Knowledge that Transforms

Les auteurs ont pour but de faire progresser la recherche dans le domaine de l’évaluation de l’audit interne en élaborant un modèle d’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne qui tient compte des relations entre les facteurs précis qu’utilisent les auditeurs externes pour évaluer la solidité de cette fonction. Le modèle repose sur trois facteurs définis par les normes d’audit et par les travaux de recherche antérieurs : la compétence, la qualité du travail et l’objectivité. Les auteurs élaborent une expression analytique du modèle à l’aide du cadre de référence des fonctions de croyance afin de dépasser les limites des études antérieures. Leurs résultats révèlent que la modélisation de la relation « et » est essentielle à l’évaluation de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne. Au chapitre des relations, l’analyse montre que, lorsque celle qui unit ces trois facteurs est solide ou parfaite, la fonction d’audit interne demeure d’une grande solidité, même en présence d’éléments probants positifs ou négatifs à l’égard de l’un des facteurs. Ce résultat persiste dans la mesure où les niveaux de croyance au sujet des deux autres facteurs sont élevés. Les auteurs démontrent en outre comment la qualité de la gouvernance d’entreprise influe sur l’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne et comment il est possible de recourir à l’analyse coûts‐avantages dans ce contexte pour mieux déterminer la quantité de travail d’audit externe qu’exige le respect des normes. L’analyse des auteurs révèle que l’étendue du travail d’audit devant être réalisé par l’auditeur externe dépend de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne et de l’importance des coûts associés aux litiges et au respect de la réglementation auxquels le vérificateur externe doit faire face.

De nombreuses sociétés qui utilisent de multiples indicateurs avancés de rendement ne valident pas le modèle causal qui relie ces indicateurs aux résultats financiers futurs, et les relations de cause à effet du modèle sont souvent abandonnées aux estimations subjectives qui peuvent être sujettes à l’erreur. En procédant à une expérience, l’auteure examine comment l’exactitude des hypothèses au sujet de la pondération des indicateurs avancés dans un modèle causal influe sur le rendement et les connaissances des gestionnaires, lorsque lesdits gestionnaires se voient offrir la possibilité d’apprendre au fil de plusieurs périodes. Les résultats obtenus montrent que le fait que des coefficients de pondération inexacts soient affectés aux indicateurs avancés améliore le rendement, réduit la fluctuation du rendement et enrichit les connaissances, comparativement à l’absence de coefficients de pondération. En outre, le rendement est semblable, peu importe que les coefficients de pondération soient exacts ou inexacts, alors que les connaissances sont meilleures lorsque les coefficients de pondération sont inexacts que lorsqu’ils sont exacts, ce qui ne confirme en rien les effets de polarisation des coefficients de pondération inexacts. Les observations résultant de l’étude semblent indiquer qu’à tout le moins dans certaines circonstances, les gestionnaires tirent avantage des coefficients de pondération affectés aux indicateurs avancés, même lorsqu’ils sont inexacts, et sont en mesure de corriger ces inexactitudes pour parvenir à un niveau comparable de rendement et de connaissances, comme s’ils avaient disposé de coefficients de pondération exacts.

We examine the impact of auditing on public school operations with two objectives: to investigate whether audits provide economic benefits to stakeholders and how complex compliance rules impact auditing effectiveness. Utilizing auditing time data and a unique opportunity presented by the Quality Basic Education Act in Georgia, we estimate the relative performance of school district operations employing a stochastic frontier estimation technique. We find that auditing produces real economic benefits for stakeholders by mitigating inefficiency in the use of school resources. We also find that stringent compliance rules reduce an audit’s effectiveness but auditors’ experience can help to overcome the problems. The lack of disclosure of auditing costs hinders the ability to conduct a cost–benefit analysis of new requirements. Our analysis supports the notion that auditing is vital to establish governance mechanisms and disclosure of auditing costs is important to adequately evaluate a new policy. Data are available from the public sources identified in the text.

