Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We use a hand‐collected sample of 1,628 S&P 1500 firms and more than 12,000 executives to examine how family firms compensate nonfamily executives. Family firms comprise a large percentage of firms around the world, and most of their executives are not members of the founding family. Moreover, the founding family's engagement in the firm alters agency conflicts, which in turn should influence the design of incentive compensation. However, there is no empirical evidence on whether and how the incentive compensation of nonfamily executives differs between family and nonfamily firms. Our study intends to fill this gap in the literature. Consistent with our predictions, nonfamily executives in family firms receive significantly less performance‐based pay and equity‐based pay. Family monitoring, risk aversion, and a reluctance to dilute family ownership all contribute to the pay differences. Although incentive pay and total pay are lower in family firms, nonfamily executives receive safer pay and enjoy greater job stability. An analysis of executives' moves across firms suggests that ownership structure, not executives' preferences, is more likely the driver of pay differences between family and nonfamily firms. Our findings suggest that researchers should consider founding family's engagement to avoid misleading inferences with regard to the determinants of incentive compensation, and our findings should help compensation consultants better understand and implement pay packages for family firms and nonfamily firms. The results also imply that uniform compensation regulations intended to improve the monitoring of executives in widely held firms may not be as effective in family firms.

ABSTRACT How is it possible that British policymakers resisted market‐based measurement for decades while financial economic concepts of decision making and valuation still gained widespread acceptance as a justification for accounting standard setting? This study introduces the concept of “technologies of financialization” to develop the theorizing of the rise of finance in the domain of accounting. Based on a genealogical history of narrative reporting in the United Kingdom, it demonstrates how references to qualitative reporting techniques helped to address recurring crises of measurement from 1969 to 1993, and ultimately contributed to the practical acceptance of market‐based measurement in the UK standard‐setting context. The data are interpreted through a cultural economy framework that directs attention to the power of referring to financial reporting as a combination of words and numbers in sustaining its theoretical redefinition “from below”—that is, by relating it to the experience of practicing accountants rather than accounting theory. As a technology of financialization, narrative reporting made financial economic ideals of market‐based measurement, decision usefulness, and future orientation appear operable in a real‐life reporting context. Whenever measurement reached its practical limits, narratives were relied on to explain the impact of price‐level changes, frame economic decisions, and relate unobservable future cash flows to present‐day strategies and resources. The insight into how narrative reporting practices have been laced into the reasoning of capital markets for over 40 years is timely because it illustrates that narratives can also play a more encompassing role and drive the turn toward wider corporate accountability on social and environmental impacts while hard measurements in this area are still being figured out.

ABSTRACT We examine whether bank connections via common mutual fund ownership serve as a contagion channel affecting the systemic risk of the banking system. Examining this relation is important because common mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over the past 20 years, and a buildup of systemic risk was at the heart of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. We predict and document that the extent of a bank's connection with other banks via common ownership increases its contribution to systemic risk. We further predict and find that this association is primarily driven by passive mutual funds. We provide evidence that common passive ownership results in higher systemic risk through two mechanisms: nondiscretionary sell‐offs of bank stocks and a common pattern of voting. Our results are also robust to two alternate instrumental variable analyses. This study contributes to the literature by documenting an unintended, macro‐level consequence of common mutual fund ownership. Our findings broaden the understanding of common ownership as one mechanism through which systemic risk materializes and should be particularly relevant for regulators who seek to prevent future systemic failures.

ABSTRACT We examine the effect of humanizing (naming) robo‐advisors on investor judgments, which has taken on increased importance as robo‐advisors have become increasingly common and there is currently little SEC regulation governing key aspects of their use. In our first experiment, we predict and find that investors are more likely to rely on the investment recommendation of an unnamed robo‐advisor, whereas they are more likely to rely on the investment recommendation of a named human advisor. Theory suggests one reason that naming a robo‐advisor may have drawbacks pertains to the complexity of the task the robo‐advisor performs. We explore the importance of task complexity in our second experiment. We predict and find that investors are less likely to rely on a named robo‐advisor when the advisor is perceived to be performing a relatively complex task, consistent with our first experiment, and more likely to rely on a named robo‐advisor when the advisor is perceived to be performing a relatively simple task, consistent with prior research on human‐computer interactions. Our findings contribute to the literature examining how technology influences the acquisition and use of financial information and the general literature on human‐computer interactions. Our study also addresses a call by the SEC to learn more about robo‐advisors. Lastly, our study has practical implications for wealth management firms by demonstrating the potentially negative effects of making robo‐advisors more humanlike in an attempt to engage and attract users.

