Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that fixed cost magnitude and fixed cost reporting format will not influence short‐term pricing decisions, these factors systematically affected pricing decisions in a duopoly experiment. Increasing fixed cost magnitude (a pure sunk cost in this study) across experimental conditions caused participants to first lower, then raise, competitive prices. Consistent with the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion, this change in pricing behavior reduced the frequency of reported losses. This study further reveals that the accounting format for reporting fixed costs influenced pricing behavior. Specifically, participants receiving capacity costing feedback reports established increasingly lower selling prices relative to the prices established by participants receiving contribution margin feedback reports. Given that a very simple cosmetic reporting manipulation produced increasingly significant competitive pricing differences in a market setting, this study provides evidence that functional fixation is not necessarily eliminated by market forces.

This paper explores the behavior of workers in an environment where it is efficient to engage in the mutual exchange of help. Experimental data show that output and workers' payoffs are greater under team‐based incentives than under individual incentives in an environment where coordination is difficult. However, when the environment is more conducive to coordination (that is, a setting where agents interact repeatedly), output and payoffs are greater under individual incentives. Manipulation of the amount of mutually observable information provides evidence that team‐based incentives, relative to individual incentives, create a more difficult coordination problem for workers and that cooperation requires a richer informational environment

This paper examines the attempts by the North American accounting institutes to develop a new market in e‐commerce assurance based on their claims to professional expertise through the WebTrust project. Employing actor‐network theory in an in‐depth longitudinal field study, we investigate how WebTrust was originally developed and promoted as a seal of business‐to‐consumer assurance, which largely failed to generate support in the marketplace. Proponents were subsequently able to generate more interest in the eyes of managers of online organizations by reshaping WebTrust as a flexible set of principles and criteria for systems advice and business‐to‐business assurance. Our analysis suggests that attempts to expand the accounting profession's domain of expertise reflect a trial‐and‐error process where the outcome achieved may be far from the vision that motivated the institutes into undertaking the project in the first place. We further show that the initial network of support for such projects can be quite fragile and dynamic as various actors reposition themselves around the shifting meanings attributed to the project

Business schools evaluate publication records, especially for the promotion and tenure decision, by comparing the quality and quantity of a candidate's research with those of peers within the same discipline (intradisciplinary) and with those of academics from other business disciplines (interdisciplinary). A recently developed analytical model of the research review process provides theory about the norms used by editors and referees in deciding whether to publish research papers. The model predicts that interdisciplinary differences exist in quality norms, which could result in disparity among business disciplines in the number of top‐tier articles published. I examine the period from 1980 to 1999 and, consistent with the theory, find that significant differences exist in the number of articles and proportion of doctoral faculty who published in the “major” journals in accounting, finance, management, and marketing. Most notably, the proportion of doctoral faculty publishing a major article is 1.4 to 2.4 times greater in the other business disciplines than in accounting (depending on the set of journals). The theory also predicts an upward drift over time in the quality norms used by referees. Consistent with a drift, the number of articles published has declined substantially in marketing and, to a lesser extent, in the other business disciplines

Practitioners and regulators are concerned that when auditors perceive management's attitude or character as indicative of low fraud risk, they are not sufficiently sensitive to high levels of incentive or opportunity risks in their overall fraud‐risk assessments. In this study, we examine whether a fraud‐triangle decomposition of fraud‐risk assessments (that is, separately assessing attitude, opportunity, and incentive risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk) increases auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues when perceptions of management's attitude suggest low fraud risk. In an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers, we find that auditors who decompose fraud‐risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply make an overall fraud‐risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues appears to happen only when those cues suggest low fraud risk. When opportunity and incentive cues suggest high fraud risk, auditors are equally sensitive to those cues whether they use a decomposition or a holistic approach. We discuss and examine potential explanations for this finding.

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.

Firms incur restructuring charges as a result of actions intended to improve their operating performance. However, there is little evidence on whether restructuring charges are associated with improved performance. We examine a sample of firms reporting restructuring in 1991‐93 and find that the restructuring firms' earnings increase over the levels immediately before restructuring. Compared with a control sample of firms that report no restructuring, the restructuring firms improve their earnings and operating income, but evidence for improvements in cash flow from operations is mixed. In regression analysis, we find that restructuring charges are significantly positively associated with post‐restructuring changes in earnings relative to the restructuring year, but this association is largely driven by firms with multiple restructurings and firms reporting losses in the restructuring year. We find no association between restructuring charges and post‐restructuring changes in earnings relative to the year before restructuring. Restructuring charges are significantly positively associated with post‐restructuring changes in operating income and cash flow from operations for firms with multiple restructurings. In summary, restructuring charges are associated with improved earnings, but our results suggest that restructuring in the early 1990s did not necessarily guarantee improved operating performance.

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.

We use experimental markets to test the Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (DFH) 1991 model of entrepreneur choice of auditor and retained ownership in initial public offerings (IPOs). DFH predict that entrepreneurs use retained ownership to signal IPO value and substitute high‐quality auditors for retained ownership to signal value as the risk of the IPO increases. Given the mixed support for DFH from archival research, we conduct experimental markets that directly operationalize the model's decision variables, which permits a direct test of whether the model is descriptively valid. In addition, our market setting provides a strong test of this theory by including an alternative Nash equilibrium also present in field settings, one in which only auditor quality is used by entrepreneurs to signal IPO value. Our results suggest that DFH predict entrepreneur behavior in baseline markets where both computerized investors and auditors are programmed to price consistently with the DFH equilibrium. However, the DFH model does not describe behavior when “robot” investors are replaced with human investors in the market. The results suggest that entrepreneurs and investors strategically interact in a manner that leads them away from the DFH equilibrium and toward the alternative Nash equilibrium behavior of entrepreneurs with high‐value assets hiring high‐quality auditors irrespective of IPO risk. Our results imply that the DFH model has limited descriptive validity, document the importance of strategic behavior on market equilibrium formation, and suggest that the mixed results found in prior DFH‐based field studies may reflect the model's low descriptive validity.