We demonstrate analytically and empirically that valuing a firm with foreign operations in the presence of exchange rate uncertainty requires information on the foreign operating cash flows disaggregated by currency and persistence. In particular, given consolidated earnings, investors need information on the exchange gain or loss on permanent foreign operating cash flows. We extend the model to show how the permanent foreign cash flows can be used to condition the change in the translation adjustment to make it value‐relevant; however, using the permanent foreign cash flows directly is superior for valuation purposes. The empirical tests support our hypothesis that the market response to exchange rate movements is sensitive to the relative magnitudes of revenues and costs denominated in each foreign currency in which a firm has transactions. Disclosure of cash flows by currency should enhance the valuation of firms with foreign operations.

Recent literature finds that firms led by female CEOs are more likely to be targeted by activist shareholders and that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders' requests. Our study complements this literature by using two controlled experiments and a series of semi‐structured interviews with CEOs and CFOs to investigate how a CEO's response to shareholder activism influences investors' reactions and whether these reactions differ depending on the gender of the CEO or on how their response is explained. In the first experiment, we find that investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a female CEO uses an uncooperative response rather than a cooperative response to shareholder activism, absent any explanation for the CEO's response. Conversely, investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a male CEO uses a cooperative response rather than an uncooperative response. In the second experiment, where there is an added explanation for the CEO response, we find that investors react more positively to a female CEO's uncooperative response when the explanation is more communal (vs. agentic). Our interviews with CEOs and CFOs provide insights into how the gender of firms' leadership may play a role when activist shareholders target firms. Our results collectively suggest that investors rely on gender stereotypes when evaluating the responses of male and female executives to shareholder activism and that these evaluations affect their investment judgments. Our results also suggest a potential alternative explanation for the finding that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders than are male CEOs. Rather than inherent differences in the management styles of male and female CEOs, responses to activist shareholders may be driven, at least in part, by managers anticipating that they will be penalized by investors for deviating from gender‐stereotypical behavior.

In this paper, we introduce the construct of proactive auditing behaviors to the accounting literature and report the first experimental investigation of their antecedents. Regulators and practitioners agree that proactive behaviors are needed to consistently achieve high‐quality audit outcomes, but also that these behaviors are scarce. Drawing on theory from management, accounting, and psychology, we predict that an environmental factor (autonomy) and a dispositional factor (tacit knowledge) interact to increase a range of distinct proactive auditing behaviors. These behaviors involve responding to evidence that has out‐of‐task implications, coordinating with clients to acquire task‐related evidence, and two forms of coaching junior auditors. As predicted, we find that auditors are more proactive when they have both higher autonomy and higher tacit knowledge than when they lack either or both factors. Our theory and findings inform academics, regulators, and practitioners about the types of work environments and policies that can promote auditor proactivity successfully.

We investigate whether a larger CEO employment network provides access to information that improves firms' earnings forecasts and find a significantly positive relation between CEO employment network size and management earnings forecast accuracy. Our results suggest that firms use information obtained from CEO contacts to increase the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our conclusion is further supported by evidence of positive associations between CEO employment network size and the likelihood, frequency, and precision of management earnings forecasts. We also find that CEO employment network size is positively related to analysts' reactions to the forecast news and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts relative to analyst forecasts. Overall, our results are consistent with a larger CEO employment network generating external information that increases the accuracy of firms' earnings forecasts.

We examine how metric intensity—that is, the quantity, frequency, and extent to which performance metrics are tracked and used—varies with a firm's dependency on innovation for business success. Although performance metrics are essential in an organization's management control system, little is known about how the use of metrics differs in organizations with varying dependencies on incremental and radical innovation. Drawing on data from a sample of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), we hypothesize and find that firms' dependency on incremental (radical) innovation is positively (negatively) associated with metric intensity. Furthermore, we find that (1) the positive relationship between the dependency on incremental innovation and metric intensity is stronger when the organizational culture is focused more on “control” and (2) the negative relationship between the dependency on radical innovation and metric intensity is mitigated when the organizational culture is focused more on “flexibility.” Additional analysis shows that the positive (negative) relationship between incremental (radical) innovation dependency and metric intensity can be mitigated by greater use of metrics for decision‐facilitating purposes. Our findings suggest that metrics‐based formal controls are designed to match the types of innovation dependencies and pre‐existing informal controls such as organizational culture. This study highlights the importance of distinguishing different types of innovation dependency in studying management control systems.

