In this paper we examine whether the occurrence of recession‐induced stress is an incrementally informative factor that contributes to the predictive and explanatory power of accounting‐based failure prediction models. We show that accounting‐based statistical models used to predict corporate failure are sensitive to the occurrence of a recession. Moreover, after controlling for the intertemporally unconditioned “stressed” and “unstressed” types of corporate failure, we find that models conditioned on the occurrence of a recession still add incremental explanatory power in predicting the likelihood of corporate failure. This source‐related characterization of stress appears distinct from other types of corporate failure that have been identified. Résumé. Les auteurs se demandent si l'occurrence du stress amené par la récession est un facteur qui apporte une information supplémentaire contribuant au pouvoir prédictif et explicatif des modèles de prévision des faillites reposant sur la comptabilité. Ils montrent que les modèles statistiques fondés sur la comptabilité utilisés pour prévoir les faillites des entreprises sont sensibles à l'occurrence d'une récession. De plus, une fois contrôlée la nature de la faillite de l'entreprise — faillite annoncée par le stress et faillite non annoncée par le stress sans conditionnement intertemporel —, les auteurs en viennent à la conclusion que les modèles conditionnés par l'occurrence d'une récession ont encore un pouvoir explicatif accru dans la prédiction de la probabilité de faillite de l'entreprise. Cette définition du stress liée à la source semble différente des autres types de faillite de l'entreprise qui ont été cernés.

This article examines the tax‐compliance game between taxpayers, a tax‐collecting agency, and third‐party tax‐return preparers. In our model, taxpayers are uncertain about their taxable income and may hire tax practitioners to reduce tax uncertainty. We examine the viability of tax practitioners as a signaling device (taking into account the effects on the behavior of the tax‐collecting agency) and investigate the desirability of encouraging (or discouraging) the use of tax practitioners via the use of alternative tax‐crediting rules. Our study establishes that tax crediting enables legislators to deal better with the consequences of taxpayers' strategic reporting. We show that the effects of changes in crediting rates cannot be replicated by changes in tax rates or penalties; the government would generally like to “price discriminate” in subsidizing tax practitioners' involvement in the tax‐compliance process. It is suboptimal to permit all taxpayers to take a tax credit for preparers' fees; some taxpayers should be denied such a subsidy. Further, if the government is constrained to adopt an identical credit schedule for all taxpayers, it will often find that a policy allowing no tax credit Pareto dominates any uniform crediting policy. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent le jeu auquel se livrent, en matière d'observation de la législation fiscale, les contribuables, les agences de perception de l'impôt et les tiers chargés de la préparation des déclarations de revenus. Dans le modèle retenu par les auteurs, les contribuables sont incertains de leur revenu imposable et peuvent recourir aux services de fiscalistes dans le but de réduire cette incertitude. Les auteurs se penchent sur le caractère indicatif du choix du fiscaliste (en tenant compte de l'influence qu'exerce l'agence de perception sur le comportement) et se demandent s'il convient d'encourager les contribuables à recourir aux fiscalistes ou de les en dissuader au moyen de différents mécanismes de dégrèvement fiscal. L'étude démontre que le dégrèvement fiscal permet au législateur de mieux faire face aux conséquences des stratégies de déclaration des contribuables. L'on constate que la modification des taux d'imposition ou des pénalités ne livre pas les mêmes résultats que la modification des taux de dégrèvement; l'État vise généralement la ≪ discrimination en fonction du prix ≫ en subventionnant le recours aux fiscalistes dans le processus d'observation fiscale. Il ne serait pas optimal de permettre à tous les contribuables de se prévaloir d'un crédit d'impôt pour les honoraires des auteurs de leurs déclarations; une telle subvention devrait être refusée à certains contribuables. En outre, si l'État se voit contraint d'adopter un programme de dégrèvement identique pour tous les contribuables, il constatera dans bien des cas qu'une politique ne permettant aucun dégrèvement est supérieure, au sens de Pareto, à toute politique de dégrèvement uniforme.

