We examine how audit partners' geographic proximity to clients affects audit quality. We use hand‐collected data to show that approximately half of audit partners are assigned to clients headquartered more than 100 km away from the partners' home locations. Few of these partners relocate after receiving their assignments and, as a result, more than one‐third of clients are audited by partners who must commute long distances to visit the client in person. We explore this phenomenon by first modeling how distance affects partner‐client matching. We find that partners' geographic proximity to a prospective client is an important matching criterion, but also that trade‐offs are made when other partner characteristics such as industry specialization are more likely to be important. Next, consistent with our prediction, we show that audit quality is lower when partners reside farther from their clients. We corroborate our primary findings by showing that the association between partner distance and audit quality is mitigated when partners have access to direct flights to their clients' headquarters and when clients are geographically dispersed. Our paper should be informative for regulators, practicing auditors, and academics interested in how partner‐client matching affects audit outcomes.

We investigate whether reviews of transactional filings by the SEC unexpectedly constrain SEC resources, leading to lower quality comment letters for periodic reports. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act requires the SEC to review periodic reports (e.g., 10‐Ks) at least once every three years. However, the SEC also reviews transactional filings (e.g., initial public offerings and acquisitions), which are unpredictable and often occur in waves. We find comment letters for periodic reports are of lower quality (in terms of outputs, inputs, and firm responses) during periods of abnormally high transactional filings. We also find that comment letters issued during periods of abnormally high versus low transactional filings are associated with increased information asymmetry and lower earnings response coefficients in the quarter after the resolution of the comment letter. Overall, our results suggest that unexpected resource constraints affect the quality of SEC oversight of periodic reports.

We investigate whether potential pension contracting benefits lead institutions that provide pension services to acquire ownership blocks in firms and the implications of such blockholdings on the firms' corporate governance. We use the 2006 Pension Protection Act, which expanded pension participation in certain states, as a quasi‐exogenous shock and find an increase in block ownership by pension‐providing institutions in firms with substantial operations in affected states. Further, we find that the acquisition of a large block increases the likelihood that the institution will provide future pension services to the firm. With regard to corporate governance, we find that the acquisition of large pension blockholdings is associated with higher CEO pay and lower CEO turnover following poor financial performance. However, contrary to the prediction of the private benefits hypothesis, we do not find consistent evidence that large pension blockholdings are associated with declining firm profitability, suggesting that pension institutions are incentivized to exert monitoring to preserve the investment value of their blockholdings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with pension service institutions acquiring ownership blocks to obtain pension contracts, but our evidence does not support the prediction that they use their influence to compromise shareholder value.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 130: Reporting Comprehensive Income encourages enterprises to report comprehensive income on a performance statement rather than on a statement of equity. We investigate the reporting decisions of 82 publicly traded property‐liability insurers that are fairly evenly split in their choice. Our results demonstrate that insurers with a tendency to manage earnings through realized securities' gains and losses (that is, cherry pickers), as well as insurers with a reputation for poor disclosure quality, are more likely to report comprehensive income in a statement of equity. Apparently, these insurers face the highest cost of transparency. We do not find a relation between the reporting decision and the volatility of comprehensive income relative to the volatility of net income. Our findings that insurers' comprehensive income reporting choices are a reflection of their proclivity toward cherry picking as well as their level of disclosure quality should be of interest to standard‐setters because of the controversy over standard‐setters' preference for mandating all firms to report comprehensive income in a performance statement.

Résumé. Les auteurs s'intéressent ici à la nature des représentations cognitives qu'utilisent les vérificateurs en situation de fraude potentielle dans les états financiers. Ils divisent le problème de détection de la fraude en deux parties: la détection de la mise en scène élaborée par la direction pour masquer la fraude et la détection de la fraude. Ils examinent les deux méthodes de détection des mises en scène proposées par Kahneman et Tversky (1986): 1) l'utilisation de représentations multiples aboutissant à différentes interprétations possibles des données contenues dans les états financiers; et 2) l'utilisation d'une méthode permettant de transposer les données contenues dans les états financiers sous forme de représentation normalisée. Vingt‐quatre associés de vérification ont participé à l'étude. Chacun d'eux devait procéder à la contre‐révision d'un dossier de vérification. Tous les vérificateurs examinaient quatre cas dans lesquels la direction avait présenté une image trompeuse de l'entreprise (au moyen d'une mise en scène) et produit des états financiers frauduleux. Les résultats obtenus par les auteurs confirment la thèse de Kahneman et Tversky selon laquelle les mises en scène peuvent être décelées grâce à la transposition du problème sous forme de représentation normalisée. Les vérificateurs qui ont eu recours à une représentation normalisée sont parvenus à percer à jour la mise en scène de la direction, à totaliser les éléments correctement et à déceler la fraude dans tous les cas. Ils ont, pour cela, appliqué des procédés conformes aux normes de vérification généralement reconnues (Institut Canadien des Comptables Agréés, 1988; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1984) pour totaliser les éléments. Les vérificateurs qui ont eu recours à des représentations multiples ont aussi détecté la mise en scène élaborée par la direction dans les quatre cas. Ils n'ont cependant pas appliqué les procédés de totalisation recommandés dans les normes de vérification et ne sont parvenus à détecter la fraude dans aucun des quatre cas.

