We provide evidence that regulatory guidance aimed at improving audit efficiency and effectiveness—allowing auditor reliance on a multi‐location client's competent and objective internal audit function (IAF)—can unintentionally increase auditors' litigation risk. Our research is important in demonstrating how client characteristics and juror cognitive processing, such as the number of client locations and jurors' susceptibility to the numerosity heuristic, factors beyond auditors' control, can exacerbate their litigation exposure. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that susceptibility to the numerosity heuristic contributes to jurors assessing an increased likelihood of misstatement on multi‐location compared to single‐location audits. Furthermore, these assessments of higher misstatement risk on multi‐location audits lead jurors to perceive that auditor reliance on the client's IAF in multi‐location audits is less appropriate (i.e., not normal). Accordingly, jurors judge that auditors are more negligent when they rely on the IAF during multi‐location audits than when they do not, but IAF reliance does not impact auditor negligence on single‐location audits. Our results suggest auditor reluctance to use a qualified IAF, despite client pressure and regulatory allowance, can provide potential benefits to firms in terms of reduced litigation exposure. Thus, we demonstrate the legal regime can undermine the objectives of regulators' guidance to enhance audit efficiency and corporate governance.

This study examines how information about a corporation's tax minimization activities and primary operations jointly influence investor behavior. Prior research identifies fear of investor backlash as a primary curb on corporations' tax minimization. However, evidence for such reactions remains mixed. Drawing on the psychological framework of legitimacy theory, we predict and find that the interaction between operations‐level validity and tax‐level propriety influences investor behavior. For companies with lower perceived validity in their primary operations, perceived improper tax minimization elicits strong negative reactions from investors, while proper tax minimization partially compensates for a lack of validity. Conversely, companies with greater perceived operational validity are mostly insulated from negative reactions to tax strategies deemed improper. Thus, management concerns over the reputational risks of tax minimization may be misplaced in some contexts, as companies whose primary operations are more valued by society may be afforded more leeway in their tax strategies.

We examine how audit partners' geographic proximity to clients affects audit quality. We use hand‐collected data to show that approximately half of audit partners are assigned to clients headquartered more than 100 km away from the partners' home locations. Few of these partners relocate after receiving their assignments and, as a result, more than one‐third of clients are audited by partners who must commute long distances to visit the client in person. We explore this phenomenon by first modeling how distance affects partner‐client matching. We find that partners' geographic proximity to a prospective client is an important matching criterion, but also that trade‐offs are made when other partner characteristics such as industry specialization are more likely to be important. Next, consistent with our prediction, we show that audit quality is lower when partners reside farther from their clients. We corroborate our primary findings by showing that the association between partner distance and audit quality is mitigated when partners have access to direct flights to their clients' headquarters and when clients are geographically dispersed. Our paper should be informative for regulators, practicing auditors, and academics interested in how partner‐client matching affects audit outcomes.

In this study, we provide theoretical guidance for both analytical research and empirical research by considering how changing expectations of earnings affect a dishonest manager's strategy to overstate earnings and an auditor's strategy to exert effort in a two‐period setting. We expect our study's insights on changing economic conditions to help shape future research. We model the manager type as either honest or dishonest, which allows us to differentiate audit risk from audit effort. The key takeaways for future research are the insights on how changes in payoffs and expected earnings affect the associations that involve earnings overstatements and audit effort with audit risk and market price. For instance, researchers typically assume audit effort and audit risk are negatively associated, but we find the association can be positive when, for example, the auditor chooses a period 2 strategy based on the changes in period 1 game parameters. The results of our study provide two additional key insights on the design of future empirical tests. First, by dichotomizing, we show the importance of estimating the intercept in the market pricing equation when studying earnings quality, because market price also adjusts for expected bias through changes in the intercept. Second, our multiperiod setting demonstrates that the effects from a change in the manager's or auditor's incentives in period 1 may reverse in period 2. Empirical studies typically examine the contemporaneous effects of these changes on market price and/or audit risk but fail to identify the cross‐temporal effects we document in our study.