Several studies have documented a significant association between firm size and cumulative abnormal returns surrounding quarterly earnings announcements, after controlling for unexpected earnings. The sign of the association depends on the sign of unexpected earnings. Specifically, in a regression of cumulative abnormal returns on unexpected earnings and firm size, the coefficient on firm size is negative for observations with positive unexpected earnings and is positive for observations with negative unexpected earnings. These results hold after adjusting returns for the firm size return effect. In the absence of an economic rationale for firm size per se to be priced in this manner, we draw on extant capital market literature to identify two potential explanations for the signed‐size effect. Each suggests that firm size may be proxying for some misspecification of the relation between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected earnings: measurement error in the researcher's proxy for unexpected earnings and constrained estimation of earnings response coefficients. The signed‐size effect remains after incorporating numerous procedures to mitigate the influence of each of these misspecifications. We develop implications of ignoring the anomalous signed‐size effect for studies investigating the association between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected earnings. Studies affected are those that omit firm size (the estimated earnings response coefficient is biased upward), include firm size as a linear additive variable (the estimated coefficient on firm size is generally not interpretable), and include other variables correlated with firm size (their estimated coefficients are generally biased). Résumé. Plusieurs chercheurs ont démontré l'existence d'une relation significative entre la taille de l'entreprise et les rendements anormaux cumulatifs entourant les annonces de bénéfices trimestriels, compte tenu du contrôle des bénéfices inattendus. Le signe de cette relation (positif ou négatif) dépend de celui des bénéfices inattendus. En termes précis, dans une régression des rendements anormaux cumulatifs par rapport aux bénéfices inattendus à de la taille de l'entreprise, le coefficient relatif à la taille de l'entreprise est négatif pour les observations de bénéfices inattendus positifs, alors qu'il est positif pour les observations de bénéfices inattendus négatifs. Ces résultats persistent une fois les rendements ajustés pour tenir compte de l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise. Faute de fondements économiques sur lesquels appuyer ce genre d'évaluation en fonction de la taille de l'entreprise en tant que telle, les auteurs ont puisé dans les écrits existants relatifs au marché des capitaux deux explications possibles de l'incidence positive ou négative de la taille: l'erreur de mesure de la variable substitutive des bénéfices inattendus utilisée par le chercheur et l'estimation restreinte des coefficients de réaction aux bénéfices. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, il semble que la taille de l'entreprise puisse servir de substitut lorsque certaines définitions de la relation entre les rendements anormaux cumulatifs et les bénéfices inattendus sont erronées. L'incidence positive ou négative de la taille demeure après l'application de nombreux procédés visant à atténuer l'influence de chacune de ces erreurs de définition. Les auteurs cernent les conséquences que peut entraîner la négligence de l'incidence positive ou négative anormale de la taille, dans le cas d'études portant sur la relation entre les rendements anormaux cumulatifs et les bénéfices inattendus. Les études en cause sont celles dans lesquelles est omise la taille de l'entreprise (le coefficient de la réaction estimée aux bénéfices étant alors biaisé à la hausse), celles qui font intervenir la taille de l'entreprise à titre de variable additive linéaire (le coefficient estimé relatif à la taille de l'entreprise ne pouvant être interprété, de façon générale) et celles qui font intervenir d'autres variables en corrélation avec la taille de l'entreprise (leurs coefficients estimés étant, dans ce cas, habituellement faussés).

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), in their joint Financial Statement Presentation project, are reconsidering the basic format of financial statements. The Boards’ preliminary discussions related to this joint project indicate that they intend to modify the required financial statements to increase the proximity of performance‐related information for each reported period. We provide evidence related to this potential change by investigating the effects of financial statement information proximity on investors’ ability to learn the forecast‐relevant time series properties of reported cash flows and accruals. We also examine the role feedback plays in this relationship. Our experimental results suggest that nonprofessional investors are able to more quickly learn the relation between current period cash flows and accruals and future cash flow realizations when financial statement information is presented in a single statement rather than separated into two statements. In addition, we find that nonprofessional investors exhibit lower levels of absolute forecast errors and less forecast dispersion when financial statement information is unified into a single statement. Finally, we provide evidence that nonprofessional investors who receive extensive outcome feedback on a single page initially learn more quickly and later, after learning has leveled off, accurately forecast more consistently than do investors who receive extensive or limited feedback spread across two pages. Overall, our results provide evidence on the effectiveness of alternate financial statement presentation formats and the potential usefulness of receiving more extensive feedback.

In this paper we seek to document errors that could affect studies of earnings management. The book income adjustment (BIA) of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) created apparently strong incentives to manage book income downward in 1987. Five earlier papers using different methodologies and samples all conclude that earnings were reduced in response to the BIA. This consensus of findings offers an opportunity to investigate our speculation that methodological biases are more likely when there appear to be clear incentives for earnings management. A reexamination of these studies uncovers potential biases related to a variety of factors, including choices of scaling variables, selection of affected and control samples, and measurement error in estimated discretionary accruals. A reexamination of the argument underlying these studies also suggests that the incentives to manage earnings are less powerful than initially predicted, and are partially mitigated by tax and non-tax factors. As a result, we believe that the extent of earnings management that occurred in 1987 in response to the BIA remains an unresolved issue.

