Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source that partially but credibly conveys the agent's private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self‐report). In a simple setting with no communication, alternative labor market frictions lead to alternative optimal recognition policies. When the agent is allowed to communicate his or her private information, accounting signals serve as a veracity check on the agent's self‐report. Finally, such communication sometimes makes delaying the recognition optimal. We see contracting and confirmatory roles of accounting as its comparative advantage. As a source of information, accounting is valuable because accounting reports are credible, comprehensive, and subject to careful and professional judgement. While other information sources may be more timely in providing valuation information about an entity, audited accounting information, when used in explicit or implicit contracts, ensures the accuracy of the reports from nonaccounting sources.

Abstract Current practice of management cash compensation is based on financial targets. The financial targets for a year may be above, equal to, or below the previous year's publicly available performance measures based in part on the prevailing economic conditions. Accordingly, during economic downturn, a flat relation between changes in management cash compensation and simple changes in corporate performance, like annual profits or return on equity, is predicted, while during economic growth, a positive relation is predicted between changes of management cash compensation and corporate performance measures. The evidence in this study is based on the period 1987‐95. Pooled, cross‐sectional results are consistent with the propositions of no relation between changes in management cash compensation and changes in measures of corporate performance during periods of economic downturn and significant positive relation during economic growth. Further sensitivity analysis of these results with respect to market‐based performance measures, size, and industry classifications confirm the main results.

We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relationship to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward-looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law. Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering, and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months before the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to “hype the stock” and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that “hyped” their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been hype, and suggesting that the hype may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.

Abstract During the recent recession (1991 to present), Japanese firms decreased their spending on R&D for the first time since World War II. The decreases have raised concerns that Japanese managers may be making suboptimal allocations to R&D. We test whether Japanese managers adjust R&D based on short‐term performance. Our results show that Japanese firms in several industries adjust their R&D budgets to smooth profits. Interestingly, adjustments to R&D are larger in expansion years. These results, similar to those documented with U.S. managers, point to myopic decision making by Japanese managers.

Abstract We show that a firm can use its decentralized organizational structure and transfer price as commitment devices to obtain strategic advantage in the product market only when there are nonstrategic reasons to decentralize and to distort transfer prices away from marginal costs, such as the sales office's local knowledge about market conditions and the presence of tax rate differentials across the two tax jurisdictions. Surprisingly, an increase in the sales office's tax rates may help a firm increase overall profits. An increase in the sales office's tax rates causes the firm to increase its transfer price, which in turn dampens the sales office's competition and may more than offset the effect of increased tax rates on the firm's overall profits.

Abstract Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost‐effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.

This study experimentally examines how industry specialization affects auditors' inherent risk assessments and their confidence in those risk assessments. Two groups of participants - experienced banking specialist auditors and equally experienced nonbanking auditors - provided inherent risk assessments for a hypothetical banking client for two financial statement accounts. They assessed inherent risk for an industry-specific account (loans receivable) and for a nonindustry-specific account (property and equipment). The results indicate that nonbanking auditors assessed inherent risk significantly higher than industry specialists for all but the valuation assertion for the loans receivable account. However, the difference between the nonbanking auditors' and banking specialists' inherent risk assessments was not as great for the property and equipment account. Further, nonspecialists were less confident about the appropriateness of their inherent risk assessments compared with industry specialists. Potential implications for research and practice are discussed in light of the study's findings.

Abstract We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs.