Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Lee (1988) finds that LIFO firms have higher earnings‐price (EP) ratios than non‐LIFO firms despite the income‐reducing effects of LIFO, a result contrary to economic intuition that Lee describes as a “puzzle.” This paper attempts to resolve this puzzle by introducing refined measures of variables that are related to both EP ratios and inventory costing method choices. The improved proxies are analysts' expectations of future growth rather than realized growth, beta computed using a procedure designed to reduce measurement error rather than the usual OLS beta, and leverage as a supplemental risk measure. Further, we control for expected earnings changes, since transitory earnings shocks that are not expected to persist in future earnings affect the numerator of the EP ratio. After controlling for these factors, we find that EP ratios for LIFO firms are actually lower than those of non‐LIFO firms, a result consistent with economic intuition and the result expected by Lee.

Abstract The paper addresses the following question: in a multiple‐date agency setting, under what conditions will the dividend policy be of no incentive relevancy? It is shown that if the accounting data—earnings, book values, and dividends — satisfy standard owners' equity accounting constructs, and if these indicate that paying dividends is a zero NPV activity, then dividend policy incentive irrelevancy applies. The basic idea is to ensure that the (history of) abnormal (residual) earnings summarize the relevant information and the solution to the incentive problem. The paper also compares classical value irrelevancy with incentive irrelevancy, and the analysis shows that conditions for incentive irrelevancy are more stringent.

Abstract This paper investigates the performance of senior and staff auditors in the identification of conceptual and mechanical errors during workpaper review. In this study, we begin to examine the potential for effectiveness and efficiency gains by involving staff (assistant) auditors in the review process. We find that senior auditors were more accurate than staff auditors in identifying conceptual errors contained in a hypothetical set of workpapers just reviewed. However, staff auditors were more accurate than senior auditors in identifying mechanical errors. Highlighting the benefits of a hierarchical review, composite groups consisting of a staff auditor and a senior outperformed composite groups consisting of two seniors or two staff auditors. The study finds that the differences in review performance between managers and seniors found in Ramsay 1994 generalize to lower levels of experience. Considering our results in conjunction with Ramsay 1994, we show a progression to a more conceptual review template as the rank of the reviewer moves from staff to senior to manager. The paper provides some guidance to audit firms that are presently introducing major changes to the way in which the review process is carried out, including the inclusion of reviews by staff auditors.

Abstract This paper examines the effects of firms' financial and pension profiles on their funding strategies and actuarial choices. The paper uses reports filed by individual pension plans with the Department of Labor under the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 for the analysis. Evidence reported in the paper shows that as firms become overfunded, they make conservative actuarial choices to avoid visibility costs, and that as firms become underfunded, they make liberal actuarial choices to avoid visibility costs. As the annual contributions increase relative to the permissible contribution ranges, firms make conservative actuarial choices to minimize penalties and maximize tax benefits. As the annual contributions decrease relative to the permissible contribution ranges, firms make liberal actuarial choices to minimize penalties and maximize tax benefits. The larger the profitability, cash flow from operations, and tax liability, and the smaller the debt of a firm, the higher the likelihood that the firm's managers will make conservative actuarial choices to maximize contributions. Conversely, the smaller the profitability, cash flow from operations, and tax liability, and the larger the debt of a firm, the higher the likelihood that the firm's managers will make liberal actuarial choices to minimize contributions. This evidence, which is consistent with the hypothesis of funding management, can aid the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in regulating the defined‐benefit pension plans more effectively and help plan beneficiaries to manage their retirement portfolios more efficiently. The debiasing method developed in the paper can provide investors and creditors with the tools to identify the discretionary components of pension liabilities and thereby value firms more efficiently.

Abstract The objective of this study is to investigate the role, if any, that management discussion and analysis (MD&A) plays in a firm's disclosure package. First, we present evidence regarding the usefulness of MD&A. Our evidence is uniformly supportive of the view that MD&A is a source of new and useful information and indicates that MD&A is used for financial analysis purposes by at least one significant user group, sell‐side analysts, who are members of the Toronto Society of Financial Analysts. We then provide evidence on disclosure quality. The results reveal that, overall, MD&A disclosure quality varies with disclosure stimuli similar to those found to influence disclosure choice in other disclosure channels. However, a more refined analysis of the MD&A subcomponents reveals that different factors influence disclosure quality for those subcomponents. Taken together, our results are consistent with the notion that MD&A is a part of a firm's overall disclosure package.

