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In this paper, we use the investment fraud of Bernard Madoff to inquire into the production of trust in the context of financial markets. Drawing upon empirical data related to U.S. individual investors (interviews and letters) as well as documentary material, we investigate the mechanisms through which investing with Madoff came to be seen as a trustworthy investment opportunity. We show how different types of information contributed to construct Bernard Madoff as a trustworthy investment manager and how Madoff avoided meeting demands for accountability by manipulating investors in face-to-face encounters. We shed particular light on the role of institution-based forms of trust which play a critical role in facilitating economic exchanges. More specifically, we suggest that the Madoff case illuminates how the provision of information can lead to an “illusion of trustworthiness” that is difficult to escape for investors. An element of such illusion, we suggest, is inherent to the functioning of financial markets more generally.
The U.S.‐based Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) emphasizes that accounting standard‐setting is not and should not be regarded as a “political process.” Employing the case of accounting for stock compensation, I examine a recent debate in which FASB appears to have successfully established and maintained a boundary between a technical accounting process and politics. This case is interesting because an earlier, failed effort to expense stock compensation was described as highly politicized. However, the boundary between technical and political processes was maintained in the more recent episode. I find that a focus on due process, characterizations of existing accounting requirements as anomalous and available measurement methods as reliable, and warnings about the dangers of injecting “politics” into standard‐setting were important to this boundary work. I also find that the boundary work required considerable interpretive flexibility in selecting (or ignoring) the evidence to be used in justifying the standard‐setting project and its conclusions. I conclude by suggesting that a different understanding of what it means to be involved in a “political process” might help all parties understand more fully what is taking place during the accounting standard‐setting process. Attention could be turned to developing processes to facilitate debates over which values should guide decisions occurring throughout the standard‐setting process. To this end, an enhanced standard‐setting process might allow for increased participation in agenda setting, in framing and scoping standard‐setting projects, and in providing opportunities for nonexperts to participate.
Auditors commonly rely on reviewing management's estimation process to audit accounting estimates. When control deficiencies bias the estimation process by creating omissions of critical inputs, standards require that auditors replace or supplement review of management's estimation process with tests that can identify the omissions. Importantly, overreliance on reviewing management's estimation process when it has been biased by a control deficiency can result in auditor acceptance of an inappropriate accounting estimate. We use an experiment to examine whether auditors recognize the insufficiency of increased sampling of a biased estimation process and their selection of alternative tests to replace or supplement review of the biased estimation process. We find that a significant minority (33 percent) of Big 4 senior auditors erroneously increase tests of management's biased estimation process. We also find that auditors have difficulty selecting alternative tests to replace or supplement review of management's biased estimation process, frequently choosing tests that are either ineffective or inefficient. Our findings suggest that auditors often reach inappropriate judgments about the capability of audit evidence to address control deficiencies and that nonsampling risk (judgment risk) may be a larger risk than auditors realize.
Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.