Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT The current audit environment encourages auditors to conduct defensive auditing procedures in lieu of using new, innovative, and potentially more effective audit procedures, due to concerns these procedures may be second‐guessed in litigation or by audit inspectors such as the PCAOB. As a result, auditors may prefer traditional “generally accepted” procedures over innovative procedures that are potentially more effective. We test recent proposals that an Audit Judgment Rule (AJR) encourages the use of innovative, and potentially more effective, audit procedures analogous to the similar Business Judgment Rule that affords legal protections to corporate directors. Under an AJR, litigators or audit inspectors could not second‐guess auditor judgments, even if they perceive that alternate judgments would have ordinarily been reached, provided the auditor's judgment was made in good faith and in a rigorous manner. However, the AJR's requirements that auditors must defend the rigor of their innovative judgments could potentially backfire and lead auditors to select more traditional procedures. Under the framework of goal activation theory, we conduct an experiment with audit managers and seniors and find that an AJR makes auditors less likely to select innovative audit procedures, particularly when audit risk is high. They do so despite believing the innovative procedures to be more effective than the traditional procedures. Findings from a supplementary experiment with experienced auditors further suggest that national office affirmation of the reasonableness of the procedures does not help overcome this effect. Overall, our findings suggest that an AJR may have the unintended consequence of further increasing auditors' focus on more traditional, and potentially less effective, audit procedures.

ABSTRACT We examine whether a stock price spillover effect spreads through the method of listing or country of origin and whether this spillover effect changes when investor sentiment shifts. Using a sample of fraud allegations against Chinese companies that became public through Chinese reverse mergers (CRMs), we investigate whether firms that experienced negative spillover effects on their stock prices are those from the same country and/or with the same method of listing as the firms accused of fraud. We first show that the negative spillover effect channeled through the firm's country of origin becomes stronger when investor sentiment about Chinese companies becomes pessimistic, as evinced by significant declines in the stock prices of non‐fraudulent Chinese companies, including both CRMs and Chinese IPOs. Second, we show that the negative spillover effects on CRMs are stronger than those on Chinese IPOs and non‐Chinese reverse mergers, suggesting that both country and listing method are applicable to CRMs. Our findings indicate that (i) investor sentiment plays an important role in the spillover process involving fraud allegations and (ii) while the two channels could coexist, negative spillover effects that spread through the country of origin play a more prominent role than those that spread through the method of listing.

ABSTRACT Inadequate testing of fair value accounting estimates, including goodwill, is often cited as an audit deficiency in PCAOB inspection reports, and, in some cases, these deficiencies have led to enforcement actions against the auditor. As a result of these issues, the PCAOB recently proposed a new auditing standard for fair value accounting. While these regulatory actions suggest that auditors are challenged by the fair value regime of accounting for goodwill, they also highlight an area where the auditor could be influenced by their financial ties to a client. In this study, we test whether nonaudit fees are associated with goodwill impairment decision outcomes. Our results indicate that the nonaudit fees a client pays are inversely related to the likelihood of impairment in settings where goodwill is likely to be impaired. Additional examinations suggest that the negative relation between nonaudit fees and auditor independence is driven by clients who are most incentivized to exert their influence over the auditor.

ABSTRACT Technological advances are creating a shift in the information disclosure environment allowing more investors to interact with management. We examine three key levels of trader‐management interaction to assess the accuracy of traders' market‐tested value estimates and resulting market price. These data require an engaging experiment and a complex, contextually rich asset, which we create by playing a popular gaming app before the experiment. Participants view financial information, ask management questions, estimate value, and trade. We find that receiving non‐personalized question responses improves trader estimates of value and market price efficiency relative to when traders ask questions but do not expect a response. This occurs because traders exert more effort estimating value and trading. However, receiving personalized versus non‐personalized responses harms value estimates and market efficiency. This occurs because traders receiving personalized responses fixate on the interaction with management, dividing their attention and diverting it away from valuing and trading the asset.

ABSTRACT Regulators and researchers have expressed concerns that social interaction leads auditors to unjustifiably trust managers, constituting a lack of sufficient professional skepticism. Using both an abstract laboratory experiment and a contextually rich experiment with practicing auditors we predict and find that higher Dark Triad auditors (those with higher levels of the shared core between psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) are relatively more resistant to lapses in professional skepticism due to the effects of social interaction. This is likely driven by higher Dark Triad auditors' callousness, lack of empathy, and lack of response to social stimuli. In contrast, while higher social interaction initially increases lower Dark Triad auditors' unjustified trust in managers, this effect reverses in subsequent interactions when lower Dark Triad auditors observe evidence suggesting managers have reported aggressively. These findings add to research on the effect of auditor personality traits, audit‐client social interaction, and the interaction of these two variables, and suggest that practitioners and researchers account for the interplay of Dark Triad traits and social interaction and their effect on professional skepticism.

ABSTRACT We examine the usefulness of other comprehensive income (OCI) to debt investors in nonfinancial companies. Motivated by Merton's (1974) real options framework, we construct a measure of incremental OCI volatility, designed to capture the effect of OCI on overall firm asset volatility, which is a primary driver of credit risk in Merton's (1974) model. We find that the volatility of incremental OCI influences the likelihood of default, credit ratings, and the cost of debt. Overall, our evidence suggests that creditors use information from OCI in their assessment of firm credit risk and in pricing debt contracts.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether income smoothing affects the usefulness of earnings for contracting through the monitoring role of earnings‐based debt covenants. First, we examine initial contract design and predict that income smoothing will increase (decrease) the use of earnings‐based covenants if income smoothing improves (reduces) the usefulness of earnings to monitor borrowers. We find that private debt contracts to borrowers with greater income smoothing are more likely to include earnings‐based covenants. A structural model that explores the cause of this relationship provides evidence that smoothing improves the ability of earnings to reflect credit risk. Second, we examine technical default following contract inception. We find that income smoothing is associated with a lower likelihood of spurious technical default (when the borrower's economic performance has not declined but the loan nevertheless enters technical default). In contrast, we find no association between income smoothing and performance technical default (when the borrower's economic performance has declined). Collectively, this evidence is consistent with income smoothing improving the effectiveness of earnings‐based information in monitoring borrowers.

ABSTRACT Creativity and innovation have been identified by senior executives as some of the most desired characteristics of corporate culture. Accordingly, managers strive to build these cultures within their organizations. However, research in psychology suggests that these attempts may have unintended negative consequences. In this study, I predict and find that managers in a more (versus less) innovative company culture will engage in higher levels of real earnings management (REM). I then test two construal level theory (CLT)‐based interventions designed to reduce REM. As I predict, I find that in more innovative corporate cultures an intervention that makes downside risk more salient reduces REM, but an intervention that encourages managers to consider the “big‐picture” impact of their decision reduces REM to a greater extent. Unexpectedly, I also find that the effect of the “big‐picture” intervention reverses in a less innovative corporate culture leading to an increase in REM. My findings contribute to the emerging accounting literature regarding REM. I also extend the psychology literature investigating the link between opportunistic behavior and creativity, and I also expand research into how interventions based on CLT can affect judgment and decision making in an accounting context.