Knowledge that Transforms

We re-investigate the market pricing of special items, with particular emphasis on how managers " frame " these non-operating earnings components via their inclusion or exclusion from " street " earnings, the earnings numbers that firms disclose in their press releases and that analysts track and forecast. When managers include the special items in " street earnings (i.e., " street " = GAAP), the market overprices them, believing the special items to be more persistent than they actually are. As a result, there is a negative relationship between the special items and future stock returns in the following year. However, when managers exclude special items from " street " earnings (i.e., " street " not equal GAAP), the market recognizes their transitory characteristic and the relationship between special items and returns is insignificant in the following year. We also demonstrate that the decision to include (exclude) special items with (from) " street " earnings is associated with whether inclusion or exclusion of special items a) increases earnings numbers, b) smoothes the earnings series, or c) helps managers to meet earnings benchmarks. These results suggest that the decision to include or exclude special items from " street " earnings is associated with managerial incentives to manage earnings numbers rather than signal the persistence of special items.

Motivated by evidence from the empirical accounting and finance literatures suggesting that short sellers target firms with suspect financial reporting, we investigate whether short interest provides a signal of the degree of audit risk. We find a positive association between audit fees and short interest (total shares sold short scaled by total shares outstanding) after controlling for other determinants of audit fees. This finding suggests that short interest is an indicator of audit risk that reflects information not captured by traditional client risk measures. We also find an increase in the magnitude of the association between audit fees and short interest after events in the early 2000s (corporate scandals, the collapse of Arthur Andersen, and the implementation of new auditing standards) which increased auditors’ responsibilities to deter fraud and made the implications of fraud particularly salient to external auditors. Our findings are important because they suggest that auditors’ sensitivity to client risk information increased post-2002, indicating that efforts by regulators and standard setters (e.g., the PCAOB and the AICPA) to increase auditors’ attention to risk have been successful.

Female directors and earnings quality

Although prior research presents employees’ subjective valuations of their stock options as being either below or above firms’ opportunity cost of issuing options, we examine subjective valuations in terms of their distribution around cost. We argue that variation of subjective valuations within this distribution is at least partly attributable to employees’ failure to fully incorporate the time-value component of options and their tendency to, instead, anchor on readily-available components of option value. Using both “real-world” and experiment data, we show that a significant proportion of both employees (30 percent) and experiment participants (47 percent) anchor on three readily-available values, two of which lie below cost (zero value, intrinsic value) and one of which lies above (stock price). We further find that a stock option education program aimed at mitigating the tendency to disregard the time-value component leads to a significant change in valuations (in terms of both median values and dispersion) and lower reliance on simple anchors. Education in the form of cognitive feedback has a greater effect on subjective valuations of additional options with differing characteristics as compared to education in the form of outcome feedback on the original option holdings.