Companies are strongly encouraged to implement whistleblowing programs to help detect and deter misconduct in organizations, but whistleblowers often face ostracism, as their coworkers are less willing to work with them (the whistleblower effect). Rewarding the whistleblower and protecting the whistleblower's identity are two highly recommended features of whistleblowing programs that aim to encourage reporting. Across two experiments, I examine the spillover effects of these whistleblowing program features on how willing employees are to work with their coworkers after reporting occurs. I find that providing a reward to the whistleblower exacerbates the whistleblower effect, leading employees to work even less with the whistleblower (the reward effect). I also find that protecting the whistleblower's identity removes the reward effect but does not remove the whistleblower effect. Instead, the whistleblower effect is extended to neutral coworkers. As a result, when employees do not know the identity of the whistleblower, they view their coworkers less as separate individuals and are less willing to work with everyone in their group.

We investigate whether foreign tax holiday participation among US multinational companies is associated with offshoring US jobs and other domestic investment activities. We find that foreign tax holiday participation is associated with (1) an increase in offshoring US jobs and (2) a decrease in domestic investment, as proxied by changes in the number of employees, capital expenditures, and R&D activity. Furthermore, we find evidence suggesting that the association between targeted, temporary tax incentives provided by foreign tax holidays and firms' domestic activities is stronger among firms with a smaller foreign presence and is distinct from the impact of foreign statutory tax rate changes. Overall, the results of this study increase our understanding of the firm‐level consequences of foreign tax holiday participation, the influence of various tax incentive structures on the allocation of firm resources, and the potential consequences of international tax competition.

Research has long recognized that institutional investors possess significant information processing advantages. Yet even these investors face limited‐attention constraints, implying that periods of distraction may attenuate their advantage. We examine the effects of a plausibly exogenous shock to institutional attention arising from the annual buy‐side‐focused Equity Research and Valuation (ERV) conference for Chartered Financial Analysts on institutions' information processing at earnings announcements. Validation tests using conference call data indicate that fewer buy‐side analysts are present on earnings calls during ERV conferences and that questions are shorter, consistent with the presence of substitute or backup analysts. In our main analyses, we find that buy‐side analyst inattention reduces information asymmetry among investors and improves liquidity at these earnings announcements, consistent with theory, and observe similar results for non–earnings announcement events. In additional tests, we document slower price formation, but also more profitable retail trading, during these periods. Collectively, we provide novel evidence on the market consequences of institutional inattention during key information events.