By employing two alternative measures of fundamental value, we reexamine the value relevance of accounting information over time. Consistent with some recent studies, we do not find evidence on the temporal decline in R 2s of conventional value-relevance regressions when the stock price is replaced by these measures as the dependent variable. Further, our results show that the divergence between fundamental value and the prevailing stock price (a) increases over time and (b) is associated with measures of noise trading and other arbitrage risks and costs. Additional analyses also reveal that proxies measuring the extent of noise trading increase over time. Overall, we do not find evidence that there is a loss over time in the value relevance of accounting information with respect to fundamental value. More importantly, we show that measures of price divergence are associated with noise trading as well as other arbitrage costs and risks (such as transaction costs and information uncertainty) that prohibit market prices from converging to fundamental values.

Analytical Procedures (APs) provide a means for auditors to evaluate the reasonableness of financial disclosures by comparing a clients reported performance to expectations gained through knowledge of the client based on past experience and developments within the company and its industry. Thus, APs are fundamentally different than other audit tests in taking a broader perspective of an entitys performance vis-a-vis its environment. As such, APs have been found to be a cost-effective means to detect misstatements, and many have argued that a number of prior financial frauds would have been detected had auditors employed effective APs. With several dramatic and far-reaching developments over the past decade, the current study examines whether and how APs have changed during this period. In particular, we focus on the impact of significant enablers and drivers of change such as technological advancements and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We also compare our findings to an influential study of the practices of APs by Hirst and Koonce (1996) that was conducted over 10 years ago. We interview 36 auditors (11 seniors, 13 managers, and 12 partners) from all of the Big 4 firms using a structured questionnaire. The data reveal some similarities in findings when compared to prior research (e.g., auditors continue to use fairly simple analytical procedures). However, there are a number of significant differences reflecting changes in AP practices. For instance, as a result of technology auditors now rely more extensively on industry and analyst data than previously. Further, auditors report that they develop more precise quantitative expectations and use more nonfinancial information. They also appear to rely more on lower level audit staff to perform APs, conduct greater inquiry of non-accounting personnel, and are willing to reduce substantive testing to a greater extent as a result of APs conducted in the planning phase. Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had an impact in greater consideration and knowledge of internal controls, which is seen as the most important factor driving the use and reliance on APs. © 2010 CAAA.

This paper examines whether credit analysts utilize the information contained in the difference between book and taxable income in analyzing a firm’s credit risk. Increased book–tax differences may be informative for credit rating agencies as they may signal decreased earnings quality or changes in the firm’s off–balance sheet financing. Results suggest a significant negative association between positive changes in book–tax differences and ratings changes. This evidence is consistent with large positive changes in book–tax differences signaling decreased earnings quality and/or increased off–balance sheet financing. We also find that large negative changes in book–tax differences result in less favorable rating changes, consistent with these changes signaling decreased earnings quality. In additional analyses, we find that the association between changes in book–tax differences and rating changes is attenuated for high–tax‐planning firms (e.g., where book–tax differences more likely reflect tax planning than decreased earnings quality).

We investigate the equity valuation effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006). The PPA 2006 has two main provisions: (1) firms must fully fund their pension plans within seven years (previously allowed 30 years to fund 90 percent of the pension liability) and (2) firms receive a tax deduction for contributions up to 150 percent of the pension liability (previously 100 percent). After controlling for the effects of SFAS 158, growth opportunities, the cost of external funds, and other information released during our sample period, we examine pension firms’ abnormal returns surrounding key dates in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the PPA 2006. First, we find a mean negative abnormal return of −4.20 percent during the period in which the PPA 2006 was first voted on by Congress. The mean (median) firm in our sample experienced a $310 million ($60 million) decline in market capitalization. Second, we find that the valuation effect was more negative for firms with larger unfunded pension liabilities and larger capital expenditure requirements, while firms with higher marginal tax rates experienced a positive effect. Third, we find no evidence of differential valuation effects for firms in different “at risk” categories as defined by the PPA 2006. Finally, we find a significant number of pension freezes occurred during our sample period. Our results are stronger when excluding these firms from our sample.