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of legal penalties on audit quality under different legal regimes. We investigate whether audit quality is affected differentially due to the complexity inherent in legal regimes and the frequency of imposing legal penalties. Economic theory predicts that players adopt equilibrium strategies that reflect the expectation that a penalty will be incurred, but the actual occurrences of penalties, if consistent with this expectation, should not prompt an individual to modify his or her strategy. However, learning theory suggests that players' choices will be repeated in the future based on outcomes. We found that penalties triggered both increases and decreases in effort, and seemed to introduce a “shock” that increased the variability of effort. We also observed a “funnel” effect — that is. greater changes in effort closer to the imposition of penalties, and smaller changes as more periods go by without a penalty.

Abstract This paper investigates whether firms benefit from expanded voluntary disclosure by examining changes in capital market factors associated with increases in analyst disclosure ratings for 97 firms. The disclosure rating increases are accompanied by increases in sample firms' stock returns, institutional ownership, analyst following, and stock liquidity. These findings persist after controlling for contemporaneous earnings performance and other potentially influential variables, such as risk, growth, and firm size. While it is difficult to draw unambiguous causal conclusions, these results are consistent with disclosure model predictions that expanded disclosure leads investors to revise upward valuations of the sample firms' stocks, increases stock liquidity, and creates additional institutional and analyst interest in the stocks.

Abstract In this study I use a principal‐agent framework to analyze optimal contracting under two accounting standards, referred to as historical cost (HC) and market value (MV), and under differing asset market assumptions. I distinguish HC from MV by the way revenue is recognized and in the reporting discretion allowed. The MV standard recognizes both realized and unrealized holding gains; HC recognizes only realized holding gains. MV allows the manager reporting discretion; the HC standard does not. Also, distinguishing an asset's value‐in‐use (VIU) from its net realizable value (NRV), I consider markets where the asset's VIU and NRV are always equal as well as markets where VIU and NRV differ. I show the following. If an asset's NRV and VIU are equal and if the manager's available reporting discretion is known, the principal prefers the MV standard because it provides better information about the manager's effort. However, the principal may prefer the HC standard if sufficiently uncertain about the manager's reporting discretion or if the asset's NRV exceeds its VIU, so that expected revenue is sufficiently enhanced by selling the asset earlier. Using an example (normal distribution and mean/variance preferences with linear contracts), I provide a case where the principal prefers the HC standard. Also, I compare the optimal effort and contract under each standard, and provide comparative static results that show how expected revenue, cost, and net income change due to changes in certain model parameters.

Abstract Researchers in financial accounting often use qualitative response models in choice‐based empirical research. Most of this research relies on the familiar techniques of dichotomous probit or logistic regression. Only a limited amount of this research uses n‐chotomous qualitative response models such as ordered probit or multinomial logistic regression. A potential explanation for this limited use is that the interpretation of model coefficients in qualitative response models with limited dependent variables (dichotomous or n‐chotomous) differs substantially from OLS regression, and econometric texts do not provide a systematic approach to coefficient interpretation. This paper discusses several approaches to interpreting coefficients in n‐chotomous qualitative response models. These methods focus on partial derivatives, elasticities of probability, sensitivity analysis, and odds ratios. The methods are applied to the models presented in Thomas (1989) and Mittelstaedt (1989). Additional analyses of the models demonstrate that the methods of interpretation can provide different conclusions or strengthen existing conclusions. The methods provide a better understanding of the directional effects of model coefficients, the relative responsiveness of the probability of choice to changes in the independent variables, and the effects of changes in the independent variables on the probability of choice. These methods should make these models more attractive to researchers interested in choice‐based financial accounting research, and allow for a broader range of decision outcomes than that provided by dichotomous qualitative response models.

Abstract In this paper, I demonstrate that the quasi‐rents earned in audits undermine an auditor's independence By considering the incentives of the auditor and the client and the interaction between them, I conclude that auditor will maintain his or her independence if the firm‐specific quasi‐rents are zero, but compromise his or her independence if the quasi‐rents are positive. The extent of the compromise is an increasing function of the quasi‐rents, since the auditor will propose that a higher value be reported in the financial statements when the quasi‐rents increase. I also show that disputes between the auditor and the client increase as the scope for errors for an auditor's test increases. When the error scope is large, the client becomes more aggressive in preparing a proposal while the auditor becomes more cautious.