Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We examine how managers assess performance and promotion prospects—that is, the ex ante likelihood of promotion—and the conditions under which these assessments diverge. We argue that managers apply different cognitive schemas when they make different assessments. To the extent that a signal provides different information about future versus current contributions, assessed performance and promotion prospects are likely to diverge. In two experiments, we manipulate professionals' promotion eligibility and level of consultative decision making. We find that experienced managers assess performance and promotion prospects differently, but only when professionals are promotion eligible. Specifically, more (as opposed to less) consultative decision making decreases promotion prospects while not affecting assessed performance (Experiment 1) or even improving it (Experiment 2). By contrast, more consultative decision making improves both assessments when professionals are not eligible for promotion. We shed light on the relations between subjective assessments, including that promotion is not necessarily the consequence of superior assessed performance.

ABSTRACT We exploit the setting of first‐time enforcement of insider trading laws to investigate the relationship between insider trading opportunities and insiders’ supply of information. Insider trading opportunities motivate insiders to reduce their supply of information by concealing firm performance, thereby increasing their information advantage over outsiders, resulting in higher insider trading profits. Using data from 40 countries over the 1988–2004 period, we find that reporting opacity, as captured by earnings smoothness, decreases significantly after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in countries with strong legal institutions. The decrease in earnings smoothness is positively related to the strictness of insider trading laws. The decrease in earnings smoothness is also more pronounced for countries that have more persistent insider trading law enforcement and for countries that impose more severe penalties on insider trading cases. Further analyses show that the decrease in earnings smoothness following insider trading enforcement is concentrated among firms that are not closely held and among high‐growth firms. In addition to uncovering a channel through which insider trading restrictions affect the information environment, our evidence highlights the importance of country‐ and firm‐level governance structures in determining the consequences of insider trading restrictions.

Abstract Accounting comparability among peer firms in the same industry reflects the similarity and the relatedness of firms’ operating environments and financial reporting. From the perspectives of “inherent audit risk” and “external information efficiency,” comparability is helpful for auditors in assessing client audit risk and lowers the costs of information acquisition, processing, and testing. I posit that the availability of information about comparable clients helps improve audit efficiency and accuracy. Empirical results show that comparability is negatively related to audit effort (surrogated by audit fees and audit delay). Moreover, comparability is negatively associated with the likelihood of audit opinion errors. These findings are robust to different specifications of regression models, particularly for the “endogeneity” issues due to the possible reverse causality that auditor style might influence client firms’ comparability. In sum, the study shows that accounting comparability enhances the utility of accounting information for external audits.

ABSTRACT We investigate the relation between audit committee co‐option and financial reporting quality, where audit committee co‐option is measured as the proportion of audit committee members who joined the board after the appointment of the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Because CEOs are often actively involved in the director nomination and selection process, we expect that higher levels of audit committee co‐option will be associated with less effective monitoring, as evidenced by more financial statement misstatements and greater absolute discretionary accruals. Consistent with our expectations, we find a positive relation between audit committee co‐option and misstatements as well as between audit committee co‐option and absolute discretionary accruals. Our findings should be of interest to regulators, investors, and other stakeholders because we provide new evidence about how potential CEO influence on director nominations and audit committee appointments impacts the effectiveness of monitoring by the audit committee.

Abstract We investigate whether attitudes toward gambling help explain the occurrence of intentional misreporting. Similar to gambling, some financial reporting choices involve taking deliberate, speculative risks. We predict that in places where gambling is more socially acceptable, managers will be more likely to take financial reporting risks that increase the likelihood the financial statements will need to be restated. To test this prediction, we exploit geographic variation in local gambling attitudes and find that restatements due to intentional misreporting are more common in areas where gambling is more socially acceptable. This association is even stronger in situations where management is under greater pressure to misreport, including when the firm is close to meeting a performance benchmark, experiencing poor financial performance, or under investment‐related pressure. Furthermore, these results are robust to numerous tests to address omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these findings suggest gambling attitudes help explain the incidence of intentional misreporting.

