We examine the relation between auditor tenure and a firm's ability to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts. We find evidence over the period 1988-2006 that firms with both short and long tenure are more likely to report levels of discretionary accruals that allow them to meet or beat earnings forecasts. These results suggest that while regulatory mandates for periodic auditor turnover have negative effects, sustained long-term auditor-client relationships may also be detrimental to audit quality. Further, although we observe a positive relation between tenure and the use of discretionary accruals to meet or beat earnings in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period, we do not observe such a relation in the post-SOX period. This latter finding is consistent with regulatory reforms and heightened scrutiny of financial reporting in the post-SOX period resulting in less aggressive efforts at managing earnings by client firms and/or increased diligence on the part of auditors. These findings may not generalize to firms that are not covered by analysts, because these firms do not face the same public pressure to manage earnings in order to meet or beat expectations. © CAAA.

Relatively few studies have examined the audit committee oversight process--the activities that link audit committee inputs and financial reporting outcomes. To study this process, we conducted extensive interviews with 42 U.S. public company audit committee members. We explore six audit committee process areas, offer insights into the state of audit committee processes in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) environment, and consider our results in light of agency theory and institutional theory; We find that many audit committee members strive to provide effective monitoring of financial reporting and seek to avoid serving on ceremonial audit committees, but within each of the six process areas we find evidence of both substantive monitoring and ceremonial action, such that neither agency theory nor institutional theory fully explains our results. We also find that many responses vary with personal and company characteristics, with particularly notable differences related to audit committee members' accounting expertise and time of appointment to the audit committee (pre-SOX versus post-SOX). We discuss implications and directions for future research and theory development.