Abstract This paper examines the effect of book‐tax differences on the probability that a transaction is audited and the probability that additional taxes are collected. It constructs a stylized model in which the taxpayer reports both financial accounting income and taxable income. The government observes both reports before deciding whether to conduct an audit. The analysis of the equilibrium yields two hypotheses. First, the probability that the government will audit a transaction is higher if the transaction generates a positive book‐tax difference (e.g., an expenditure that is deducted for tax purposes but capitalized for financial reporting purposes) than if the transaction generates no book‐tax difference. Second, conditional on being selected for audit, transactions with and without book‐tax differences are equally likely to have detected understatements of tax liability. These hypotheses are tested using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data from the Coordinated Examination Program. The empirical tests are consistent with the predictions of the strategic tax compliance model.

Abstract. “The definition of auditing calls for the communication of the degree of correspondence between assertions and established criteria” (AAA. 1972). At present, there continues to be no precise scale for measuring the degree of credibility lent to financial statements by the auditor. Don Leslie recently recommended adoption of a standard requiring auditors to disclose their operational materiality levels [Leslie, 1985]. No serious research has examined this proposal. The American Auditing Standards Board recently modified the standard form auditor's report in the United States. Neither Leslie's recommendation nor universal definitions of materiality were adopted. Among the objectives of report revision are better auditor‐user communication and abridgment of auditor legal liability. Few empirical studies have considered the former; none that we know of have examined the latter. This study enters that void and examines whether selected report modifications including explicit disclosure of the working materiality thresholds underlying preparation and audit of the financial statements serve to mitigate auditor liability. A behavioral experiment was conducted with 77 general jurisdiction judges serving as subjects. Findings support the potential for meaningful modifications to the standard auditor's report to abridge auditor liability. Résumé. « La définition de la vérification fait intervenir la communication du degré de correspondance entre des assertions et des critères établis», [Traduction. AAA 1972]. À l'heure actuelle, il n'existe toujours pas d'échelle précise permettant de mesurer le degré de fiabilité que le vérificateur accorde aux états financiers. Don Leslie recommandait récemment l'adoption d'une norme exigeant que les vérificateurs fassent état des niveaux d'importance relative qu'ils utilisent [Leslie, 1985]. Cette proposition n'a fait l'objet d'aucune recherche sérieuse. L'American Auditing Standards Board modifiait récemment aux États‐Unis le rapport type du vérificateur. Ni la recommandation de Leslie, ni les définitions universelles de l'importance relative n'ont été adoptées. Parmi les objectifs de ce remaniement du rapport type du vérificateur figurent une meilleure communication entre le vérificateur et l'utilisateur et la limitation de la responsabilité civile du vérificateur. Peu d'études empiriques ont porté sur la première question et, à notre connaissance, aucune ne s'est intéressée à la seconde. Les auteurs, pour combler cette lacune, examinent si certaines modifications sélectionnées apportées au rapport type du vérificateur, parmi lesquelles la divulgation explicite des seuils de tolérance opérationnels sous‐jacents à la préparation et à la vérification des états financiers, font en sorte de limiter la responsabilité des vérificateurs. Une expérience de comportement a été menée auprès de 77 juges de compétence générale qui ont servi de sujets. Les résultats de l'étude confirment que des modifications pertinentes au rapport type du vérificateur peuvent limiter la responsabilité de ce dernier.

Abstract We survey commercial bank lenders to better understand how they evaluate and react to variation in financial statement quality and how they view recent changes in accounting standards. A unique aspect of this study is that our respondents focus on medium‐size loans to private companies. In fact, more than 90 percent of the survey respondents primarily make credit decisions on loans between $250 thousand and $50 million. This is in contrast to prior archival research, which focuses primarily on very large loans to public firms or very small loans to private firms. We find that lenders in our sample distinguish among financial statements in terms of quality, including conservatism, primarily on the basis of accrual patterns and restatements. While this general result holds throughout our sample, financial statement quality is substantially more important for lenders making larger loans (over $10 million) as compared to very small loans (under $1 million). In addition, bank lenders are much more likely to respond to low‐quality reporting with collateral and guarantee requirements than with an increase in the interest rate charged. This finding is consistent for lenders making both larger and smaller loans. Finally, despite concerns in the academic literature, bank lenders in our sample actually hold a neutral‐to‐positive view of recent changes in accounting standards. In addition, most do not support current efforts to exempt private companies from some accounting standards.

Abstract This study provides evidence that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions. We hypothesize that CEO s who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that (i) short‐tenured CEO s, CEO s promoted from inside the firm, and nonfounder CEO s are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance when they have bad news, and (ii) their downward guidance tends to be more conservative. In response, analysts revise earnings forecasts less for the downward guidance provided by more career‐concerned CEO s. This indicates that analysts rationally incorporate these CEO s' stronger incentives to be conservative in their earnings guidance. Consequently, we find that CEO s with greater career concerns are not more likely to beat the market expectations, even when they provide more conservative downward guidance.

Accepted by Steve Salterio. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Steven Salterio (editor), two anonymous reviewers, Joan Luft, and Dave Ricchiute. We are also grateful to Joanna Ho, Kathryn Kadous, Khim Kelly, Bill Kinney, Ella Mae Matsumura, Lisa Sedor, participants at the 2005 Global Management Accounting Research Symposium, and participants at the 2004 Auditing Midyear Research Conference for their helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. The authors are indebted to the auditors who participated in the experiment, and to the Master of Science in Accountancy students who participated in the pilot study. Professor Vera-Muñoz acknowledges financial support by KPMG LLP through its Faculty Fellowship program.

ABSTRACT Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material . Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.

ABSTRACT Staggered boards (SBs) are one of the most potent common entrenchment devices, and their value effects are considerably debated. We study SBs' effects on firm value, managerial behavior, and investor composition using a quasi‐experimental setting: a 1990 law that imposed SBs on all Massachusetts‐incorporated firms. We find that relative to a matched control group of companies, for treated companies the law led to an increase in Tobin's Q, investment in capital expenditures and R&D, patents, and higher‐quality patented innovations, resulting in higher profitability. These effects are concentrated in innovating firms, especially those facing greater Wall Street scrutiny. An increase in institutional and dedicated investors also accompanied the imposition of SBs, facilitating a longer‐term orientation. The evidence suggests that SBs can benefit early‐life‐cycle firms facing high information asymmetries by allowing their managers to focus on long‐term investments and innovations.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether audit offices respond to audit fee pressure by increasing their focus on nonaudit services (NAS), as well as the combined effect of audit fee pressure and an increased focus on NAS on audit quality. We find a positive association between audit fee pressure and changes in NAS at the audit office level. We also find increased rates of client misstatement among audit offices that increase focus on NAS in the presence of audit fee pressure compared to audit offices that do not, suggesting a joint effect on audit quality. We find that the reduction in audit quality occurs in large audit offices. Overall, we provide evidence that audit offices’ provision of additional NAS in the presence of fee pressure is an important dimension to consider when examining the effects of declining audit fees on audit quality.