Knowledge that Transforms

This study complements and extends prior decision aid (DA) research by examining the DA reliance behavior of professional buy-side financial analysts in the context of their actual work environment. A large mutual fund company provided data on buy-side analysts' earnings forecasts over the course of one year, during which forecasts were made at the end of each quarter for the following four consecutive quarters. As part of the decision process, all analysts could voluntarily access a DA to assist them in forecasting earnings. Consistent with extant DA theory, the results indicate that analysts with greater performance-contingent incentives were less likely to rely on the DA and analysts with more complex portfolios were more likely to rely on the DA. Contrary to the results of most DA research and inconsistent with extant DA theory, analysts with greater task ability relied more on the DA than analysts with lesser ability. Finally, when DA reliance was high, analysts' forecast accuracy was also high, regardless of DA accuracy. The results provide valuable insight into the use of DAs by professional decision makers and the influence of DA reliance on their judgments in light of real-world pressures and performance consequences. The theoretical and practical implications of this study call for more research into why, how, and under what conditions highly skilled knowledge workers rely on the advice of DAs.

Les auteurs examinent l’incidence de la demande inhérente que supposent les positions courtes en étudiant dans quelle mesure les réactions des cours boursiers à la publication des résultats dépendent du niveau des positions courtes. Selon leurs constatations, si les nouvelles publiées sont extrêmement positives ou extrêmement négatives, la demande inhérente entraîne à la hausse le cours des actions à proximité de la date de la publication des résultats, la hausse étant plus prononcée dans le cas des nouvelles positives que des nouvelles négatives. Plus précisément, la réaction initiale du marchéà des résultats imprévus extrêmement positifs est plus importante dans le cas d’entreprises ayant des niveaux élevés de positions à découvert. En revanche, lorsque les résultats imprévus sont extrêmement négatifs, la réaction initiale du marché est moins négative dans le cas d’entreprises dont le niveau des positions à découvert est élevé. Les auteurs constatent au surplus que l’ampleur du mouvement réactif suivant la publication des résultats est plus modeste (plus marquée) dans le cas de résultats imprévus extrêmement positifs (négatifs) pour les entreprises dont les positions à découvert sont importantes.

We examine how inventory overproduction among high fixed costs firms affects these firms’ contemporaneous and future accounting performance, and how financial analysts and the stock market incorporate implications of these relations in their reactions. We find that higher fixed costs firms engaging in opportunistic overproduction are able to increase their contemporaneous return on assets (ROAs), but only those higher fixed costs firms that also experience inventory increases, sales declines, and issue common stock also experience declines in their future accounting performance. We further find that financial analysts are aware of this phenomenon and appropriately reduce their forecasts of future earnings per share (EPS) for higher fixed costs firms that experience sales declines and inventory increases. In general, we do not find that the stock market penalizes such opportunistic overproduction.

An important dimension of audit committee (AC) effectiveness that has gained the attention of regulators and academics is the financial expertise of AC members (General Accounting Office 1991; Public Oversight Board 1993; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; DeZoort 1997, 1998; Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 1999; DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, and Reed 2002; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [SOX] 2002; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2004). Section 407 of SOX requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules mandating that the AC of public firms include at least one member who is a financial expert or disclose reasons for not adopting this requirement. While SOX proposes a narrow definition of financial expertise, to include individuals with experience in accounting or auditing, the SEC controversially adopted a broader definition of financial expertise that includes accounting and certain types of nonaccounting (finance and supervisory) financial expertise ....