Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R suggests that lattice valuation models may improve the estimates of reported employee stock option values relative to the more commonly used Black–Scholes (BS) model. However, lattice model critics have expressed concerns that managers may use lattice models' flexibility to opportunistically understate option values. In this study, we investigate a sample of firms that recently adopted a lattice model to value employee stock options to provide evidence on this issue by identifying the determinants of lattice model adoption and examining the effect of lattice model use on reported option values. We report three main results. First, we find that firms are more likely to adopt a lattice model when it is more likely to produce lower values than the BS model and when managers have incentives to lower stock option expense. Second, we find that firms adopting a lattice model increase understatement of reported option values more than firms that continue to use the BS model and that the incremental understatement is due to use of the lattice model. Third, we conduct several tests to examine whether the valuation effect of lattice model use is consistent with efforts to correct for documented shortcomings in the BS model and find no evidence that this is the case. Taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that firms adopt and implement lattice models primarily to lower reported option values.

Recent research finds that analysts' cash flow forecasts have meaningful financial reporting ramifications, but, to date, the identified effects are unlikely to yield meaningful cash flow benefits. This study examines whether analysts' cash flow forecasts encourage managers to enhance the firm's cash flow position through tax avoidance activities. We evaluate the change in cash tax avoidance after analysts begin issuing cash flow forecasts relative to a propensity score matched control sample of firms without cash flow forecasts. Consistent with analysts' cash flow forecasts encouraging tax avoidance that enhances the firm's cash flow health, we find a negative association between cash tax payments and analysts' cash flow coverage. Additional analysis suggests this association is driven primarily by strategies to permanently avoid rather than to temporarily defer tax payments and that increased cash tax avoidance activity represents a nontrivial component of the overall increase in reported operating cash flows after the initiation of analysts' cash flow coverage.

Many studies use GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) as a proxy for tax avoidance and assume that very low (high) ETRs represent the greatest (least) tax avoidance, yet ETRs can be affected by items unrelated to tax avoidance. Despite awareness of the potential limitations of ETRs versus other factors as a measure of tax avoidance, the literature lacks consistent evidence on the extent to which ETRs capture tax avoidance. We take a step toward filling this void using income tax footnote disclosures from 2008 through 2016 to investigate how well ETRs versus other factors capture cross‐sectional differences in tax avoidance. We document that ETRs below 5% and above 40% are significantly influenced by items largely unrelated to tax avoidance, such as valuation allowances and goodwill impairments. Truncating ETRs at zero and one, controlling for standard determinants of tax avoidance, and using industry‐size‐adjusted ETRs or multiyear GAAP ETRs do not eliminate the clustering of factors largely unrelated to tax avoidance in the tails of the ETR distribution. Cash ETRs attenuate but do not eliminate this clustering. Researchers can use ETR rate reconciliation data to construct an adjusted ETR that removes the influence of factors largely unrelated to tax avoidance. Our findings inform researchers about factors largely unrelated to tax avoidance that drive significant deviations in ETRs from the statutory tax rate. This is of increasing importance as the number of studies examining the consequences of very high and very low ETRs grows.