Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract This study examines the effect of independence threats and litigation risk on auditors' evaluation of information and subsequent reporting choices. Using a Web‐based experiment, I tracked auditors' information gathering and evaluation leading to a going‐concern reporting decision. Specifically, 48 audit managers assessed client survival likelihood, gathered additional information, and suggested audit report choices. I found that auditors facing high independence threats (fear of losing the client) evaluated information as more indicative of a surviving client and were more likely to suggest an unmodified audit report, consistent with client preferences. In contrast, auditors facing high litigation risk evaluated information as more indicative of a failing client and were more likely to suggest a modified audit report. In addition, the association between risk and report choice was fully mediated by final information evaluation. This suggests that it is unlikely that different reporting choices resulted from a conscious choice bias, but rather that motivated reasoning during evidence evaluation plays a key role in the effect of risk in auditor decision making.

Abstract The finance literature identifies two agency problems between managers and outside shareholders. First, there is a divergence‐of‐interests problem as management ownership falls. Second, there is an offsetting entrenchment problem when management ownership increases within intermediate regions of ownership. Agency problems are mitigated through contracting, but contracts are often based on accounting numbers prepared by management. Because accounting numbers must be reliable for contracts to be enforced, agency theory predicts a demand for higher‐quality auditors when agency problems are more severe. However, extant studies find no significant or robust relation between management ownership and audit firm size. In contrast to extant research, this study samples unlisted companies rather than listed companies for two reasons. First, the monitoring value of auditing may be higher in unlisted companies because they are less vulnerable to takeover and they are required to disclose much less nonaccounting information to shareholders. Second, unlisted companies have greater variation in management ownership, which permits more powerful tests of the demand for auditing as ownership varies between 0 percent and 100 percent. Consistent with a divergence‐of‐interests effect, the association between management ownership and audit firm size is found to be significantly negative within low and high regions of management ownership. The association is flatter and slightly positive within intermediate regions of management ownership, suggesting the existence of an opposite entrenchment effect. The negative association and the nonlinearity is consistent with the finance literature and with the predictions of agency theory.

Abstract We demonstrate analytically and empirically that valuing a firm with foreign operations in the presence of exchange rate uncertainty requires information on the foreign operating cash flows disaggregated by currency and persistence. In particular, given consolidated earnings, investors need information on the exchange gain or loss on permanent foreign operating cash flows. We extend the model to show how the permanent foreign cash flows can be used to condition the change in the translation adjustment to make it value‐relevant; however, using the permanent foreign cash flows directly is superior for valuation purposes. The empirical tests support our hypothesis that the market response to exchange rate movements is sensitive to the relative magnitudes of revenues and costs denominated in each foreign currency in which a firm has transactions. Disclosure of cash flows by currency should enhance the valuation of firms with foreign operations.