We examine how executive equity incentives are associated with firms' conforming tax avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance is unique compared to nonconforming tax avoidance in that it decreases tax liabilities by reducing pretax income. Thus, conforming tax avoidance presents a unique set of consequences with important links to both risk and value‐creation incentives. Consistent with risk‐taking incentives increasing conforming tax avoidance, we find that linking executive wealth to stock price volatility (i.e., vega) is positively associated with conforming tax avoidance. We also find that linking executive wealth to stock price (i.e., delta) is negatively associated with conforming tax avoidance. The results of our cross‐sectional tests suggest that the negative association between delta and conforming tax avoidance is predominantly driven by a risk aversion effect rather than a value‐creation effect. Our findings add to the literature on the relation between tax avoidance and executive compensation, as well as the trade‐off between book and taxable income.

This study examines the benefits of employee involvement in feedback system design for cooperation. Understanding how to enhance cooperation is important given the increasing use of team settings in practice. Control systems often provide feedback on cooperative actions of coworkers, which can help enable cooperation in teams and between organizational units. We predict that involvement in the design of feedback systems can be a source of trust between employees and enhances cooperation. This is particularly important for dynamic environments, in which an incomplete feedback system which initially provides perfect signals of cooperation no longer does so after the environment changes. Adding to prior evidence, we find that an incomplete feedback system can benefit cooperation in a static environment, but the benefit is greater when employees were initially involved in its design. In a dynamic environment, an incomplete feedback system fails to facilitate cooperation unless employees were involved in its design. Our results identify a behavioral benefit for firms that grant decision rights to employees as part of their organizational architecture.

This paper examines whether the increased accounting guidance and reporting requirements of FIN 48 impact the adequacy and accuracy of tax reserves and the effect of auditor‐provided tax services on tax reserves. While we do not find FIN 48 affected the adequacy or accuracy of tax reserves on average, FIN 48 eliminated the differences in the tax reserve adequacy of firms with and without auditor‐provided tax services that existed prior to its adoption. We also find evidence of less premature releasing of tax reserves post‐ FIN 48. Our evidence is consistent with an increase in the comparability of reserves for firms that do and do not purchase auditor‐provided tax services, consistent with one of the FASB 's objectives for FIN 48.

This study finds that investors price firms' greenhouse gas ( GHG ) emissions as a negative component of equity value, and this valuation discount does not differ between firms that voluntarily disclose to the Carbon Disclosure Project ( CDP ) and nondisclosing firms. We derive the GHG emissions for nondisclosers from an estimation model that incorporates firm characteristics and industry. The finding that investors view CDP amounts and estimates of emissions as equally value‐relevant suggests that equity values reflect GHG information from channels other than the CDP . An event study of investors' response to emission‐related information in firms' 8‐K filings further supports this finding. Economically, our results suggest that, for the median S&P 500 firm, GHG emissions impose a market‐implied equity discount of $79 per ton, representing about one‐half of 1 percent of market capitalization.

We find that the effectiveness of piece‐rate compensation relative to fixed pay in a laboratory letter‐search task hinges on the presence or absence of a nonbinding statement to participants that the experimenter values correct responses. In the absence of the value statement, participants with piece‐rate rewards for correct responses generate more correct and incorrect responses than do their counterparts with fixed pay, correcting errors as they go along to maximize compensation. Essentially, piece‐rate compensation acts as an output control, incentivizing participants to maximize correct responses through a “produce‐and‐improve” strategy. The value statement suppresses this strategy because participants appear to perceive it as an input constraint, prompting greater initial care at the expense of lower overall productivity. As a result, the value statement eliminates the gains in correct responses that piece‐rate incentivized participants otherwise realize. Thus, in settings in which individuals can gain efficiency by working expeditiously and improving quality when necessary, our results suggest the possibility that organizations could be better off just letting incentive schemes operate, rather than emphasizing quality in ways that could overly constrain productivity.