We examine whether a stock price spillover effect spreads through the method of listing or country of origin and whether this spillover effect changes when investor sentiment shifts. Using a sample of fraud allegations against Chinese companies that became public through Chinese reverse mergers (CRMs), we investigate whether firms that experienced negative spillover effects on their stock prices are those from the same country and/or with the same method of listing as the firms accused of fraud. We first show that the negative spillover effect channeled through the firm's country of origin becomes stronger when investor sentiment about Chinese companies becomes pessimistic, as evinced by significant declines in the stock prices of non‐fraudulent Chinese companies, including both CRMs and Chinese IPOs. Second, we show that the negative spillover effects on CRMs are stronger than those on Chinese IPOs and non‐Chinese reverse mergers, suggesting that both country and listing method are applicable to CRMs. Our findings indicate that (i) investor sentiment plays an important role in the spillover process involving fraud allegations and (ii) while the two channels could coexist, negative spillover effects that spread through the country of origin play a more prominent role than those that spread through the method of listing.

We develop parametric estimates of the imitation‐driven herding propensity of analysts and their earnings forecasts. By invoking rational expectations, we solve an explicit analyst optimization problem and estimate herding propensity using two measures: First, we estimate analysts’ posterior beliefs using actual earnings plus a realization drawn from a mean‐zero normal distribution. Second, we estimate herding propensity without seeding a random error, and allow for nonorthogonal information signals. In doing so, we avoid using the analyst's prior forecast as the proxy for his posterior beliefs, which is a traditional criticism in the literature. We find that more than 60 percent of analysts herd toward the prevailing consensus, and herding propensity is associated with various economic factors. We also validate our herding propensity measure by confirming its predictive power in explaining the cross‐sectional variation in analysts’ out‐of‐sample herding behavior and forecast accuracy. Finally, we find that forecasts adjusted for analysts’ herding propensity are less biased than the raw forecasts. This adjustment formula can help researchers and investors obtain better proxies for analysts’ unbiased earnings forecasts.

This paper examines how disclosures regarding internal controls, required by sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 ( SOX ), affect the market for corporate control. We hypothesize that acquirers with internal control weaknesses ( ICW s) make suboptimal acquisition decisions based on poor‐quality information generated by their ineffective controls over financial reporting. We expect that such acquirers will be more likely to misestimate the value of their targets or the potential synergies from mergers, thereby overpaying for completed deals. Using a treatment sample of acquisitions made by acquirers that have disclosed ICW s and two matched control samples without ICW disclosures, we document that ICW acquirers experience a substantially more negative market response to acquisition announcements and have lower future performance than the two matched control samples without ICW disclosures. Overall, our results suggest that ineffective internal controls hinder decision making related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

Using terrorist attacks and mass shootings as an exogenous source driving psychological changes in managerial sentiment, we explore the causal effect of managerial sentiment on firms' short‐term operating decisions. Employing cost stickiness to measure short‐term operating decisions on resource allocation and cost control, we find that firms located in the attacked metropolitan areas experience a significant decline in the degree of cost stickiness. We further find that the effect is more pronounced for firms that have inexperienced and less confident CEOs, when attack events are more salient, and when managers have lower prior exposure to negative events in their personal experiences. We also explore inventory management as another form of short‐term operating decisions and find that firms exhibit reduced asymmetric inventory management and a lower level of abnormal inventory holdings in postattack periods. Overall, our study suggests that shocks caused by exogenous negative events affect managerial sentiment, which in turn shapes managers' short‐term operating decisions.

This study investigates the association between managerial ability and cost rigidity. Cost rigidity refers to the relative proportion of fixed and variable costs. We expect that high‐ability managers will assess the potential upside congestion and downside default risks and choose an appropriate level of cost rigidity accordingly. Our results show that, on average, high‐ability managers tend to adopt a more rigid cost structure because they are more likely to realize favorable demand, and therefore, they retain higher capacity with more fixed inputs to alleviate potential congestion risk. We further document that firms with high‐ability managers will exhibit a higher (lower) level of cost rigidity when facing higher congestion risk (default risk). Our results are robust to using a propensity score matching method, a CEO turnover subsample, and alternative measures of cost rigidity and managerial ability. Taken together, this study suggests that firms' capacity management choices vary with the level of managerial ability.