This study uses a confidential data set of firms assigned to the Internal Revenue Service's Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program to examine the effect of audit certainty on firms' tax reporting behavior. We first model the determinants of assignment to the program. Although the ability and incentive to avoid taxes are related to CIC assignment, we find that the IRS assigns firms primarily based on size and complexity. We then test whether audit certainty has a detectable effect on tax payments. Our results show that tax payments do not change when firms enter the CIC program, suggesting the CIC program does not have higher deterrence or enforcement effects relative to the IRS's standard selection and audit process for large corporations not included in the CIC program. However, supplemental analysis suggests that audit certainty does alter managers' expectations regarding future tax payments. Our paper provides new empirical evidence on the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority and has important implications for tax authorities as they consider the costs and benefits of certain audit programs.

This study examines U.S. auditors' observations of the PCAOB inspection process, and its impact on their work, in order to understand the current U.S. regulatory audit climate. Using 20 interviews with experienced auditors, we consider behavioral factors (e.g., perceived power of and trust in the PCAOB) that can impact the level and form of auditor compliance according to theory from the slippery slope framework on audit regulation (Kirchler et al. 2008; Dowling et al. 2018). Our participants described an audit climate with a powerful regulator. They reported that their desire to receive “clean” inspection reports has had a substantial impact on audit procedures and quality control. However, our participants do not appear to have high trust in the PCAOB, as they questioned aspects of the inspection process and its expectations. Accordingly, we conclude that U.S. public company auditors operate in an antagonistic environment in which auditors perceive the PCAOB has high coercive power. In other words, they comply due to fear of enforcement rather than agreement with the PCAOB's views on audit quality. Some auditors also indicated that they consider both the costs and benefits of compliance. Theoretical intuition implies that any future increases to perceived costs relative to perceived benefits of compliance could ultimately decrease the PCAOB's coercive power and reduce U.S. auditor compliance. Our findings have implications for regulators and researchers interested in understanding behavioral factors that may influence regulatory compliance.

This study investigates whether environmental risk affects the efficiency of negotiated transfer prices. We analyze a setting where the buyer faces environmental risk but the seller does not. From the risk‐neutral firm's perspective, the transfer should be made in our setting because the expected value of the buyer's profit is greater than the certain opportunity cost of the seller from the transfer. We develop hypotheses to predict that, as environmental risk increases, it becomes more difficult for buyers and sellers to reach agreement. Such difficulty reduces efficiency in terms of both firm profit and negotiation time. We test our hypotheses via an experiment in which buyer and seller dyads negotiate over the transfer of a resource at six levels of environmental risk. Results show that, as predicted, environmental risk decreases efficiency. Specifically, as environmental risk increases, the frequency of agreement decreases, thereby reducing expected firm profit. Further, environmental risk increases negotiation time for those dyads that are able to reach an agreement. Data suggest that the cause of the decreased efficiency is that buyers and sellers use different reference points for determining a fair transfer price and environmental risk exacerbates the effects of such differences.

Prior literature suggests that the market underreacts to the positive correlation in a typical firm's seasonal earnings changes, which leads to a post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) in prices. We examine the market reaction for a distinct set of firms whose seasonal earnings changes are uncorrelated and show that the market incorrectly assumes that the earnings changes of these firms are positively correlated. We also document that positive (negative) seasonal earnings changes in the current quarter are associated with negative (positive) abnormal returns in the next quarter. Thus, we observe a reversal of abnormal returns, consistent with a systematic overreaction to earnings, rather than the previously documented PEAD. Additional analysis indicates that financial analysts similarly overestimate the autocorrelation of these firms, although to a lesser extent. We also find that the magnitude of overestimation and the subsequent price reversal are inversely related to the richness of the information environment. Our results challenge the notion that investors recognize but consistently underestimate earnings correlation and provide a new perspective on the inability of prices to fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. That is, we show that investors predictably overestimate correlation when it is lacking, but underestimate it when it is present.

This article investigates whether investors respond to explanatory language (EL) added to unqualified audit reports. Although prior research finds an association between auditor EL and lower financial reporting quality, surveys suggest that many investors limit their attention to the unqualified nature of the opinion. We use three‐day abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume to measure investor response to EL in unqualified audit reports issued from 2000 to 2014. We find little evidence to indicate that investors respond to auditor EL at the audit report release date. In further analyses, we find that the lack of investor response is attributable both to incomplete investor reactions (55 percent of EL occurrences) and previous incorporation of EL (40 percent of EL occurrences). Overall, the results support policymakers’ initiatives to improve the usefulness of unqualified audit reports.

Reported deficiencies continue to persist in audits of fair value measurements and other complex accounting estimates (hereafter, “FVMs”), despite improvements in auditor performance observed by regulators. The persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs suggests that factors underlying this trend may be more complicated and multidimensional than previously suggested by regulators and academic research, which has focused largely on auditors' unsatisfactory performance as the principal source of reported deficiencies. Drawing from the judgment and decision‐making expertise literature, we gather field‐based data from audit experts to identify additional factors that are likely to be contributing to differences of opinion between audit and inspection experts and the persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs. We find evidence that audit experts interpret standards and evaluate audit evidence differently than inspectors, and thus perceive there to be a gap between what auditors and inspectors regard as sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support audits of FVMs (hereafter, “FVM gap”). Moreover, results highlight several areas in audits of FVMs where differences of opinion exist between auditor and inspector experts regarding what constitutes a reported deficiency. Within the contexts we examine, our results identify additional factors, beyond deficient auditor performance, that may contribute to the FVM gap. We also report audit partners' recommendations for ways to reduce the FVM gap and suggest avenues for future research. Gaining a more complete understanding of sources contributing to reported deficiencies will help regulators, standard setters, audit firms, and academics to identify ways to reduce the FVM gap and reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs.

This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.