Abstract We examine the effects of organization capital—evident in management quality practices—on firms’ implied cost of equity. We show that superior management practices decrease firms’ cost of equity capital. This novel finding, robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses and to endogeneity bias, highlights the importance of superior management practices in improving firms’ financing conditions. In sum, this study demonstrates that the quality of management practices maps onto firms’ financing conditions, stressing the value relevance of intangible assets.
ABSTRACT This study investigates whether and how a firm's real earnings management (REM) is influenced by the strength of a country's legal regime and the presence of a Big 4 auditor. In a cross‐country examination using data from 22 countries, we find that REM increases in countries with stronger legal regimes as firms switch from accrual‐based earnings management (AEM) to REM. The presence of a Big 4 auditor reduces REM (as well as AEM) and attenuates the positive relation between legal regime strength and REM. Our results suggest that higher‐quality auditors limit client firms’ use of REM, especially in countries with a strong legal regime.
Abstract We find that non‐Big 4 audit offices with greater awareness of SEC enforcement are more likely to issue first‐time going‐concern reports to distressed clients; where SEC “awareness” is measured using (i) audit office proximity to SEC regional offices, and (ii) proximity to specific SEC enforcement actions against auditors. We also show that these non‐Big 4 audit offices issue more going‐concern opinions to clients who do not subsequently fail, indicating a conservative bias that reduces the informativeness of audit reports. This conservative reporting bias is also associated with higher audit fees and higher auditor switching rates. These findings are important because non‐Big 4 firms now audit 39 percent of SEC registrants and issue 88 percent of going‐concern audit reports. For Big 4 offices, we find some evidence that awareness of SEC enforcement may improve reporting accuracy by reducing Type II errors (failing to issue a going‐concern report to a company that fails), although the number of cases is small.
ABSTRACT In this study we use the recently mandated risk factor disclosure to examine the spillover effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) review of qualitative corporate disclosure. We find that firms not receiving any comment letter (“No‐letter Firms”) modify their subsequent year's disclosures to a larger extent if the SEC has commented on the risk factor disclosure of (i) the industry leader, (ii) a close rival, or (iii) numerous industry peers. We refer to this effect as “spillover.” Further, we find that after SEC comments on the industry leader's disclosure, No‐letter Firms also provide more firm‐specific disclosures in the subsequent year. The increased disclosure specificity reduces these firms’ likelihood of receiving SEC risk disclosure comments on their new filings. Our evidence suggests an indirect effect of the SEC review of qualitative disclosure.
ABSTRACT Information about an executive's decisions at his/her former employer can have a significant impact on the stock returns of his/her current employer, even after the job change occurs. In this article, we analyze transfers of information, which, we argue, reflect executive decision‐making ability as executives change jobs. We examine information about restructurings and write‐downs at the new employer emerging after the executive has left an employer that indicates the executive is of lower ability than investors had expected at the time of the hiring. Our results show that such signals are associated with significant negative returns to the current employer's shares, particularly for within‐industry job changes. We distinguish between restructurings at firms with and without departing executives and find that following an executive's departure, firms that had executives depart experience negative market reactions.
Abstract This paper examines whether the increased accounting guidance and reporting requirements of FIN 48 impact the adequacy and accuracy of tax reserves and the effect of auditor‐provided tax services on tax reserves. While we do not find FIN 48 affected the adequacy or accuracy of tax reserves on average, FIN 48 eliminated the differences in the tax reserve adequacy of firms with and without auditor‐provided tax services that existed prior to its adoption. We also find evidence of less premature releasing of tax reserves post‐ FIN 48. Our evidence is consistent with an increase in the comparability of reserves for firms that do and do not purchase auditor‐provided tax services, consistent with one of the FASB 's objectives for FIN 48.
