Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.

The 1991 amendment to the auditor appointment requirement of section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Act removes certain barriers to entry into the Ontario municipal audit market. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the amendment has enhanced competition in this market. The results indicate that there is a general reduction in the real municipal audit fees compared with the pre-amendment levels, and that the market has become more contestable following the amendment. Notwithstanding the heightened competition, the Big 6 audit firms continue to command audit fee premiums over the non-Big 6 audit firms. This suggests that Big 6 audit fee premiums possibly reflect brand name reputation rather than monopoly/oligopoly rents.

A claim is commonly made that cash flow and accrual accounting methods for valuing equities must always yield equivalent valuations. A recent paper by Lundholm and O'Keefe 2001, for example, claims that, because of this equivalence, there is nothing to be learned from empirical comparison of valuation models. So they dismiss recent research that has shown that accrual accounting residual income models and earnings capitalization models perform, over a range of conditions, better than cash flow or dividend discount models. This paper demonstrates, with examples, that the claim is misguided. Practice inevitably involves forecasting over finite, truncated horizons, and the accounting specified in a model — cash versus accrual accounting in particular — is pertinent to valuation with finite‐horizon forecasting. Indeed, the issue of choosing a valuation model is an issue of specifying pro forma accounting, and so, for finite‐horizon forecasts, one cannot be indifferent to the accounting.

This paper examines how managers in New Zealand allocate the cost of firms' investments in subsidiaries between net tangible assets and acquired goodwill. We find a negative relation between acquired goodwill and leverage. This could be interpreted as the result of managers of highly leveraged acquiring firms opportunistically allocating a lower portion of the acquisition price to acquired goodwill. However, this analysis, like much of the research on accounting choice, suffers from an omitted variables problem. We present evidence that the observed negative relation between acquired goodwill and leverage may stem from each variable's relation to the investment opportunity set. Further, we find no evidence that acquired goodwill is related to the existence of debt covenants. Together, these results suggest an endogenous relation between the firm's asset structure, its financing policy, and the allocation of acquisition price to acquired goodwill.

In this paper, we propose that affective reactions are integral to accounting decision contexts like capital budgeting, and that researchers must jointly consider affect and cognition to better understand accounting decision makers' behavior. We argue that interpersonal relationships are characteristic of many capital‐budgeting contexts, and that these relationships can lead to emotional affective reactions. For example, reactions such as frustration and anger may result if a manager is treated unfairly by another individual involved in a capital project. Drawing on relevant work in neurobiology and psychology, we then predict that these affective reactions can influence managers' capital‐budgeting decisions. We report on four experimental scenarios that demonstrate the impact of affective reactions on capital‐budgeting decisions. Consistent with our predictions, the results indicate that managers consider both financial data and affective reactions when evaluating the utility of an investment alternative. Our results suggest that researchers should consider both affect and cognition to more fully understand decision making in accounting contexts.

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year.

This paper examines how managers in New Zealand allocate the cost of firms' investments in subsidiaries between net tangible assets and acquired goodwill. We find a negative relation between acquired goodwill and leverage. This could be interpreted as the result of managers of highly leveraged acquiring firms opportunistically allocating a lower portion of the acquisition price to acquired goodwill. However, this analysis, like much of the research on accounting choice, suffers from an omitted variables problem. We present evidence that the observed negative relation between acquired goodwill and leverage may stem from each variable's relation to the investment opportunity set. Further, we find no evidence that acquired goodwill is related to the existence of debt covenants. Together, these results suggest an endogenous relation between the firm's asset structure, its financing policy, and the allocation of acquisition price to acquired goodwill.