In this study, we address the question of what kinds of cognitive representations auditors use in a situation of potential financial statement fraud. We divide the problem of detecting fraud into two parts: detecting the frame management has constructed to mask the fraud, and detecting the fraud. We examine two ways proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1986) for detecting a frame: (1) use of multiple representations that provide alternative interpretations of data in the financial statements; and (2) use of a procedure that transforms financial statement data into a standard representation. Twenty‐four audit partners served as participants in the study. Each partner conducted a simulation of a concurring partner review. All auditors reviewed four cases in which management had created a misleading description of the company (a frame) and a financial statement fraud. The results support Kahneman and Tversky's proposal that frames can be detected by transforming a problem into a standard representation. Auditors who used a standard representation successfully detected management's frame, aggregated the items, and detected fraud in all four cases. Auditors who used a standard representation followed a procedure specified by generally accepted auditing standards (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 1988, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1984) for aggregating items. Auditors who used multiple representations detected management's frame on all four cases. These auditors, however, did not use the aggregation procedure specified by auditing standards and failed to detect the fraud on all four cases.

We investigate whether audit offices respond to audit fee pressure by increasing their focus on nonaudit services (NAS), as well as the combined effect of audit fee pressure and an increased focus on NAS on audit quality. We find a positive association between audit fee pressure and changes in NAS at the audit office level. We also find increased rates of client misstatement among audit offices that increase focus on NAS in the presence of audit fee pressure compared to audit offices that do not, suggesting a joint effect on audit quality. We find that the reduction in audit quality occurs in large audit offices. Overall, we provide evidence that audit offices’ provision of additional NAS in the presence of fee pressure is an important dimension to consider when examining the effects of declining audit fees on audit quality.

This study investigates whether environmental risk affects the efficiency of negotiated transfer prices. We analyze a setting where the buyer faces environmental risk but the seller does not. From the risk‐neutral firm's perspective, the transfer should be made in our setting because the expected value of the buyer's profit is greater than the certain opportunity cost of the seller from the transfer. We develop hypotheses to predict that, as environmental risk increases, it becomes more difficult for buyers and sellers to reach agreement. Such difficulty reduces efficiency in terms of both firm profit and negotiation time. We test our hypotheses via an experiment in which buyer and seller dyads negotiate over the transfer of a resource at six levels of environmental risk. Results show that, as predicted, environmental risk decreases efficiency. Specifically, as environmental risk increases, the frequency of agreement decreases, thereby reducing expected firm profit. Further, environmental risk increases negotiation time for those dyads that are able to reach an agreement. Data suggest that the cause of the decreased efficiency is that buyers and sellers use different reference points for determining a fair transfer price and environmental risk exacerbates the effects of such differences.

In 2007, Pink Sheets LLC assigned each Pink Sheets ® company to a disclosure tier and on its website affixed a colorful graphic to its stock symbol signifying the company's public disclosure level. This unique innovation allows us to investigate the impact of increased salience of disclosure practices on liquidity. Using a difference‐in‐difference design, we find evidence that firms classified into the Current Information category experienced an increase in liquidity while firms classified into the No Information category experienced a decrease in liquidity, both relative to other unclassified over‐the‐counter firms. This suggests that increases in the salience of disclosure practices via assignment to disclosure tiers affect investors’ attention, leading to changes in trading behavior that ultimately translate into liquidity changes. We also provide evidence that some investors anticipated the resulting liquidity changes because stock returns around a key event date leading up to the release of the disclosure tiers are positively associated with subsequent liquidity changes.