Rank transformation of observations has been shown to be useful in linear modeling because the models so constructed are less sensitive to outliers and/or non‐normal distributions than are models constructed using standard methods. In the present study, we apply rank transformations to financial ratios to improve the predictive usefulness of standard failure prediction models. Kane, Richardson, and Graybeal (1996) have shown that failure prediction can be improved by conditioning accounting‐based statistical models on the occurrence of recession. Our results suggest that rank‐ transformed data models show additional improvement in prediction without the added cost of having to predict recession for the companies undergoing testing for potential failure.

This article examines how corporate reliance on budgets is affected by major changes in the economic environment. We combine survey and archival data from the economic crisis that began in 2008. The results indicate that budgeting became more important for planning and resource allocation but less important for performance evaluation in companies affected more strongly by the 2008 economic crisis. Additional evidence from interviews and data gathered in a focus group further illustrate these results and show the changes organizations have introduced to respond to the economic crisis. Taken together, and contrary to more general conclusions from the literature such as an overall increase or decrease in the importance of budgeting, we find that companies emphasize certain budgeting functions over others during economic crises.

This study investigates the role of financial reporting quality in merger and acquisition (M&A) deals that are ultimately terminated (i.e., go bust). If a target is a U.S. publicly traded company, an acquirer’s initial assessment of the potential benefits associated with the acquisition of the company is based on publicly available information. Generally, the acquirer obtains limited private information from the target prior to announcing the deal, but engages in transactional due diligence after signing the acquisition agreement to affirm that the financial reporting warranties made by the target are accurate. We construct a low‐quality financial reporting score based on measures prior research identifies as being associated with less reliable, less relevant, and less precise financial reporting. We find that acquirers offer higher premiums for targets with low‐quality financial reporting. However, we also find that low‐quality financial reporting increases the likelihood of deal renegotiation, and contributes to the probability of deals going bust. We document that failed targets are more likely to restate their financial statements after the announcement of the deal, supporting our conjecture that low‐quality financial reporting contributes to deals being terminated. Our research develops a new measure of low‐quality financial reporting, documents that the measure is related to M&A deal outcomes and financial restatements, and provides insights into the consequences of M&A transactional due diligence.

Two standard‐setting approaches have emerged globally to guide the choice of accounting for securitizations: the control and components approach ( SFAS No. 125 and SFAS No. 140 ) and the risks and rewards transfer approach ( IAS No. 39 ). A lack of consensus about derecognition accounting is a major impediment to achieving convergence in global standards that must be resolved. Thus, both SFAS No. 140 and IAS No. 39 will be reexamined, and evidence pertinent to the debate is timely and important. In this study, we present evidence consistent with the view of credit‐rating analysts, who view many securitizations as, in substance, secured borrowings. Specifically, for a sample of originators applying sale accounting guidance in SFAS No. 125 / 140 during the period 1997‐2003, we show that off‐balance‐sheet debt related to securitizations has, on average, the same risk‐relevance for explaining market measures of risk (that is, CAPM beta) as on‐balance‐sheet debt. We also find that, in a returns and earnings association framework, the pricing multiple on securitization gains declines as the amount of off‐balance‐sheet debt increases, implying that investors take off‐balance‐sheet debt into account when assessing the valuation‐relevance of such gains. For those who advocate the control and components approach to securitization accounting, our results suggest that, at least for frequent securitizers, the put option arising from implicit recourse is a “missing piece” that is not currently accounted for when calculating securitization gains. Our results challenge the extant measurement standards in SFAS No. 140 .

Much research over the last 30 years has provided evidence that individuals display accounting fixation; that is, their cognitive process does not appropriately adapt to cross‐sectional or temporal differences in an accounting method. This paper presents the results of a quasi‐experimental test of the hypothesis that cognitive adaptation to a change in accounting method is an ordinal interactive function of three person characteristics: relevant accounting knowledge, general problem‐solving ability, and intrinsic motivation to appropriately engage in the decision task. Based on a product‐pricing decision task in which participants are provided with product costs reported by two generally employed product‐costing methods (activity‐based costing [ABC] and volume‐based costing), the results show that the majority of participants did not change their cognitive behavior when there was a change in the costing method. Further, those participants who did adapt to the change in accounting method, and thus avoided accounting fixation, did so by debiasing costs reported by volume‐based costing but not by ABC. Finally, these adapters generally exhibited high values for all three of the person characteristics compared with those who did not adapt.