Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT To effectively manage audit risk, auditors must correctly predict the potential litigation and reputation consequences associated with inaccurate accounting estimates. Accurate predictions are critical because underestimation of negative consequences leads to excess legal exposure and overestimation leads to overauditing. Our paper examines whether auditors correctly anticipate these litigation and reputation outcomes. We provide manager‐ and partner‐level auditors with case facts from an auditor negligence lawsuit and ask them to predict the proportion of juries that will return verdicts against their firm. We then compare auditors' predictions to the actual verdicts we observe when we provide the same set of case facts to mock jurors who deliberate as part of juries. We find that auditors overestimate the likelihood of negligence verdicts, especially when audit quality is relatively high. Our supplemental measures help explain the reasons for this overestimation: auditors tend to underestimate jurors' perceptions of audit quality and willingness to attribute inaccurate estimates to situational factors. Finally, we examine auditors' predictions about how a news article about the litigation will affect their reputation with the general public. Similar to our litigation results, we find that auditors tend to overestimate the article's negative impact on auditor reputation. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors overestimate litigation and reputation consequences resulting from inaccurate accounting estimates. This overestimation is consequential as it leads to inefficient allocation of audit resources.

ABSTRACT Although internal control over financial reporting has gained increasing regulatory attention, its enforcement is far from perfect; thus, firm‐specific incentives to management become important to increase the quality of financial reports. We study how owners can motivate managers to invest in accounting quality even though it is costly to the managers. Using an agency model, we establish that a sufficiently conservative accounting system (which understates performance) is necessary to induce a manager to invest in accounting quality, and more conservatism increases this investment. The reason is that higher accounting quality mitigates the expected reduction of the manager's compensation from conservatively measured performance. Higher accounting quality makes the performance measure more precise, and the owner optimally lowers incentives, even though that entails some loss of productivity. In total, more conservatism increases both firm value and accounting quality. Our findings suggest that striving for neutral accounting can counteract incentives to improve accounting quality, and they provide support to using conservatism as a metric of financial reporting quality in empirical studies.

ABSTRACT We investigate the determinants and consequences of budget reallocations—that is, corrective changes to the budget made during the year. Using proprietary data from a large consumer goods manufacturer, we analyze the extent to which initial budgeting decisions drive reallocations. Examining this relationship is important because initial budget negotiations are often troubled by power struggles and politicking, which may give rise to the need for reallocations. We hypothesize that one important driver of reallocation decisions is the firm's aim to correct systematic deviations from the optimal initial budget that were driven by lobbying during the initial budgeting process. We find evidence that is consistent with this prediction. In a more exploratory analysis, we show that reallocations do not have the desired effects on market performance. In particular, budget cuts are negatively associated with a product's change in market share. More surprisingly, while budget increases do help product lines achieve their sales targets in the last quarter, they do not boost market share. Our results demonstrate that efficient investment planning is essential to achieve an improvement in market performance.

ABSTRACT Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.

ABSTRACT Over the past three decades, academic research has sought to understand how cash shortfalls impact a firm's ability to take all available value‐increasing investment projects. We investigate whether firms facing greater financing constraints turn to tax strategies that generate lower cash effective tax rates (ETRs) to mitigate the adverse effect of these financing constraints. We use the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006) as an exogenous shock to financing constraints for pension firms, but not for other firms. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we predict and find that pension firms experience a decrease in their cash ETRs by 1.8%–2.4% after the PPA 2006, relative to other firms. These cash tax savings mitigate the investment shortfall brought about by financing constraints by 19%. We also predict and find that the decline in cash ETRs is greater among firms more adversely affected by the PPA 2006. Our paper sheds light on the direction, causality, and economic magnitude of the association between financing constraints and tax planning activities. We also provide insight into the role of tax planning activities within firms' broader corporate business strategies in responding to financing constraints.

ABSTRACT We analyze the effect of mandatory financial transparency on corporate tax avoidance. The effectiveness of comprehensive tax transparency, in the form of a public country‐by‐country reporting, to mitigate corporate tax planning is largely unknown. Capital Requirements Directive IV by the European Commission required multinational banks to publish key financial and tax data in the form of public country‐by‐country reporting. We examine tax avoidance of banks around the reform. Our focus is on multinational banks newly required to report activities in tax havens that had not been publicly disclosed before the country‐by‐country reporting mandate. We predict and find that these exposed banks increased their tax expense relative to multinational banks with no activities in tax havens to disclose, as well as relative to domestic banks unaffected by the new mandate. In additional tests, we compare our sample of exposed multinational banks to several control groups from the financial sector and other industries. Our results suggest that country‐by‐country reporting can serve as an additional policy instrument to curb corporate tax avoidance, but only when the reporting exposes the firms' tax sheltering activities to public scrutiny.