ABSTRACT We build and test a Bayesian model that shows how investors revise their earnings persistence expectations after dividend announcements. When dividend changes confirm preceding earnings changes, our model predicts inverse u‐shaped investor revisions conditional on the prior expectations for noisy dividend signals. As the dividend signal becomes more informative, our model predicts that investor revisions will become more skewed converging to a monotonically decreasing relation for perfectly informative dividend signals. When dividend changes contradict preceding earnings changes, our model predicts u‐shaped investor revisions. In empirical tests, we find results generally consistent with our model predictions.

ABSTRACT The literature on the usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts is unsettled, with Call et al. ( ), Mohanram ( ), and Radhakrishnan and Wu ( ) providing evidence in favor of their usefulness, and Givoly et al. ( ), Bilinski ( ), and Ecker and Schipper ( ) questioning this. Target prices provide a good setting to test the usefulness of cash flow forecasts because they are an ultimate output of an analyst's valuation process to which cash flow forecasts are an input. Moreover, studying the effect of cash flow forecasts on target prices is more relevant for assessing their usefulness than is studying their effect on earnings‐forecast accuracy, as the accuracy of target prices requires a comparison with market prices, which are less subject to management influence than reported earnings. By improving an analyst's understanding of unexpected accruals and permanent earnings, a cash flow forecast can increase an analyst's target price accuracy and signal an analyst's superior forecasting ability. We examine whether, conditional on their earnings forecasts, analysts’ cash flow forecasts improve their target price accuracy. We find that when analysts issue cash flow forecasts, their target price accuracy increases. We also find that this accuracy increases with the accuracy of their cash flow forecasts. Finally, we find that this increased target price accuracy is greater for more challenging‐to‐value firms. Our study provides confirmatory evidence of the usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts.

Abstract We investigate whether restatements announced by economically related firms influence the contract terms a borrower receives from lenders. A restatement by a major customer firm increases the loan spread of a borrower by 11 basis points, on average. The contagion effects of customer restatements are higher (45 basis points) when a borrower's switching costs are high. Restatements by peer firms in the same industry also increase a borrower's loan spread, and this increase occurs regardless of restatement severity. Moreover, the sensitivity of loan spread to peer restatements is significantly greater when the restating peer firms are also in the bank's lending portfolio, suggesting that a lender's personal experience with restatements in an industry makes it more attuned to the potential implications of these restatements for the borrowing firm. Finally, our results suggest that lenders utilize information from peer restatements to anticipate future restatements by the borrowing firm.

Abstract We document the existence of expertise rents by finding that financial experts on audit committees obtain higher abnormal returns from insider purchases than do non‐financial experts on audit committees. We further investigate whether information processing skills work alone or jointly with an information advantage to generate expertise rents. While financial experts on audit committees outperform financial experts on other committees, financial experts on compensation, executive, nominating, and governance committees do not outperform non‐financial experts on these committees. These findings suggest that expertise rents are domain‐specific and can be obtained only when directors have both access to private information and information processing skills. In additional testing, we find that expertise rents for financial experts on audit committees are primarily driven by non‐accounting financial experts, whose finance or supervisory experience could make them better than accounting financial experts in understanding market conditions and assessing firm risk.

Abstract Several major stock exchanges, including the NASDAQ and NYSE Euronext, have recently embarked on schemes to sponsor and promote analyst coverage for firms listed on their exchanges. We evaluate the efficacy of one such scheme pioneered by the Singapore Exchange (SGX). We find that sponsored analysts produce forecasts with similar bias, but lower accuracy than those issued by analysts voluntarily following a firm. In analyses that control for self‐selection into the SGX Scheme, we find that sponsored firms enjoy at best minor improvements in their information environments and stock liquidity. Any benefits accruing from the scheme are insufficient to make sponsored firms fully comparable to those of firms with voluntary analyst following on the measured attributes.