We examine the efficacy of public enforcement in weak investor protection countries by examining the outcomes of a comprehensive public enforcement campaign in China. The campaign, launched in 2007, was designed to help enforce China's first mandatory Corporate Governance Code, issued in 2002. The 2007 campaign was characterized by several important features: (i) the campaign required firms to identify their problems before the securities regulators conducted on‐site inspections; (ii) the campaign provided a detailed checklist of the status of a firm's compliance with the Code; (iii) the campaign was transparent with regard to the disclosure and correction of identified problems; and (iv) the campaign threatened penalties for firms that failed to correct the identified governance problems in a timely manner. Our empirical analyses suggest that the 2007 campaign was effective in improving publicly listed firms' corporate governance. The corporate governance improvement was associated with a reduction in earnings management, higher earnings response coefficients, and higher operating accounting performance. In addition, we find preliminary evidence that the detailed checklist is partially responsible for the efficacy of the campaign. Our results suggest that public enforcement, if properly implemented, works in increasing shareholder value in weak investor protection countries.

We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX ‐mandated internal control deficiency ( ICD ) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICD s during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICD s in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.