Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Previous research has highlighted the crucial roles that accounting plays in both the construction and development of the state. However, only limited attention has been paid to how accounting is both conceived and implemented as a technology of government. Taking a historical perspective, and through extensive archival analysis of the Canadian experience, we explore here the ways in which accounting practices were significantly expanded and elaborated over time. Progressively, accounting was successful in increasingly infiltrating the machinery of the state, resulting in greater power and influence being accorded to state accounting professionals. We contribute to existing governmentality research on accounting in two principal ways. First, we demonstrate how the territorializing power of accounting has transnational dimensions. The Canadian initiative was galvanized by simultaneous initiatives taking place in the United Kingdom, the United States, and a range of other Commonwealth nations. The similar trajectories of these various initiatives leads to a view of accounting as something that is co‐constructed across borders, a process we refer to here as transnational territorialization. Second, we demonstrate the crucial role played by key individuals in this transnational territorialization. Auditors general worked both individually and in concert to skillfully sell the evaluative potential of accounting to key power brokers in the state apparatus, thereby creating advantageous positions for themselves. This highlights the crucial role required by skillful and reflexive social agents in the elaboration of accounting technologies, something that hitherto has been underappreciated in extant literature on both auditing and governmentality.

ABSTRACT We hypothesize that the arrival of star analysts improves the performance of incumbent financial analysts, while the departure of star analysts has the opposite effect. Our results consistent with this hypothesis are concentrated primarily in the tests related to star arrivals. Our findings are robust to an instrumental variable approach and a falsification test. In addition, we hypothesize that the impact of the arrival/departure of star analysts is more pronounced when the star analyst covers the same industry as the incumbents (especially for industries with high uncertainty), when the star analyst is more established, when the incumbent analysts are less experienced, and when the brokerage house has fewer existing star analysts. Overall, our paper offers evidence of peer effects among financial analysts, mainly through the arrival of star analysts.

ABSTRACT This paper draws on extensive fieldwork to explore the nature, scope, and implications of management preparations for the question and answer session (Q&A) that occurs during a firm's results presentation. Prior literature has associated the value of this encounter with investor‐manager interactivity. As such, it is assumed that there are high levels of managerial authorship, ownership, and spontaneity as executives face questions from analysts. Following on, it is generally assumed that this translates into an increased risk of unintended disclosure, through verbal and nonverbal messaging. However, our data indicate that management engages in vast preparatory work to mitigate the risks associated with real (“original,” natural, spontaneous, un‐staged) interactivity. Instead, the Q&A is carefully planned, organized, scripted, and rehearsed. As such, the event is transformed into a hyperreal encounter in the Baudrillardian sense. Despite this, the value of the Q&A is not necessarily impaired. Instead, these managerial backstage preparations arguably make the encounter realer than real. We suggest that the Q&A that we observe (the “copy”) is more useful than the original might have been. Our work provides evidence and discussion of two interconnected paradoxes: perfection and self‐reference. This study not only raises important questions, challenges, and opportunities for researchers interested in the study of investor‐manager interactions but also speaks to those with an interest in workplace meetings and Q&A more broadly.

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the joint effect of vertical pay dispersion and peer observability on subordinates' misreporting choices. We adopt a participative budgeting setting in which two subordinates report to one superior, and we manipulate vertical pay dispersion (low/high) and peer observability (absent/present). Subordinates have private information about actual project costs and can over‐report project costs to the superior without detection and thus create budgetary slack. When a peer's reporting choices are observable, we predict and find that peer reporting choices have an asymmetric influence on the focal subordinates' reporting choices, and this asymmetric influence depends on the level of vertical pay dispersion. Specifically, we find that when vertical pay dispersion is low, subordinates who observe peer reports containing low slack misreport less , whereas observing peer reports that contain high slack has no significant effect. However, when vertical pay dispersion is high , subordinates who observe peer reports containing high slack misreport more , whereas observing peer reports that contain low slack has no significant effect. Driven by these asymmetric effects, subordinates misreport less in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is low and misreport more in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is high. Overall, our findings suggest that when a firm has a more egalitarian pay structure (i.e., low vertical pay dispersion), an open information policy is conducive to a more honest reporting environment, whereas under a more hierarchical pay structure (i.e., high vertical pay dispersion), open information policies can compromise the honesty of subordinates' reports.

