Knowledge that Transforms

We provide a list of points to consider ( PTC s) to help researchers self‐assess whether they have addressed certain common issues that arise frequently in accounting research seminars and in reviewers’ and editors’ comments on papers submitted to journals. Anticipating and addressing such issues can help accounting researchers, especially doctoral students and junior faculty members, convert an initial empirical accounting research idea into a thoughtful and carefully designed study. Doing this also allows outside readers to provide more beneficial feedback rather than commenting on the common issues that could have been dealt with in advance. The list, provided in the appendix, consists of five sections: Research Question; Theory; Contribution; Research Design and Analysis; and Interpretation of Results and Conclusions. In each section, we include critical items that readers, journal referees, and seminar participants are likely to raise and offer suggestions for how to address them. The text elaborates on some of the more challenging items, such as how to increase a study's contribution, and provides examples of how such issues have been effectively addressed in previous accounting studies.

This study examines the persistence and economic consequences of variations in reporting style across audit partners in individual engagements. Our results show that both aggressive and conservative audit reporting, measured by the pattern of prior Type 2 and Type 1 audit reporting error rates in auditor‐specific clienteles, persist over time and extend to other clients of the same partner. Analyses of abnormal accruals and persistence of client firms’ accrual estimates corroborate this finding, and hold both for private and publicly listed companies. Further, our results also show that the market penalizes client firms susceptible to aggressive audit partner reporting decisions. In particular, we find that our proxies for aggressive audit reporting are related to higher interest rates, worse credit ratings and less favorable forecasts of insolvency for private client companies, and a lower Tobin's Q for publicly listed client companies. Collectively, these results imply that audit partner aggressive or conservative reporting is a systematic audit partner attribute and not randomly distributed across engagements.

This is a published manuscript of an article published by Wiley.

We develop a data‐generated tool for distinguishing between fraudulent and truthful reports based on the language used in the management discussion and analysis section of annual and interim reports. Using this method, we are able to assign a probability of truth to each report which is then shown to be an effective indicator of fraud. Our work goes beyond the development of a tool alone, however, by conducting an extensive comparison of our probability‐of‐truth measure with eight alternative detection tools representing both quantitative and language‐based approaches. Comparisons are made across a variety of samples and show that our language‐based approach can be effective in both cross‐sectional and time‐series settings. It is useful both in distinguishing between fraudulent and truthful firms and in identifying fraudulent reports from a series of reports issued by a single firm. This second setting is one in which accounting‐based detection tools have frequently struggled. We establish that, not only is our probability‐of‐truth measure significantly associated with fraud, so too is the change in this measure from a firm's previous reports. Prior reports may serve an important benchmarking role in using language‐based tools to identify fraud.

Liao ( ) argues that the monitoring by large outside shareholders (blockholders) exacerbates the conflict between debt and equity and in turn affects the choice and structure of debt financing. The study contends that private debt is more immune to the increase in debt‐equity conflict. Consistent with this argument, companies with outside blockholders are inclined to issue private debt over public debt. Further, private debt exhibits less price protection but relies on more protective covenants than does public debt. The findings are interesting and intuitive. I evaluate the economic arguments in the paper and discuss some of the challenges that the study faces. My conclusion is that the interpretation of the results is more complex than the one the study presents. I offer a broader framework that can be used to shed light on why the governance structure combines equity blockholders and private debt issuance. I also discuss several questions to be addressed by future research.

Research on the Balanced Scorecard ( BSC ) has questioned whether its adoption generates greater integration between financial and nonfinancial performance measures, supports strategy implementation, increases performance and improves strategic decision making. This research has also highlighted how the BSC often generates effects other than these. Building on studies that portray Performance Measurement Systems as intrinsically incomplete practices of representation, the purpose of this article is to investigate how the BSC engages users because of the organizing work that it stimulates around this incompleteness. Our findings allow us to further articulate the power of specific visual elements of the BSC , such as hierarchical trees, wheels, causal and strategy maps. The article provides material that contributes to a better understanding of how the BSC performs multiple roles within organizations beyond a simple representational functionality and unfolds continuously. It contributes to the growing literature on accounting inscriptions, that is, signs producing incomplete representations, by developing an analytical theoretical framework that defines the BSC as a rhetorical machine composed of four key features: (i) a visual performable space (i.e., a schema generating creative engagement); (ii) a method of ordering and innovation; (iii) a means of interrogation and mediation; and (iv) a motivating ritual.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R suggests that lattice valuation models may improve the estimates of reported employee stock option values relative to the more commonly used Black–Scholes (BS) model. However, lattice model critics have expressed concerns that managers may use lattice models' flexibility to opportunistically understate option values. In this study, we investigate a sample of firms that recently adopted a lattice model to value employee stock options to provide evidence on this issue by identifying the determinants of lattice model adoption and examining the effect of lattice model use on reported option values. We report three main results. First, we find that firms are more likely to adopt a lattice model when it is more likely to produce lower values than the BS model and when managers have incentives to lower stock option expense. Second, we find that firms adopting a lattice model increase understatement of reported option values more than firms that continue to use the BS model and that the incremental understatement is due to use of the lattice model. Third, we conduct several tests to examine whether the valuation effect of lattice model use is consistent with efforts to correct for documented shortcomings in the BS model and find no evidence that this is the case. Taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that firms adopt and implement lattice models primarily to lower reported option values.

This study experimentally tests the hypothesis that investor reaction to favorable investment ratings is influenced by attributes of analysts’ supporting arguments. Specifically, I argue that argument ambiguity and the mix of positive and negative argumentation interact to influence how investors process and, in turn, react to information contained in analysts’ arguments. When positive arguments are unambiguous, I predict and find that investors react to the content of the arguments because they perceive the arguments provide sufficient support for the rating. In this case, investors react more favorably when the report includes strictly positive argumentation (i.e., one‐sided argumentation) than when it includes a mix of positive and negative argumentation (i.e., two‐sided argumentation). In contrast, when positive arguments are ambiguous, two‐sided argumentation acts as a credibility cue and leads to a higher likelihood of investment than one‐sided argumentation. These results provide important insights about the conditions under which investors react to justifications in favorable analyst reports and shed light on how analysts can credibly convey favorable information.

This article uses the Canadian environment, where French civil law (FCL) in the province of Quebec coexists with common law (CL) in the Rest of Canada (denoted as bijural), to test the thesis of the neutrality of the legal system with regard to financial reporting quality (FRQ). This single‐country design allows for a better control over other factors that influence FRQ. The FCL environment appears to encourage firms to publish accounting data of better quality due to the greater liability risk faced by auditors and corporate directors under that regime. These findings, based on 10 years of data and seven attributes of FRQ, are robust to different matching procedures and model specifications. This research contributes to the current debates in Canada as to whether financial market regulation under FCL and CL jurisdictions should be unified under a single CL national securities regulator. At the broader level, the results support claims that a more in‐depth understanding of the implementation of civil law and CL is needed rather than gross generalization about the two systems. These results especially call into question that CL regimes are unambiguously superior to civil law regimes in encouraging high‐quality financial reports.