Abstract. This paper considers an intrafirm resource allocation model with a single principal and n agents. Each agent represents a division manager who uses a centrally provided input together with other inputs, including effort, to produce and sell final products. The principal represents an owner who is responsible for providing an input to the divisions. It is assumed that each agent (division manager) knows the local profit function for the division and has disutility for effort. The principal seeks to maximize firm‐wide profits net of the costs of the centrally provided input and compensation to the agents. In this setting, which incorporates divergence of preferences and asymmetric information, it is shown that the principal and the n agents can strictly improve their welfare by moving from a set of compensation functions that do not include any allocation of costs to compensation functions that are based on cost allocation. Résumé. Les auteurs se penchent sur un modèle de répartition des ressources intraentreprise en présence d'un seul mandant et de n mandataires. Chaque mandataire représente un directeur de division qui utilise un intrant, fourni par l'échelon central, en conjonction avec d'autres intrants, y inclus l'effort, pour fabriquer et vendre des produits finis. Le mandant représente un propriétaire à qui incombe la responsabilité de fournir un intrant aux divisions. L'on suppose que chaque mandataire (directeur de division) connaît la fonction de profit de sa division et a l'effort en aversion. Le mandant cherche à maximiser les profits globaux de l'entreprise, compte tenu des coûts de l'intrant fourni par l'échelon central et de la rémunération des mandataires. Dans cette situation, qui fait intervenir des préférences divergentes et de l'information asymétrique, l'on démontre que le mandant et les n mandataires peuvent strictement améliorer leur situation en passant d'un ensemble de fonctions de rémunération qui ne prévoient aucune ventilation des coûts à des fonctions de rémunération basées sur la ventilation des coûts.

We investigate the mechanism through which the Sarbanes Oxley Act ( SOX ) was associated with changes in corporate investment strategies. We document that the passage of the governance regulations in SOX was followed by a significant decline in pay‐performance sensitivity (Delta) and incentives to take risk (Vega) in CEO s' compensation contracts. These changes in compensation contracts are related to a decline in investments, including research and development expenditures, capital investments and acquisitions. Moreover, consistent with the rules in SOX directly affecting CEO s' incentives to take risk, we document that the decline in investments exceeds the amount that would be expected from changes in compensation packages alone. Finally, we also find evidence that the changes in investments are related to lower operating performances of firms, suggesting that these changes were costly to investors. Our evidence speaks to the debate on how corporate governance regulation interacts with firms' and managers' incentives, and ultimately affects corporate operating and investment strategies. Our study suggests that one indirect cost of such regulations in SOX is the significant reductions in corporate risk‐taking activities in the post‐ SOX period. The changes in investments were in part due to changes in executive compensation contracts and in part related to increased executives' personal costs of engaging in risky activities.

Abstract The recent financial crisis has brought to the forefront the need for companies to effectively manage their risks. In this regard, one approach that has gained prominence is enterprise risk management ( ERM ). Importantly, little is known about the link between ERM and the financial reporting process. This link is critical, because it is imperative that financial reporting adequately depicts the financial status (e.g., valuations, estimates) and associated risks of a company as revealed by ERM . Additionally, from an auditing perspective, ERM affects the risks of misstatement, which should impact audit planning. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to examine the experiences of audit partners, CFO s, and audit committee ( AC ) members (“the governance triad”) on the link between ERM and the financial reporting process. To determine whether members of the governance triad focus on monitoring, strategy, or both, we also examine their definition of and experiences with ERM with respect to agency and/or resource dependence theory. To address these issues, we conduct semistructured interviews of experienced individuals that form the governance triads from 11 public companies. There are three major findings from our study. First, importantly, all three types of participants see a strong link between ERM and the financial reporting process. Second, despite recognition of the broad nature of ERM , the predominant experiences of the actual roles played by triad members center on agency theory, while resource dependence may be relatively underemphasized by all triad members. Finally, CFO s and AC members indicate that auditors may be especially underutilizing ERM in the audit process, suggesting an “expectations gap.”

