ABSTRACT The management control information used in decision‐making comports with one of the two generally accepted roles—to monitor and evaluate employees to conform their behavior to achieving organizational goals (decision‐influencing role), or to reduce decision uncertainty (decision‐facilitating role). However, the ways in which these two roles may combine concurrently has received limited empirical attention. Thus, in this case study, archival data and evidence from 30 interviews with space sector experts are employed to evaluate how the two roles assumed by management control contributed—both individually and jointly—to the achievements of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Apollo program. The analysis leads to a proposed 2×2 matrix that better characterizes the roles that could be assumed by management control in decision settings. This study extends the management control literature by presenting an additionally nuanced picture of these roles, as well as the subsequent consequences that arise from their combinations. Its findings provide insight for management control development and application.

Abstract We examine how executive equity incentives are associated with firms' conforming tax avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance is unique compared to nonconforming tax avoidance in that it decreases tax liabilities by reducing pretax income. Thus, conforming tax avoidance presents a unique set of consequences with important links to both risk and value‐creation incentives. Consistent with risk‐taking incentives increasing conforming tax avoidance, we find that linking executive wealth to stock price volatility (i.e., vega) is positively associated with conforming tax avoidance. We also find that linking executive wealth to stock price (i.e., delta) is negatively associated with conforming tax avoidance. The results of our cross‐sectional tests suggest that the negative association between delta and conforming tax avoidance is predominantly driven by a risk aversion effect rather than a value‐creation effect. Our findings add to the literature on the relation between tax avoidance and executive compensation, as well as the trade‐off between book and taxable income.

ABSTRACT Stock exchanges are important intermediaries in how firm information enters price. Trading halts are a key tool, often exercised at the exchanges' discretion, to prevent extraordinary price volatility when new information arrives. We investigate how exchanges use discretion and whether the discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts. We provide evidence consistent with halts reflecting the preferences of listed firms rather than the stated exchange objectives (i.e., minimizing excess volatility and off‐equilibrium trades). Furthermore, when exchanges exercise more discretion (unexplained by firm and information characteristics), the halts are less effective. Specifically, halts with more discretion are less likely to resume trading with efficient prices and are more likely to have been called unnecessarily (i.e., little to no price movement during the halt). These findings are consistent with exchanges using halts to cater to listed firms rather than to meet exchange objectives such as minimizing excess volatility or avoiding trades at off‐equilibrium prices.