Abstract Investors and analysts are designated as the primary users of financial reports by standard setters, yet we know very little about their use of accounting information and about their relationship with standard setters. This paper explores how investors and analysts evaluate the usefulness of fair values to their work. Standard setters typically presume that investors and analysts view accounting as a practice of valuation and, therefore, favor the greater use of fair value measurement. However, using interview evidence, it is shown here that investors and analysts expect accounting to provide them with insights into the performance of a business, and are quite cautious about the limits of using fair values in financial reports. Overall, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between accounting and its users. It adds specifically to research which has analyzed the disconnect between users and standard setters in terms of standard setters ignoring user needs (Young ), and in terms of users being indifferent about, or uncritical of, outcomes of standard‐setting processes (Durocher, Fortin, and Cote ; Durocher and Gendron ). The paper suggests a re‐theorization of the disconnect between the two groups that involves thinking away from tension, or blame. Drawing on the work of David Stark ( ), the situation observed is conceptualized as one of “dissonance,” where the different ways of evaluating fair values coexist without being involved in a fierce contest. That is, even though the principles of valuation and performance differ, this difference does not lead to open disagreement and political lobbying from investors and analysts. Consequences of this dissonance to our understandings of the (absence of) worth of fair values in capital markets are discussed.
Abstract Recent work in the supply chain literature suggests that the variance in orders placed with suppliers will be larger than that of sales to buyers. This distortion in demand information increases as it is passed along the supply chain from customers to upstream suppliers and has been referred to as “the bullwhip effect.” In this paper, we argue that the bullwhip effect reduces the ability of order backlog to predict future sales and earnings for upstream suppliers. Results obtained from our empirical analysis support this proposition. We find that the impact of bullwhip on the predictive ability of order backlog is further accentuated in firms with longer operating cycles. Market intermediaries such as financial analysts, on average, are unable to fully account for differences in the predictive ability of order backlog. However, analysts belonging to employers that follow all firms in a vertical supply chain do a better job of understanding the impact of bullwhip on the predictive ability of order backlog. In additional tests, we find that the bullwhip effect also impedes the ability of inventory components to predict future sales and earnings.
ABSTRACT This study sheds light on how self‐developed local accounting and control systems (so‐called vernacular accounting systems; VAS ) can influence knowledge integration in development processes of enabling global accounting and control systems. We focus on accounting and control systems as devices that enable local actors to build on codified knowledge to create “new” knowledge that can facilitate local problem solving. We argue that local actors would evaluate a proposed global system as enabling or coercive depending on both their ability to manipulate the knowledge codified within as well as the consequences that the codified knowledge has for their authority in the local knowledge creation process. Based on a case study of the development process of a global accounting and control system, we demonstrate that VAS can play a crucial role in both local actors’ evaluation of a proposed system (as points of reference) and their influence on knowledge integration (as knowledge transformation devices). Furthermore, local actors may continue to rely on their VAS if they realize that the proposed global system does not fit their needs. Local actors can thus use their VAS (as negotiation devices) to strengthen their position in the development process as counterparts to the global system designers because the “threat” of continuing to use the VAS may prompt system designers to integrate local knowledge into the proposed global system. We thus also suggest that, if made visible to others and actively mobilized, VAS may foster productive debates that facilitate the migration of local knowledge into global systems.
Abstract Prior research emphasizes the centrality of audit offices in understanding auditing practices, and documents significant interoffice variation in audit outcomes based on industry expertise and office size. Our study examines how two city‐specific labor characteristics also affect audit offices and local audit markets: the city's average educational attainment, and the number of accountants in a city, which proxy for a city's human capital. Our argument draws on the urban economics literature and predicts that the level of human capital in a city is positively associated with an audit office's ability to conduct high‐quality audits. As expected, there is a positive association between audit quality (quality of audited earnings and accuracy of going‐concern reports) and average education level in the city in which the lead engagement office is located. This association is generally significant for both Big 4 and non‐Big 4 offices, but is relatively stronger for non‐Big 4 firms that are more tied to local labor markets. A company is also more likely to choose a non‐Big 4 auditor in cities with higher educational levels and relatively more accountants, and there is evidence of higher non‐Big 4 audit fees as a city's education level increases. Collectively, these results suggest that local labor characteristics affect audit offices, audit quality, and the ability of non‐Big 4 auditors to compete with Big 4 auditors in the audits of public companies.