Using an international sample, I investigate whether the extent of firms' disclosure of their accounting policies in the annual report is associated with properties of analysts' earnings forecasts. Controlling for firm‐ and country‐level variables, I find that the level of accounting policy disclosure is significantly negatively related to forecast dispersion and forecast error. In particular, I find that accounting policy disclosures are incrementally useful to analysts over and above all other annual report disclosures. These findings suggest that accounting policy disclosures reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings. I find univariate but not multivariate support for the hypothesis that accounting policy disclosures are especially helpful to analysts in environments where firms can choose among a larger set of accounting methods.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS No. 109) allows firms to use their discretion to set arbitrarily high valuation allowances against deferred tax assets. Firms can then later use these "hidden reserves" to manage earnings. Our evidence indicates that most banks do not record a valuation allowance to manage earnings, but rather to follow the guidelines of SFAS No. 109. However, if the bank is sufficiently well capitalized to absorb the current‐period impact on capital, then the amount of the valuation allowance increases with a bank's capital. In later years, bank managers adjust the valuation allowance to smooth earnings. The magnitude of the discretionary adjustment increases with the deviation of unadjusted earnings from the forecast or historical earnings.
This paper explores whether analyst forecasts impound the earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, whether analysts are able to identify which specific firms engage in such earnings management, and the implications for significant forecast error anomalies at zero earnings and zero forecast earnings. We use data from Zacks Investment Research 1999 and find that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small earnings decreases. Further, analysts are much more likely to forecast zero earnings than firms are to realize zero earnings, and analysts are unable to consistently identify the specific firms that engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. This latter inability contributes to significant forecast pessimism associated with zero reported earnings and significant forecast optimism associated with zero earnings forecasts.
This paper investigates the relation between analyst characteristics (number of analysts following a firm and their forecast dispersion) and market liquidity characteristics (bid‐ask spreads and depths and the adverse‐selection component of the spread). Prior research has found contradictory results on the relation between analyst following and market liquidity and has offered differing theories on how analysts affect liquidity. While prior research has posited analysts as proxies for privately informed trade or as signals of information asymmetry, I hypothesize that analysts provide public information, implying that analyst following (forecast dispersion) should have a positive (negative) association with liquidity. Cross‐sectional simultaneous estimations provide support for this hypothesis. The results are both statistically significant and economically important. Granger causality tests indicate that analyst characteristics lead market liquidity characteristics. These results clarify the role of analysts in providing information to financial markets and highlight benefits of increased analyst following.
This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.
In this paper, we investigate whether, and how, audit effectiveness differentiation between Big 6 and non‐Big 6 auditors is influenced by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives faced by corporate managers and external auditors. In so doing, we incorporate into our analysis the possibility that managers self‐select both external auditors and discretionary accruals, using the two stage “treatment effects” model. Our results show that only when managers have incentives to prefer income‐increasing accrual choices are Big 6 auditors more effective than non‐Big 6 auditors in deterring/monitoring opportunistic earnings management. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find Big 6 auditors are less effective than non‐Big 6 auditors when both managers and auditors have incentives to prefer income‐decreasing accrual choices and thus no conflict of reporting incentives exists between the two parties. The above findings are robust to different proxies for opportunistic earnings management and different proxies for the direction of earnings management incentives.
In this paper, we examine the relative efficiency of audit production by one of the then Big 6 public accounting firms for a sample of 247 geographically dispersed audits of U.S. companies performed in 1989. To test the relative efficiency of audit production, we use both stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). A feature of our research is that we also test whether any apparent inefficiencies in production, identified using SFE and DEA, are correlated with audit pricing. That is, do apparent inefficiencies cause the public accounting firm to reduce its unit price (billing rate) per hour of labor utilized on an engagement? With respect to results, we do not find any evidence of relative (within‐sample) inefficiencies in the use of partner, manager, senior, or staff labor hours using SFE. This suggests that the SFE model may not be sufficiently powerful to detect inefficiencies, even with our reasonably large sample size. However, we do find apparent inefficiencies using the DEA model. Audits range from about 74 percent to 100 percent relative efficiency in production, while the average audit is produced at about an 88 percent efficiency level, relative to the most efficient audits in the sample. Moreover, the inefficiencies identified using DEA are correlated with the firm's realization rate. That is, average billing rates per hour fall as the amount of inefficiency increases. Our results suggest that there are moderate inefficiencies in the production of many of the subject public accounting firm's audits, and that such inefficiencies are economically costly to the firm.
This study provides evidence regarding the effects of online trading on stock price and trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. We test for differences in stock price and volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements between a period with a significant amount of online trading (1996‐99) and a period without online trading (1992‐95). We conjecture that online trading has increased the proportion of naive investors in the market. We predict that this will result in (1) a decrease in the average precision of investor information prior to earnings announcements leading to higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs), (2) an increase in differential interpretation of earnings leading to higher trading volume reactions that are unrelated to price change, and (3) a decrease in differential prior precision leading to a decrease in the association between trading volume and absolute price change. We find evidence consistent with all three predictions. Our findings are relevant for assessing the validity of concerns about online trading expressed by regulators and the validity of theoretical models of trade with asymmetrically informed investors.
Industry classification is an important component of the methodological infrastructure of accounting research. Researchers have generally used the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system for assigning firms to industries. In 1999, the major statistical agencies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States began implementing the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The new scheme changes industry classification by introducing production as the basis for grouping firms, creating 358 new industries, extensively rearranging SIC categories, and establishing uniformity across all NAFTA nations. We examine the implications of the change for accounting research. We first assess NAICS's effectiveness in forming industry groups. Following Guenther and Rosman 1994, we use financial ratio variances to measure intra‐industry homogeneity and find that NAICS offers some improvement over the SIC system in defining manufacturing, transportation, and service industries. We also evaluate whether NAICS might have an impact on empirical research by reproducing part of Lang and Lundholm's 1996 study of information‐transfer and industry effects. Using SIC delineations, they focus on whether industry conditions or the level of competition is the main source of uncertainty resolved by earnings announcements. Across all levels of aggregation, we find inferences are similar using either SIC or NAICS. How‐ever, we also observe that the regression coefficients in Lang and Lundholm's model show smaller intra‐industry dispersion for NAICS, relative to SIC, definitions. Overall, the results suggest that NAICS definitions lead to more cohesive industries. Because of this, researchers may encounter some differences in using NAICS‐industry definitions, rather than SIC, but these will depend on research design and industry composition of the sample.
This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.