ABSTRACT Understanding the association between quasi‐indexer ownership and insider trading is important given the externalities that insider trading can impose on shareholders, the importance of quasi‐indexers in the capital markets, and their mixed monitoring incentives. The prior literature has produced an inconsistent set of results regarding this association. These results are difficult to interpret because the association between them is likely endogenous, and prior studies have not employed effective identification strategies to address this issue. In this study, we examine the effects of quasi‐indexer institutional ownership on insider trading using the plausibly exogenous discontinuity in quasi‐indexer ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 index cutoff. Using both regression discontinuity and instrumental variable research designs, we find higher quasi‐indexer ownership leads to less insider trading (both buys and sells) and less profitable sell trades. The effects for sells are concentrated among insider trades that, ex ante, are more likely to be based on private information. Our evidence on the profitability of buys is mixed. In addition, we find firms with higher quasi‐indexer ownership are more likely to have and/or more strictly enforce blackout policies. Overall, our results suggest that quasi‐indexers can reduce the agency costs associated with insider trading through their direct and indirect monitoring activities.

ABSTRACT When information asymmetry is a major market friction, earnings forecasts can lead to higher price efficiency even after the information in forecasts completely dissipates upon earnings realizations. We show this in an experimental market that features information asymmetry (i.e., some traders possess differential private information). Earnings forecasts reduce information asymmetry and lead to prices that reflect a greater amount of private information. Traders can learn more about others' information from prices. This information learned from past prices continues to reduce information asymmetry and improve price efficiency even after earnings realizations. We contribute to the disclosure literature by showing the evidence that the learning‐from‐price effect amplifies the impact of public disclosure on price efficiency.

ABSTRACT Using the relationship between institutional trades and sequential public information, this study provides a systematic way to identify institutional trades that are informative about future equity returns. By studying the US financial institutions from 1994 to 2016, I show that institutional trades initiated by managers responding proactively to upcoming informational signals strongly predict future stock returns. The predictability of informed institutions is more evident for stocks with higher information asymmetry and in periods of higher profit opportunities. The informed institutions outperform the uninformed ones by 2% on an annualized basis and their performance gap is persistent. Importantly, the return predictability of informed institutional trades is not subsumed by the return‐predictive signals documented in prior research, computed either from institutional holdings or from financial statements. Further analyses show that the informed institutional investors derive their superior ability to forecast future stock returns from processing corporate fundamentals and acquiring private information. This study derives a novel return predictor using the institutions' proactive trading behavior and identifies various informational sources of informed traders.

ABSTRACT Using detailed data for fieldwork hours and audit hours by rank from audit engagements in Korea, we examine whether audits conducted under workload imbalance, proxied by busy‐season audits, impair audit quality, and how auditors adjust staff assignments for busy‐season audits. We generally find that busy‐season audits are associated with lower audit quality, and that audit firms reduce the involvement of senior auditors during busy‐season audits. In addition, the greater the involvement of senior auditors and junior auditors, the lesser the deterioration in audit quality. Finally, although there is no increase in interim audits in response to workload imbalance during busy seasons, increasing interim audits can mitigate the negative impact of busy‐season audits on audit quality. Our results are relevant to auditors and regulators, who have expressed concerns about the adverse effects of workload imbalance on audit quality.

ABSTRACT As firms increasingly use social media to provide disclosures to investors, it is important to understand whether the characteristics that are associated with these disclosures lead to different reactions from investors than disclosures provided via more traditional channels. In this paper, we use an experiment to examine whether linguistic formality in positive news disclosures, and engagement of social media users surrounding the disclosures (e.g., “likes” and “retweets”), affect investors' judgments about a firm and its management. Results suggest that, as predicted, investors are more sensitive to signals of audience engagement when disclosures use informal rather than formal language. Specifically, when associated with signals of high audience engagement, the use of informal language leads to greater willingness to invest than the use of formal language in a disclosure. However, also as predicted, the use of informal language hurts willingness to invest when associated with signals of low audience engagement. In two follow‐up experiments, we investigate how news valence and linguistic formality are expected to affect the level of audience engagement in the first place, and we investigate whether managers strategically vary their use of linguistic formality based on characteristics of the setting. Overall, our results provide evidence on how firms might use social media disclosures to better connect with investors. This study contributes to the growing literature on linguistic attributes of disclosures, and the emerging literature investigating the consequences of issuing financial disclosures through social media.

ABSTRACT Regulators and researchers provide evidence that auditors' judgment quality is problematic in complex audit tasks. We introduce a framework for improving auditor judgment in these tasks. The framework builds on dual‐process theory to recognize that high‐quality judgment in complex tasks requires that auditors (i) possess the knowledge needed for the task, (ii) recognize the need for analytical (versus heuristic) processing, and (iii) have sufficient cognitive capacity to complete the analytical processing. Based on the framework, we predict that auditors' need for cognition (NFC), a characteristic theoretically linked to recognizing the need for analytical processing, is associated with higher quality complex judgments. Analysis of 11 studies supports this assertion. We demonstrate the usefulness of the framework by predicting and finding that priming auditors with an accuracy goal improves judgments, particularly for lower NFC auditors, who are less likely to spontaneously engage in analytical processing. The framework facilitates systematic development of interventions to improve auditor judgment by highlighting that solutions should address the specific conditions causing judgment problems.