ABSTRACT Prior studies use fundamental earnings forecasts to proxy for the market's expectations of earnings because analyst forecasts are biased and are available for only a subset of firms. We find that as a proxy for market expectations, fundamental forecasts contain systematic measurement errors analogous to those in analysts' biased forecasts. Therefore, these forecasts are not representative of investors' beliefs. The systematic measurement errors from using fundamental forecasts to proxy for market expectations occur because investors misweight the information in many firm‐level variables when estimating future earnings, but fundamental forecasts are formed using the historically efficient weights on firm‐level variables. Thus, we develop an alternative ex ante proxy for the market's expectations of future earnings (“the implied market forecast”) using the historical (and inefficient) weights, as reflected in stock returns, that the market places on firm‐level variables. A trading strategy based on the implied market forecast error, which is measured as the difference between the implied market forecast and the fundamental forecast, generates excess returns of approximately 9 percent per year. These returns cannot be explained by investors' reliance on analysts' biased forecasts. Overall, our results reveal that market expectations differ from both fundamental forecasts and analysts' forecasts.

ABSTRACT By analyzing a large panel of elections in 55 countries, we show that political uncertainty surrounding elections can affect asymmetric cost responses to activity changes (i.e., cost stickiness). In comparison to non‐election years, we find that the asymmetry in cost behaviors is stronger during election years in regressions that control for other firm‐level and country‐level determinants. In another series of tests, we report strong, robust evidence supporting the predictions that the importance of political uncertainty to cost stickiness is concentrated in countries with sound political and legal institutions. Collectively, the results imply that managers retain slack resources when political uncertainty is high but to be resolved soon.

ABSTRACT We select a small set of recommendations that lie in the upper and lower tail of the empirical distribution of divergences between a recommendation, and the consensus over the window (−30, −1) days prior to that recommendation. We classify these extremely divergent recommendations as bold, and then subdivide them into informative bold recommendations that lead other analysts (leading‐bold) and those that are ignored by other analysts (contra‐bold) based on the consensus change in the 30 days after the announcement. We focus on the information conveyed to the market by these bold, leading‐bold, and contra‐bold recommendations through their effects on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). We find that bold recommendations are not anticipated by market participants (CARs are negative before a bold buy and positive before a bold sell). The next finding is that the market responds strongly to both leading and contra‐bold recommendations over the (0, +4)‐day window and that these reactions are stronger than that to nonbold recommendations. In contrast, over the longer (0, +30)‐day window, leading‐bold recommendations earn additional returns whereas contra‐bold ones reverse significantly due to lack of confirmation. The overall pattern is one of rational market reaction both in the short and long windows. We support the rationality of the market reaction by showing that the percentage of leading‐bold recommendations exceeds that of contra‐bold recommendations, and that these two types of recommendations cannot be separated using observable analyst characteristics such as experience or brokerage size.

ABSTRACT Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long‐term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long‐term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short‐term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long‐term contracts generally dominate short‐term contracts. With long‐term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.

ABSTRACT We develop a model to examine implications of empowering shareholders to replace directors. We find that shareholder empowerment functions as a double‐edged sword. On the one hand, it can weaken ineffective boards' incentive to hold on to their position. On the other hand, it can induce both effective and ineffective boards to behave strategically to avoid a potential dismissal. As a result, empowerment does not necessarily increase firm value; in some cases, empowerment exacerbates the agency problem it is intended to address. Giving shareholders the power to set board compensation (have a “say on pay”) can mitigate these problems. However, even when empowerment benefits (harms) the shareholders, firm value may decrease (increase). Finally, we discuss empirical and policy implications of the main findings.