structure of communications in accounting research by analyzing patterns of citations among authors who have published in five major journals between 1984 and 2008. Understanding communication structures is important because they shape academic knowledge creation, which prominent scholars have claimed has become narrowly focused and self-perpetuating in accounting due to a specific type of communication structure - 'tribalism.' We use a mathematical algorithm and other analyses to distinguish among five types of communication structures. We find that the field contains multiple clusters, with some clusters being centered on research topics alone, a finding consistent with a 'normal academic field.' Remaining clusters are more narrowly based – on combinations of topics, methods and theory bases – and all but one of them represent a “small world” structure because they are close together and exhibit frequent communication. Both normal academic fields and small worlds have been shown to contribute positively to innovation in research. The economics-based archival financial accounting cluster exhibits some properties of a tribal structure because, while researchers in other clusters communicate toward this cluster, the cluster sends most of its outbound communication to itself. A contribution of our study is that it shows that tribalism is not as rampant as previously suggested. Also, our findings suggest the field has become less tribal over time. Further, we identify 'hub' researchers who attract communications from multiple clusters and whose articles build on, and cite, work from multiple clusters. These individuals are instrumental in moving fields away from tribalism. Finally, we discuss possible determinants and consequences of the existing communication structure.

This paper examines the accuracy and optimism of forecasts made by affiliated analysts compared to those made by independent analysts. Using Korean chaebol firms, we test the information-sharing hypothesis and the conflict of interest hypothesis. Our results show that the forecasts made by the affiliated analysts are less accurate and more optimistic than those made by the independent analysts. This finding is inconsistent with the information-sharing hypothesis but supports the conflict of interest hypothesis. The results also indicate that the forecast accuracy of affiliated analysts is not related to the internal sales transaction ratio or the idiosyncratic information of the group firms. We also find that the forecast accuracy of affiliated analysts increased after Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect in 2002 in Korea, which finding is in disagreement with the information-sharing hypothesis. Our results reveal that the forecast inaccuracy and optimistic bias of the affiliated analysts are not directly related to the individual ownership relationship of the affiliated group firms with the forecasting firm. Our results provide further evidence of analysts' conflict of interest that arises from earnings-related intragroup propping behavior.