We study the influence of perceived auditor quality on investment decisions by bond mutual fund investors. Audits of bond mutual funds require significant auditor expertise. Fund managers estimate daily the fair market values of holdings that are often opaque and illiquid. Managers can use their discretion to manipulate their fund's performance results. While it is known that investment flows into funds that report good past performance, little evidence exists about whether investors' confidence in the reliability of fund financial reports is influenced by auditor quality. Using hand‐collected data from SEC filings, we find that the positive association between reported performance and investment flows is stronger for funds with auditors who are industry specialists and are longer‐tenured, as well as for funds that pay higher audit fees. We do not find that auditor office size strengthens the association. We also find that the presence of industry‐specialist auditors, long‐tenured auditors, and higher audit fees lead to additional disclosure in the form of emphasis‐of‐matter. This study contributes to the streams of research investigating perceived audit quality, fund investment decisions, and auditing for financial services.

Prior research finds that investors respond more favorably to a disaggregated earnings forecast than to an aggregated one. The present study examines whether this initial favorable effect on investors’ decisions leads to investors giving management the benefit of the doubt, or backfires in the event of a subsequent earnings surprise announcement. The results of our experiment indicate a “backfire effect” consistent with Expectation Violation Theory. We find that investors’ negative reactions to an earnings surprise are stronger if they first observed a disaggregated forecast than if they first saw an aggregated forecast. The largest downward adjustment in investment interest occurs when the disaggregated forecast is later found to be overstated. This study provides evidence of the complexity of the effect of disaggregated earnings forecast and adds to the literature concerning the costs and benefits of accounting information disaggregation.

During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or even eliminates the improvements in audit committee effectiveness resulting from independent and financially expert committee members. Thus, CEO power may result in an audit committee that appears effective in form but is not in substance. We construct a composite index for CEO power by combining ten CEO characteristics and employ the incidence of internal control weaknesses as a proxy for audit committee monitoring quality. Since all the firms in our sample have completely independent audit committees, we use financial expertise to examine the impact of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness. We find that, when CEO power is low, audit committee financial expertise is negatively associated with the incidence of internal control weaknesses. However, as CEO power increases, this association monotonically weakens. When CEO power reaches a sufficiently high level, this association is no longer negative. The moderating effect of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness is more prominent when the CEO extracts more rents from the firm through insider trading. Our results are not driven by the CEO 's involvement in director selection. Our paper suggests that more expert audit committees in form do not automatically translate into more effective monitoring. Rather, the substantive monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is contingent on CEO power.

Downside risks are ubiquitous and can profoundly impact firm operations and valuation. Failure to adequately assess and manage target firms' downside risks hinders acquirers' ability to integrate and manage these businesses. This article introduces a novel measure of firms' downside risk similarity (DRS) based on risk factor descriptions and examines its implications for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) outcomes. We first validate that the measure is distinct from existing similarity measures and that it captures similarity in firms' potential significant downside. Using the new measure, we find that the market reacts more positively to deals in which acquirers and targets share more downside risks. Additional analyses show that this beneficial effect of DRS is driven primarily by risks that are idiosyncratic or firm‐specific, consistent with these risks requiring acquirers' relevant expertise to manage. Last, we document that in deals with more similar downside risks, the acquirers experience fewer risk profile changes and are less likely to suffer from adverse outcomes, such as deal‐specific goodwill impairment, divestitures, and significant profitability declines. Overall, we conclude that DRS plays a significant role in the M&A process.

Enforcement of non‐compete agreements could affect executives' and directors' incentives to profit from their information advantage. This is because excessive trading profits could result in job termination, which would trigger the restrictions imposed by the non‐compete agreements. We find that executives' and directors' insider trading profits from sales are lower for companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements. The path analyses suggest that high enforcement of non‐compete agreements disincentivizes managers to profit from their information advantage to avoid the possibility of job termination and the cost of job terminations. We also find that insiders in companies headquartered in states with greater enforcement of non‐compete agreements are less likely to exploit their information advantage by timing their sales before unfavorable corporate earnings announcements. The results suggest that enforcement of non‐compete agreements reduces executives' and directors' incentives by imposing costs on future outside employment opportunities.

In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting revenue following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in the pre‐ and post‐SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.

In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.

International standards encourage auditors to consider regulatory factors and external parties during the risk assessment process. One such external party is the taxation authority, which monitors corporate conduct and uses the threat of tax audits to constrain managerial opportunism. This study examines whether tax enforcement influences auditors' perception of the risk of material misstatement on their engagements. Using a sample of companies listed on European exchanges, we assess the strength of tax enforcement at the country level based on the number of full‐time equivalent (FTE) employees in the tax audit and verification function relative to the size of the economy. Since auditors of these European listed companies must publicly disclose key audit matters (KAMs), we use the number of KAMs to capture auditors' perceptions of client‐level misstatement risk. Our results indicate that auditors report fewer KAMs in the presence of more FTEs in the tax audit and verification function. In cross‐sectional tests, we find that this negative association is stronger in settings where auditors are more inclined to incorporate the monitoring potential of the tax authority into their risk assessment, such as in countries with high book‐tax conformity and for auditors with greater exposure to complex tax issues. These findings offer new insights into the role of tax enforcement in auditors' decision‐making and have timely implications for accounting regulators and academics studying the determinants of KAMs.

The SEC has long asserted that earnings management practices result in adverse consequences for investors. We examine whether SEC oversight affects firms' accounting quality in terms of earnings management trade‐offs. We expect that increased firm‐specific regulatory scrutiny, in the form of an SEC comment letter, will induce management to switch from accrual‐based earnings management (AEM), which is a main focus of the SEC, to real‐activities‐based earnings management (REM), which is not likely to be commented on in the SEC's review process. Consistent with our predictions, we find that AEM is lower and REM is higher following the receipt of a comment letter, relative to non‐comment‐letter years and a propensity‐score‐matched sample of non‐comment‐letter firms. However, we do not find a significant difference in total earnings management (i.e., the sum of AEM and REM), suggesting that the higher REM acts as a substitute for lower AEM activity. We further find that our results are driven by accounting comments relating to estimates and accruals and not by classification‐only comments, which suggests that a comment letter that does not question specific issues associated with estimates and accruals is not a strong enough signal to induce the firm to change earnings management behavior. Additionally, the shift to REM is attenuated for firms with high institutional ownership. These results collectively suggest that the comment letter process effectively constrains AEM but has the unintended consequence of firms, on average, switching to REM.

Motivated by prior literature on organizational identification and 23 semistructured interviews with a variety of US audit partners and directors, we examine whether the gender and ethnic diversity of an office's audit partners influences the retention of the office's audit professionals and the quality of the audits conducted by the office. Using hand‐collected data on US audit partners, we find that greater levels of (or changes in) diversity in office audit partners' gender and ethnicity are associated with lower (reduced) turnover among office audit professionals and higher (increased) office‐level audit quality. We conduct a path analysis based on the most common mechanisms highlighted in our interviews to provide further insight into the audit quality results. The results indicate partial mediation through increased retention, greater gender and ethnic diversity among office audit personnel, client continuity, and increased efficiency. Further tests reveal that the association with audit quality is incremental to, and distinct from, the effect of individual engagement partner characteristics and does not reflect client screening. The findings underscore the importance of gender and ethnic diversity among office audit partners to organizational outcomes and provide important practical implications for audit firms.