Abstract This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non‐Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross‐sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non‐Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non‐Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non‐Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5‐2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non‐Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.

Abstract We examine the 49 Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 firms that voluntarily disclosed in their 1993 proxy statements, the composition of the comparison group used by each board's compensation committee to set executive compensation policies. We hypothesize that the net benefits of this disclosure are largest when (1) there is a high degree of stakeholder concern about compensation, (2) compensation policies are defensible, and (3) corporate governance is strong. Consistent with our stakeholder concern prediction, disclosing firms have higher compensation levels and are more apt to have received prior shareholder proposals about executive compensation. Contrary to this prediction, we find a negative association between financial press coverage of compensation policies and the probability of disclosure. Additionally, the disclosure decision is unrelated to the defensibility of compensation policies and the firm's corporate governance profile. Industry‐adjusted firm performance, managerial entrenchment, CEO tenure, institutional holdings, and compensation committee independence variables are insignificant. We also compare the financial performance and compensation practices of compensation peers to two yardsticks — performance and pay practices at the sample firms and the corresponding S&P industry index firms. The compensation levels of compensation peers exceed those of the firms in the corresponding S&P industry indexes. Because (1) compensation levels and performance sensitivities at sample firms are more similar to those at compensation peers than to those at S&P industry index firms, and (2) the superior financial performance and higher performance sensitivities of disclosing firms justify high pay, this evidence suggests that the compensation peers of disclosing firms are an appropriate comparison group.

Abstract Rank transformation of observations has been shown to be useful in linear modeling because the models so constructed are less sensitive to outliers and/or non‐normal distributions than are models constructed using standard methods. In the present study, we apply rank transformations to financial ratios to improve the predictive usefulness of standard failure prediction models. Kane, Richardson, and Graybeal (1996) have shown that failure prediction can be improved by conditioning accounting‐based statistical models on the occurrence of recession. Our results suggest that rank‐ transformed data models show additional improvement in prediction without the added cost of having to predict recession for the companies undergoing testing for potential failure.