Abstract In this study, we examine the possibility that audit managers' judgments may be affected by practice development objectives. Given the competitive nature of public accounting, the extent to which auditors are inclined to be aggressive in the domain of practice development may be a function of their superiors' preferences. This study builds on the exploratory work of Hooks, Cheramy, and Sinich 1994 and Asare, Hackenbrack, and Knechel 1994 by examining the delicate balance that exists between a public accounting firm's need to “grow its business” and its need to maintain its objectivity and professionalism. An experiment is conducted to determine whether the auditor's willingness to tender a bid on an engagement is affected by (1) the nature of the auditor‐auditee relationship (i.e., do existing clients receive the same treatment as potential clients?), or (2) the audit partner's aggressiveness with respect to practice development, which also includes elements of ethics and competence. Seventy‐four audit managers from two Big‐Six firms participated in the study. The results indicate that the type of client (current or potential) and the type of partner (more or less aggressive with respect to practice development) significantly affected the auditors' judgments. Specifically, subjects in the “current client” condition, as well as those who are accountable to a more aggressive partner, are more likely to recommend bidding for the client. The experimental results of this study are based on a case where the client was proposing a relatively aggressive position with respect to accounting for research and development (R&D) costs. Our findings also suggest that the judgements related to bidding on the client are not independent of the auditor's willingness to accept the client's accounting treatment. These results also provide further evidence that the influence of accountability is important in the professional audit environment.

ABSTRACT The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.

Abstract There has been growing recognition in recent years of the importance of corporate governance in ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. The audit serves as a monitoring device and is thus part of the corporate governance mosaic. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various corporate governance factors, such as the board of directors and the audit committee, on the audit process. Importantly, there is little professional guidance on how auditors should consider such factors when formulating an appropriate audit strategy, and there has been only one prior study on this issue (Cohen and Hanno 2000). Because there are no current specific auditing standards that relate to the effect of corporate governance on the audit process, we conducted a semi‐structured interview with 36 auditors on current audit practices in considering corporate governance in the audit process. Reflecting on client experiences, auditors indicate a range of views with regard to the elements included in the rubric of “corporate governance”. Most significantly, auditors view management as the primary driver of corporate governance. The inclusion of top management in the “corporate governance mosaic” is inconsistent with agency theory's prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee management's actions to protect stakeholders. Auditors consider corporate governance factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and in an international context. Further, despite the attention placed on the audit committee in the academic literature, in the business community, and by regulators in different countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Australia), several respondents indicated that their experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. Implications for research and practice are presented.

ABSTRACT To test hypotheses about earnings management, many studies investigate managers' manipulation of real activities (real earnings management, REM). Tests using measures of abnormal REM hinge critically on the measurement of normal real activities. Yet, there is no systematic evidence on the statistical properties of commonly used REM measures. We provide such evidence by documenting the Type I error rates and power of the test of the REM measures commonly used in the literature. We find these measures are often misspecified with Type I error rates that deviate from the nominal significance level of the test, especially in samples of firms with extreme performance or firm characteristics. We also compare the specification and power of traditional REM measures with performance‐matched REM measures to see if the latter provide better specified and more powerful tests. While performance‐matched REM measures are not immune from misspecification in all settings, in general they are better specified under the null hypothesis (i.e., in terms of Type I errors) than are traditional REM measures. Comparisons of the power to detect abnormal REM reveal that neither approach, traditional or performance‐matched, is consistently more powerful than the other in terms of detecting abnormal REM ranging from 1 to 10 percent of (lagged) total assets. The absence of a dominant approach to measure abnormal REM leads us to recommend that future researchers report results using both traditional and performance‐matched measures, so that readers are able to clearly assess the reliability of the inferences drawn about the magnitude and significance of the abnormal REM documented in a given study.