This study investigates how transfer pricing risk affects the premiums in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Differences in the rigor of transfer pricing enforcement and the severity and clarity of rules across countries create differential risk of material costs for multinationals as they expand globally. We use 448 country‐level transfer pricing risk assessments by global transfer pricing partners and managers from two firms in 33 countries to develop a metric of country‐year transfer pricing risks. The resulting measure of transfer pricing risk is used to analyze the premiums of 3,103 cross‐border M&A from 2000 to 2012. We find that lower bid premiums are associated with higher transfer pricing risk in the target's country. We find the relation is stronger when expected future transfer pricing benefits are larger. Our results, consistent with the views of experts in the field, provide the first archival evidence that acquirers consider synergies created by future tax planning when estimating the value of a target.

A rich literature suggests that investor relations officers (IROs) fulfill a one‐way information intermediary role by transmitting firm information to investors. We advance this literature with empirical evidence suggesting IROs are two‐way information intermediaries who also return investment efficiency‐increasing investor feedback to firm insiders. Exploiting granular investor relations activity data for 1,375 global firms, we document that firm investment efficiency is higher when IROs spend more time with existing institutional investors, conduct more institutional investor outreach, and meet more often with investment professionals (market intelligence collection), and when IROs transmit investment community feedback to board directors (market intelligence circulation). We mitigate endogeneity concerns stemming from our association tests by employing an expansive suite of control variables, a high‐dimensional fixed‐effects structure, an entropy‐balanced estimation sample, and an instrumental variables analysis. Our evidence supports theory predicting that managers learn about investment opportunities and their costs and benefits from investors and informs a literature predominantly characterizing IROs as one‐way information intermediaries.

Using a survey of tax executives from multinational corporations, we document that some firms set their transfer pricing strategy to minimize tax payments, but more firms focus on tax compliance. We estimate that a firm focusing on minimizing taxes has a GAAP effective tax rate that is 6.6 percentage points lower and generates about $43 million more in tax savings, on average, than a firm focusing on tax compliance. Available COMPUSTAT data on sample firms confirm our survey‐based inferences. We also find that transfer pricing‐related tax savings are greater when higher foreign income, tax haven use, and R&D activities are combined with a tax minimization strategy. Finally, compliance‐focused firms report lower FIN 48 tax reserves than tax‐minimizing firms, consistent with the former group using less uncertain transfer pricing arrangements. Collectively, our study provides direct evidence that multinational firms have differing internal priorities for transfer pricing, and that these differences are strongly related to the taxes reported by these firms.