Focusing on mandatory partner rotations, we examine the importance of within‐firm network connections to the selection of successor partners and the impact of those connections on post‐rotation audit performance. Using data from China, we track partners' history and identify incumbent‐successor connections stemming from jointly conducted prior engagements. Although these connections can enhance incumbent‐successor information transfers and thus post‐rotation audit performance, they may also pose a threat to quality by compromising the successor's independence. Among the pool of replacement candidates, we find that individuals with stronger connections with the incumbent are more likely to be appointed as successors. This finding is more pronounced when the audit engagement is more complex, client‐specific knowledge is not readily available to the succeeding partner, and the engagement is more valuable to the audit firm. We also document that successor‐incumbent connections are associated with equal or better post‐rotation audit quality and fewer client defections. These results suggest that the benefits of network‐based successor selection may outweigh its costs. By enriching our understanding of the partner transition process, this study contributes to the public policy discourse on partner rotation.

Although recent evidence suggests that individual audit partners explain a substantial portion of the variation in audit quality proxies, much less is known about what determines an audit partner's quality. Psychology and behavioral economics theories hold that an individual's experiences can have enduring impacts on subsequent behavior. We examine whether auditors' direct exposure to Arthur Andersen's collapse has a long‐term impact on the quality of their audits. Our evidence implies that audit partners who directly experienced Andersen's demise impose stricter monitoring evident in their clients exhibiting a lower propensity for misstatements and small profits, and paying higher audit fees. Importantly, these findings reconcile with research in finance and economics implying that firsthand experiences matter more to subsequent behavior than general economic conditions or secondhand or thirdhand experiences. Collectively, the results shed light on one facet of how partners' audit quality evolves over time. Our findings suggest that major failures associated with the audit firm in which an auditor works can ultimately result in these affected individuals later delivering higher audit quality, which should benefit audit committees in partner selection decisions and audit firms in designing partner assignment policies.