Knowledge that Transforms

This study investigates the time‐series trend and determinants of matching between revenues and expenses in a sample of 42 countries. We find that the decline in matching documented by Dichev and Tang ( ) is not unique to the United States, but is a worldwide phenomenon. Our results show that matching is weaker in countries with (i) wider use of accrual accounting; (ii) a larger proportion of firms reporting significant special items; (iii) slower economic growth; (iv) more research and development activities; (v) larger service sectors; and (vi) stronger investor protection. We find no evidence that mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards affects matching. Changes in accounting and economic factors collectively explain the downward trend in matching. Overall, the results suggest that both accounting and economic factors are important determinants of matching over time and across countries.

We examine the importance of Big Four audits in reducing agency costs evident in corporate debt maturity worldwide. Analyzing a large sample of public firms from 42 countries reveals that the fraction of long‐term debt in firms' capital structures rises with the presence of a Big Four auditor, suggesting that higher‐quality audits substitute for short‐term debt for monitoring purposes. In additional analyses, we find that the role that auditor choice plays in debt maturity is concentrated in firms from countries with strong legal institutions governing property rights and creditor rights. Collectively, our research implies that Big Four audits matter to corporate debt maturity, although the impact is isolated in firms operating in countries with more protective legal regimes.

While the debt‐contracting literature has extensively examined financial covenants, there has been little attention paid to audit‐related covenants. We focus on a covenant that restricts the borrower from receiving a going‐concern audit report ( GCAR covenant). We hypothesize that a debt agreement is more likely to include a GCAR covenant as the borrower's credit quality decreases and the length of the loan period increases, and that it is more likely to impose a covenant restricting the choice of auditor when the debt includes a GCAR covenant. Also, we expect that an audit client with a GCAR covenant will be charged a higher audit fee and is more likely to receive a going‐concern audit report. We test these hypotheses on a sample of firms that issue private debt. Our results generally support our hypotheses. Our study suggests that lenders rely on the auditor's assessment in contracting, and audit‐related covenants influence auditor behavior.

It is widely held that better financial reporting makes investors more confident in their predictions of future cash flows and reduces their required risk premia. The logic is that more information leads necessarily to more certainty, and hence lower subjective estimates of firm “beta” or covariance with other firms. This is misleading on both counts. Bayesian logic shows that the best available information can often leave decision makers less certain about future events. And for those cases where information indeed brings great certainty, conventional mean‐variance asset‐pricing models imply that more certain estimates of future cash payoffs can sometimes bring a higher cost of capital. This occurs when new or better information leads to sufficiently reduced expected firm payoffs. To properly understand the effect of signal quality on the cost of capital, it is essential to think of what that information says, rather than considering merely its “precision,” or how strongly it says what it says.

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.

This study examines the relationship between institutional pressures to provide social benefits and the discretionary accrual behavior of nonprofit firms. I examine this issue within the context of U.S. nonprofit hospitals, an economically significant and politically rich setting where firms face considerable institutional pressure to provide an important social benefit: charity care. I argue that institutional pressures on nonprofits to provide higher levels of social benefits imply that lower profits should be reported. I develop theory and provide evidence which suggests that, due to competing private incentives to report higher profits, nonprofit managers strategically use discretionary accruals to increase accounting earnings when the social benefits their firms have provided in the current period exceed external stakeholders' normative expectations. The findings from this study inform the ongoing political debate regarding the appropriateness of tax exemptions for U.S. nonprofit hospitals and should therefore be of interest to both regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides timely insights for researchers regarding how institutional pressures can affect managers' reporting behaviors in other settings where similar competing reporting incentives exist between managers' private benefits and stakeholder expectations related to social benefits.

This study investigates whether differences in accounting standards across countries create information costs that inhibit firms from investing in foreign markets. Using the frequency and dollar magnitude of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from 32 countries over the period 1998–2004, we find that the aggregate volume of M&A activity across country pairs is larger for pairs of countries with similar Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ( GAAP ), and that this increased volume of M&A activity is driven by target countries that also have strong enforcement. We also find that the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standard ( IFRS ) attracted more cross‐border M&As among IFRS ‐adopting countries, and that this increase in M&A activity within the IFRS countries is more pronounced for country pairs with low similarity in GAAP in the pre‐ IFRS adoption period. Overall, our results highlight the role of accounting standards and enforcement in shaping cross‐border M&A activity.

Academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that incentive systems often provide short‐term payouts without regard for long‐term consequences. New detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether boards adjust performance‐based pay for uncertainty. We find managers’ bonus payouts are positively associated with tax performance; however, bonus payouts are lower when measures of ex ante tax uncertainty are higher. Our results are robust to tests of alternative explanations including financial reporting aggressiveness, overall firm risk, and other forms of compensation. Further, we document that the relation between bonus compensation and tax performance has changed in the post‐ FIN No. 48 period. Specifically, we identify a significant association between bonus payout and GAAP ETR only in the pre‐ FIN No. 48 period and a significant association between bonus payout and cash ETR only in the post‐ FIN No. 48 period, suggesting that the relation between compensation and tax avoidance should be examined carefully with particular attention to the post‐ FIN No. 48 period.

Asset growth has been shown to be negatively associated with future returns. Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) argue that an aggregation of all asset growth components as total asset ( TA ) growth leads to the strongest association with future negative returns. Based on their study, the literature now employs TA growth as an umbrella proxy for “the growth effect.” I hypothesize that not all types of growth imply negative future returns. Specifically, I show that growth financed by suppliers is positively associated with future performance and returns. Removing this growth component from TA growth makes it evident that the TA growth anomaly is simply a noisy manifestation of the net operating asset growth anomaly. Consequently, I suggest caution when using TA growth to control for the growth effect.