We interview public company tax executives to provide new evidence on how corporate taxpayers experience and navigate the income tax audit process. Interviewees describe being “targeted” by “tax police” and having to “defend” their positions. Thus, we adopt a structural metaphor of tax audits as police investigations and use a framework from the policing literature to explain what influences taxpayers' perceptions of fairness during audits. Perceptions of fairness are important as targets of investigations are more likely to cooperate and accept outcomes when they perceive policing processes as fair. Tax executives aim to obtain fair and consistent treatment by compiling documentation, consulting with peers and external advisors, and educating tax agents. Audits are adversarial, however, and taxpayers also act strategically to secure favorable outcomes and appeal or litigate when they believe outcomes are unfair. Interviewees note variation in the extent to which tax authorities create frameworks that facilitate fair audit processes and whether tax agents implement these frameworks. Our study offers new insights into the tax audit process from corporate taxpayers' perspectives. First, public company taxpayers view tax audits as redundant to financial statement audits of their tax positions. Thus, tax audits may have limited scope to deter tax noncompliance. Second, tax executives are not passive actors; they take deliberate actions to shape audit outcomes. Third, audits are less efficient for everyone when taxpayers perceive them as procedurally unfair. Investments by tax authorities that increase perceptions of fairness may enhance audit efficiency by increasing taxpayers' cooperation and acceptance of outcomes.

We examine the effect of humanizing (naming) robo‐advisors on investor judgments, which has taken on increased importance as robo‐advisors have become increasingly common and there is currently little SEC regulation governing key aspects of their use. In our first experiment, we predict and find that investors are more likely to rely on the investment recommendation of an unnamed robo‐advisor, whereas they are more likely to rely on the investment recommendation of a named human advisor. Theory suggests one reason that naming a robo‐advisor may have drawbacks pertains to the complexity of the task the robo‐advisor performs. We explore the importance of task complexity in our second experiment. We predict and find that investors are less likely to rely on a named robo‐advisor when the advisor is perceived to be performing a relatively complex task, consistent with our first experiment, and more likely to rely on a named robo‐advisor when the advisor is perceived to be performing a relatively simple task, consistent with prior research on human‐computer interactions. Our findings contribute to the literature examining how technology influences the acquisition and use of financial information and the general literature on human‐computer interactions. Our study also addresses a call by the SEC to learn more about robo‐advisors. Lastly, our study has practical implications for wealth management firms by demonstrating the potentially negative effects of making robo‐advisors more humanlike in an attempt to engage and attract users.

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.