ABSTRACT We use changes in mandatory pension funding to investigate the relation between internal financing constraints and incremental investment. Pension funding relief enacted in 2012 significantly reduced mandatory employer contributions to defined benefit pension plans. Prior to learning of the pension relief, firms disclosed their expected pension contributions under FAS 132R, which allows us to infer changes in investment plans in response to this unanticipated pension relief. Although our setting is pensions, our inferences contribute to the broader literature on how access to finance impacts the firm. We predict and find that pension relief resulted in increased nonpension investment in the year after enactment for financially constrained firms, and is stronger for constrained firms with greater pension underfunding. Our results are consistent with pension relief providing an important means of funding investment for financially constrained firms. Our identification strategy and results provide an important innovation to the literature examining the effect of financing constraints on investment.

ABSTRACT A common view is that verified earnings reports encourage investment through improved transparency. We lack direct evidence on this foundational proposition because researchers cannot observe counterfactuals in which a manager either (i) must remain silent about performance or (ii) can make any statement about performance they desire, even a bald‐faced lie. We experimentally manipulate whether a manager can provide information to an investor by voluntarily disclosing a verified earnings report, communicating freely via unverifiable cheap talk, or both. Our experiment involves repeated interactions between an uninformed investor with funds that, if invested, generate uncertain gains, and a trustee‐manager who observes and then divides gains after they are realized. We hypothesize and find that (i) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to higher investment compared with a world in which reporting is not possible and (ii) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to more accurate cheap talk communication than when earnings reports are unavailable. Contrary to our prediction, we find that investment when both earnings reports and cheap talk are possible is statistically indistinguishable from investment when only cheap talk communication is available. Further tests reveal that a lack of verified earnings reports leads managers to sustain a partner's investment by providing high returns to the investor while also limiting (but not completely eliminating) deceptive communication and profit‐taking. Our main conclusion is that verified earnings reports promote investment on a stand‐alone basis by improving transparency, but the effect of greater transparency from earnings reports on investment is more nuanced when earnings reports can influence the disclosure of unverifiable information. The main implication of our evidence is that the greater transparency of management behavior with verified earnings reports is not unambiguously positive because making behavior more transparent can lead managers to change their behavior.

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether the tone of corporate textual disclosures related to risk and uncertainty conveys relevant information to the credit default swap (CDS) market. Prior studies largely focus on the amount of risk disclosures and provide inconclusive evidence on the usefulness of risk disclosures for investors in assessing firm risk. Using a large sample of textual risk disclosures in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of 10‐K and 10‐Q filings, I predict and find that the change in CDS spreads over the three‐day window surrounding the 10‐K/Q filing date is positively associated with the pessimism of the language used in the risk disclosures. I conduct several analyses to show that the effect of the tone of risk disclosures is distinguishable from that of the amount of such disclosures. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that the CDS market reaction to the tone of MD&A risk disclosures is more pronounced for reference entities closer to default, consistent with creditors' particular concern about downside risk. Further, the CDS market reacts more significantly to the tone of MD&A risk disclosures for reference entities with a weaker information environment. Overall, these results support the view that the tone of textual risk disclosures in MD&As has information content for investors in the CDS market in particular and debt markets in general. My findings improve the understanding of textual risk disclosures by showing that the tone and the amount of such disclosures have different implications for debt market investors' risk perceptions.

ABSTRACT Although large shareholders have sufficient influence to engage privately with management, extant literature provides inconclusive evidence on the relation between large equity positions and corporate disclosure. This study examines whether large shareholders' portfolio diversification affects voluntary corporate disclosure. We define diversification as the extent to which investors spread investments among portfolio stocks. We predict that holding a diversified portfolio deters large shareholders from incurring the costs of private information gathering about a portfolio firm. We document that firms provide more voluntary disclosure when their large shareholders hold a more diversified portfolio, consistent with investors relying more on public disclosure about portfolio firms when their portfolio diversification is higher. Evidence from cross‐sectional analyses suggests that, as predicted, the positive relation between portfolio diversification and voluntary disclosure is weaker as the net benefit of acquiring private information increases for large shareholders (i.e., when portfolio firms are more connected, have alternative information channels, or are more complex). Overall, our results suggest that diversified large shareholders' preference for a richer public disclosure environment creates a positive externality of lowering the information costs for external stakeholders without private access to management.