Knowledge that Transforms

How do auditors behave during periods of market euphoria? To address this question, we study auditor going-concern opinions around the time of the wave of stressed Internet companies filing to go public on Nasdaq, a period many characterize as the ‘dot com bubble’. We focus on the day the auditor signs the opinion that appears in a stressed, Internet registrants’ IPO filing and document a sharp increase in the number of opinions with dates between January 1999 and April 2000. Contemporaneous with this jump in transaction volume, and for the duration of these 16-months, Big 5 firms were less likely to render going-concern opinions to their stressed, Internet IPO registrant clients. Upon conducting tests for determinants that could lead auditors to shift their decision criteria during this euphoric audit market, we find the presence of a going-concern opinion varies with variables that proxy for client reasons (financial distress, company age, venture backing, IPO cash burn) and for less auditor independence/skepticism (recent fees for clients without venture backing and a rush-to-market for clients with venture backing) by the Big 5 firms. These findings suggest a mixed conclusion regarding the Big 5's behavior; as the presence of a going-concern opinion varies inversely with variables that proxy for both client viability and auditor self interest. As for consequences to investors, our analysis of two, three and four-year post-IPO stock delisting provides some evidence of a decrease in the predictive content (early-warning value) of Big 5 opinions signed during the Internet IPO bubble.

This paper investigates the effect of venture capitalist (VC) quality on earnings management in firms conducting initial public offerings of their equity stock, focusing on manipulation of both accruals and real activities. I develop a measure of VC quality based on a principal components factor analysis using data that are obtainable for virtually all VC firms. This metric is highly correlated with VC funds’ financial returns, and with the likelihood of successful exits through initial public offerings or trade sales. After going public, companies backed by higher quality VCs have lower abnormal accruals, lower earnings management through real activities manipulation, and a lower likelihood of financial restatement. Companies backed by top‐quartile VCs do not appear to engage in real activities manipulation as a substitute for accruals manipulation. Companies backed by lower‐tier VCs exhibit earnings management behaviors which are indistinguishable from those of non‐VC‐backed companies. The results continue to hold when controlling for endogeneity. Overall, the results suggest that higher quality VCs are better able to constrain opportunistic financial reporting by their portfolio companies going public.

This paper develops a theoretical model to understand the role of accounting con- servatism in debt contracts, incorporating the possible renegotiation of debt contracts with accounting-based covenants. I find that the demand for accounting conservatism depends on whether renegotiation occurs and if so, at what cost. When the covenant is not renegotiable or when renegotiation cost is sufficiently high, more conservative accounting actually reduces the efficiency of debt contracts. When renegotiation cost is moderate, more conservative accounting may increase the entrepreneur's welfare under certain conditions, especially for firms with less promising investment opportunities and for firms with higher liquidation values. Both are characteristics of "traditional industries" characterized by low growth and high level of tangible assets in place. When renegotiation is costless, the degree of accounting conservatism becomes irrelevant and the first best liquidation is always achieved. These results call for more cross-sectional examinations on the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracts in empirical studies.

In frictionless capital markets with complete information and rational investors, stock prices adjust to new information instantaneously and completely. However, a substantial body of research studies information imperfections such as asymmetric information and incomplete information. Information imperfections potentially hinder timely price discovery and are likely associated with delayed stock price adjustment to information. Our first research question therefore is whether the quality of accounting information (or “accounting quality”) is one such information imperfection that is associated with cross‐sectional variation in stock price delay. We define accounting quality as the precision with which financial reports convey information to equity investors about the firm’s expected cash flows. Poor accounting quality is likely associated with higher expected returns through uncertainty about stock valuation parameters and incomplete information. Our second research question therefore is whether the accounting quality component of price delay is associated with higher future stock returns. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show that poor accounting quality is associated with delayed price adjustment and higher future stock returns. Thus, accounting quality plays a role in timely stock price discovery.

This paper investigates factors associated with high‐quality Enterprise Risk Management ( ERM ) programs in financial services firms, and whether ERM quality enhances performance and signals credibility to the financial markets. ERM , developed with the assistance of the accounting profession, provides a framework and plan to integrate management of all sources of risk. Challenged by measurement difficulties common to research on management control systems, prior ERM studies present mixed findings. Using ERM quality ratings of financial companies by Standard & Poor's, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with greater complexity, less resource constraint, and better corporate governance. Controlling for such characteristics, we find that higher ERM quality is associated with improved accounting performance. Results show a market reaction to signals of enhanced management control from initial ERM quality ratings and rating revisions, and a stronger response to earnings surprises for firms with higher ERM quality. Focusing on the recent global financial crisis, our analysis suggests that there is no relation between ERM quality and market performance prior to and during the market collapse. However, returns of higher ERM quality companies are higher during the market rebound. Overall, results reveal that firm performance and value are enhanced by high‐quality controls that integrate risk management efforts across the firm, enabling better oversight of managers' risk‐taking behavior and aligning that behavior with the strategic direction of the company.

We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX ‐mandated internal control deficiency ( ICD ) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICD s during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICD s in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.