Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Audit regulators around the world have expressed concern over market dominance by Big 4 accounting firms and the potential adverse effect it may have on the quality of audited financial statements. We use cross‐country variation in the audit market structure of 42 countries to examine two separate aspects of Big 4 dominance: (1) Big 4 market concentration as a group relative to non–Big 4 auditors; and (2) concentration within the Big 4 group in which one or more of the Big 4 firms is dominant relative to the other Big 4 firms. We find that in countries where the Big 4 (as a group) conduct more listed company audits, both Big 4 and non–Big 4 clients have higher quality audited earnings compared to clients in countries with smaller Big 4 market shares. In contrast, in countries where there is a greater concentration within the Big 4 group, we find that Big 4 clients have lower quality audited earnings compared to countries with more evenly distributed market shares among the Big 4. Thus concentration within the Big 4 group appears to be detrimental to audit quality in a country and of legitimate concern to regulators and policymakers. However, Big 4 dominance per se does not appear to harm audit quality and is in fact associated with higher earnings quality, after controlling for other country characteristics that potentially affect earnings quality.

Evidence suggests that the negotiated wage for a unionized employee group is an increasing function of the firm’s prior profitability. As a result, managers may have an incentive to strategically signal a negative outlook to their unionized workers in order to improve the firm’s bargaining position. I assess the strategy of missing mean consensus analysts’ earnings estimates as a way for managers to signal a negative outlook to their unionized employees. I find that unionized firms are more likely to miss estimates than their nonunionized counterparts. Additionally, this propensity to miss estimates is increasing in both the firm’s percentage of unionized employees and multiunionism, but is unaffected by the timing of the signal relative to contract renewal. Finally, the increased propensity to miss estimates appears to be driven by both differences in expectations management and earnings management across the two groups. Specifically, managers of unionized firms take less action than their nonunionized counterparts to guide forecasts downward when estimates are too high, and they take more action to deflate earnings when expectations are too low. Taken together, the findings suggest that managers do seek to project a negative outlook to their unions, and that this tendency is increasing in the union’s negotiation strength.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 introduced integrated audits of internal control over financial reporting and the financial statements. Since the internal control and audit reports are joint products of the audit process, we examine whether the issuance of an internal control material weakness opinion (MWO) influences, other things equal, the issuance of a going concern audit opinion (GCO). Using a sample of financially stressed companies, we find that the issuance of a MWO increases the likelihood of a GCO, suggesting that auditors do respond to the uncertainty surrounding a MWO by issuing a GCO. Further analyses reveal that the positive association between MWO and GCO obtains for company-level material weaknesses, which are known to be difficult to “audit-around”, and for more litigious industries. We also compare these results with those for a Section 302 sample with manager-reported (but not audited) material weaknesses, and find that the material weakness reported under Section 302 does not impact the GCO. Hence, the auditors respond to the uncertainty surrounding material weaknesses only when they issue MWOs, and not due to the existence of material weaknesses per se – that is, the issuance of a MWO seems to induce further conservatism in the auditor’s GCO decision. We conclude that researchers and policymakers should consider the overall effect of Section 404 on the financial statement audit.

This study investigates the role of financial reporting quality in merger and acquisition (M&A) deals that are ultimately terminated (i.e., go bust). If a target is a U.S. publicly traded company, an acquirer’s initial assessment of the potential benefits associated with the acquisition of the company is based on publicly available information. Generally, the acquirer obtains limited private information from the target prior to announcing the deal, but engages in transactional due diligence after signing the acquisition agreement to affirm that the financial reporting warranties made by the target are accurate. We construct a low‐quality financial reporting score based on measures prior research identifies as being associated with less reliable, less relevant, and less precise financial reporting. We find that acquirers offer higher premiums for targets with low‐quality financial reporting. However, we also find that low‐quality financial reporting increases the likelihood of deal renegotiation, and contributes to the probability of deals going bust. We document that failed targets are more likely to restate their financial statements after the announcement of the deal, supporting our conjecture that low‐quality financial reporting contributes to deals being terminated. Our research develops a new measure of low‐quality financial reporting, documents that the measure is related to M&A deal outcomes and financial restatements, and provides insights into the consequences of M&A transactional due diligence.

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We provide evidence on the preliminary effects of mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRS ) on accounting quality for a relatively broad set of firms from 20 countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 relative to a benchmark group of firms from countries that did not adopt IFRS matched on the strength of legal enforcement, industry, size, book‐to‐market, and accounting performance. Relative to these benchmark firms, we find that IFRS firms exhibit significant increases in income smoothing and aggressive reporting of accruals, and a significant decrease in timeliness of loss recognition; however we do not find significant differences across IFRS and benchmark firms in meeting or beating earnings targets. Our findings contrast with findings in earlier studies which suggest that IFRS adoption leads to increased accounting quality. Our findings primarily hold for firms in strong enforcement countries, which suggests that enforcement mechanisms in these countries were not able to counter the initial effects of greater flexibility in IFRS relative to domestic GAAP .