Knowledge that Transforms

Auditing is often depicted in scientific and professional literature as being subject to conflicting forces, such as mechanization versus flexibility, and professionalism versus commercialism. This paper examines how auditors actually make the client-acceptance decision in the midst of these forces. The investigation was conducted via a field study at three Big 6 firms located in Canada. The results show that in all firms the client-acceptance decision process in action is largely flexible, being characterized by a high degree of informal communication and the adaptation of the client-acceptance written policies and decision aids to circumstances. Furthermore, while commercialism in one firm (A) has a significant influence on the decision process, in the two other firms (B and C) the decision process is mostly consistent with professionalism. This result conflicts with the concerns that North American regulators have recently expressed about auditors' professionalism.

This paper revisits Ohlson 1995 to make a number of points not generally appreciated in the literature. First, the residual income valuation (RIV) model does not serve as a crucial centerpiece in the analysis. Instead, RIV plays the role of condensing and streamlining the analysis, but without any effect on the substantive empirical conclusions. Second, the concept of “other information” in the model can be given concrete empirical content if one presumes that next‐period expected earnings are observable.

Prior research indicates that individuals acting as jurors experience outcome effects in audit negligence litigation. That is, jurors evaluate auditors more harshly in light of negative outcomes, even when audit quality is constant. I posit that outcome effects in this setting are caused by jurors using their negative affect (i.e., feelings) resulting from learning about negative audit outcomes as information relevant to auditor blameworthiness. I tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which I manipulated audit quality, outcome information, and provision of an attribution instruction. The attribution instruction was designed to discredit negative affect as a cue to auditor blameworthiness. Consistent with expectations, attribution participants' evaluations of auditors exhibited less reliance on outcome information and more reliance on audit quality information than did evaluations made by control participants. In fact, outcome effects were eliminated for attribution participants. Courts may be able to improve the quality of jurors' decisions in such cases by employing an attribution instruction.

Auditors' professional judgements are typically made following a discussion of contentious issues with other auditors (Gibbins and Mason 1988). These discussions may be with others at various levels in the hierarchy of the audit firm, with informal discussion with peers often taking place prior to formal discussions with audit supervisors (see, e.g., Solomon 1987). This study uses an experiment, involving 286 public accountants, to consider how discussion with peers may influence auditors' subsequent resolution of realistic audit-specific moral dilemmas. Auditors were asked to prescriptively discuss how an accountant ideally should resolve a moral dilemma, or to deliberatively discuss how an accountant actually would resolve a moral dilemma. The results showed that auditors have higher moral reasoning scores after prescriptive discussion with peers and lower moral reasoning scores after deliberative discussion with peers. Thus, the study findings point to the significance of discussion of contentious dilemmas with peers and the importance of type of discussion for predicting and explaining auditors' moral reasoning. More specifically, the results indicate that discussion with peers may provide information and/or signal what is important and acceptable to the resolution of a moral dilemma, which facilitates transformation of an auditor's moral reasoning. This suggests the importance of informal mechanisms, such as peer discussion, as part of the social control system in audit firms.

This paper examines the effects of disclosure and recognition requirements on investment decisions when shareholders have limited liability. Firms' investment projects have either high initial pollution prevention costs or high subsequent clean‐up costs, and their liability for clean‐up costs may be either individual or joint and several. Even with individual liability for clean‐up costs, shareholders' limited liability creates an incentive to select the latter project type and to impose costs on the rest of the economy. This tendency is exacerbated when clean‐up liability is joint and several. We show that a disclosure requirement cannot have an unambiguous effect on the selection of the “cleaner” project. However, an accrual requirement, together with an accounting‐based dividend restriction, is shown to promote choice of the project that imposes lower expected costs on the rest of the economy. Moreover, we find that it is possible for a recognition requirement to have a greater impact in a joint‐and‐several liability regime than in an individual liability regime.

Recently, Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis, Olsson and Oswald (1999) compared the bias and accuracy of the dividend discount model (DDM), discounted cash flow model (DCF), and Edwards-Bell-Ohlson residual income model (RIM) in explaining the relation between value estimates and observed stock prices. Both studies report that, with non price-based terminal values, RIM outperforms DCF and DDM. Our primary research objective is to explore whether, over a five-year valuation horizon, DDM, DCF and RIM are empirically equivalent when Penman's (1998) theoretically terminal value expressions are employed in each model. Using Value Line terminal stock price forecasts at the horizon to proxy for such values, we find empirical support for the prediction of equivalence between these three price-based valuation models. Our secondary research objective is to demonstrate that, within each class of the DCF and RIM valuation models, the model that employs Value Line forecasted price in the terminal value expression will generate the lowest pricing errors, compared to models that employ non price-based terminal value under an arbitrary growth assumption. Results indicate that, for both DCF and RIM, price-based valuation models outperform the corresponding non price-based models by a wide margin. We also revisit the issue of the apparent superiority of RIM, and find that this result does not hold in a level playing field where an approximation of ideal terminal values is employed. In fact, the price-based RIM model is marginally outperformed by the price-based DCF and DDM models, in terms of pricing errors as well as its ability to explain current market price.

The 1991 amendment to the auditor appointment requirement of section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Act removes certain barriers to entry into the Ontario municipal audit market. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the amendment has enhanced competition in this market. The results indicate that there is a general reduction in the real municipal audit fees compared with the pre‐amendment levels, and that the market has become more contestable following the amendment. Notwithstanding the heightened competition, the Big 6 audit firms continue to command audit fee premiums over the non‐Big 6 audit firms. This suggests that Big 6 audit fee premiums possibly reflect brand name reputation rather than monopoly/oligopoly rents.

While professional standards indicate that auditors have the responsibility to both detect and report material errors, empirical evidence shows that auditors waive approximately 50 percent of material errors (Wright and Wright 1997). Unlike prior research that has examined factors that may affect auditors' decisions to waive single material misstatements, the current study examines auditors' propensity to waive proposed adjusting journal entries (henceforth PAJEs) that exceed materiality, either individually or in aggregate, under several different aggregation contexts. These contexts are represented in the form of different cases that vary in terms of the materiality and income direction of the individual and aggregate PAJEs. The current paper posits that auditors will be more likely to waive PAJEs in excess of materiality (i.e., make a “non‐GAAS” decision) when there is potential reward for doing so or when there is little litigation risk from doing so. The case decisions of 155 audit partners and managers indicate that they are not affected by potential reward (Client's Relative Fees), but are affected by potential risk (the Client's Financial Health, the PAJE's Subjectivity, and the PAJEs' Aggregate Directional Effect on Income). However, these factors are not equally influential across all aggregation contexts. Additionally, auditors are more likely to make non‐GAAS decisions when they are evaluating immaterial PAJEs that aggregate to a material level than when they are evaluating a single material PAJE.

This study empirically examines the relation between certain board of director characteristics and the extent that audit committee composition voluntarily exceeds minimum mandated levels and includes outside directors with financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience. This study focuses on board characteristics because the board directly controls audit committee membership. Such staffing decisions can directly affect the ability of the audit committee to monitor management's financial reporting process on behalf of the board. Results suggest that Canadian firms that voluntarily include more outside directors on the audit committee than the mandated minimum have larger boards with more outsiders serving on those boards and are more likely to segregate the board chairperson position from the CEO/president positions. Additionally, firms that voluntarily create audit committees composed of outsider members with a breadth of relevant financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience have boards that are larger, have more outside members, and are less likely to be chaired by the CEO/president. Implications of these findings for auditors, institutional investors, regulators, and other interested parties are discussed.