Auditors frequently use valuation specialists to help them evaluate fair values, but researchers and regulators know little about how auditors use these specialists. Based on interviews with 28 auditors and 14 valuation specialists, I develop a theoretical framework informed by expert systems and professional competition theories. The interviews suggest that institutional pressures in the fair value environment unevenly impact auditors and specialists, causing tension between auditors' needs for ontological security and jurisdictional claims. This tension leads to one‐sided competition between auditors and specialists and incomplete acceptance of specialists' work. Auditors' competitive behaviors coupled with this incomplete acceptance result in a tendency to make specialists' work conform to auditors' views. Collectively, these findings suggest that auditors use specialists as an institutional mechanism to create comfort, but not insight. This study links expert systems and professional competition theories, and it provides critical insight into some assumptions underlying tenets of each theory. It also informs researchers, regulators, and practitioners interested in understanding and addressing problems related to the use of specialists.

Regulators and researchers provide evidence that auditors' judgment quality is problematic in complex audit tasks. We introduce a framework for improving auditor judgment in these tasks. The framework builds on dual‐process theory to recognize that high‐quality judgment in complex tasks requires that auditors (i) possess the knowledge needed for the task, (ii) recognize the need for analytical (versus heuristic) processing, and (iii) have sufficient cognitive capacity to complete the analytical processing. Based on the framework, we predict that auditors' need for cognition (NFC), a characteristic theoretically linked to recognizing the need for analytical processing, is associated with higher quality complex judgments. Analysis of 11 studies supports this assertion. We demonstrate the usefulness of the framework by predicting and finding that priming auditors with an accuracy goal improves judgments, particularly for lower NFC auditors, who are less likely to spontaneously engage in analytical processing. The framework facilitates systematic development of interventions to improve auditor judgment by highlighting that solutions should address the specific conditions causing judgment problems.

Auditors and regulators have invested heavily in improving audits of estimates in recent years, but problems in this area persist. We examine the causes of these problems and why they persist. To do so, we interview 24 very experienced auditors about how they audit complex accounting estimates such as fair values and impairments and what problems they experience in the process. We find that auditors overwhelmingly choose to audit the details of management's estimate rather than use other allowable approaches. The steps auditors describe and the language they use to describe those steps indicate that they follow a process of verifying individual elements of management's assertions on a piecemeal basis, resulting in overreliance on management's process, rather than engaging in a critical analysis of the overall estimate. The problems that auditors identify are consistent with this view, and include failures to notice inconsistencies among the estimate and other internal data or external conditions and overreliance on specialists to identify, evaluate, and challenge critical assumptions. We interpret these processes and problems using institutional theory and identify two root causes: standards' and firm policies' emphasis on verifying management's model, and audit firms' division of knowledge between auditors and specialists. Institutional theory proposes these conventions arise from firms extending use of procedures that are legitimate in one area (i.e., auditing accounts without significant uncertainty) to a new area (i.e., auditing complex estimates), even though they are likely less effective in the new area. These conventions are reinforced by regulators' method of inspection and by firms' reluctance to change methods without a prompt to change to a clearly better method. We argue that these institutionalized conventions thwart auditors' good‐faith attempts to engage in skeptical analysis of estimates. Thus, audit quality problems are likely to persist.